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Executive summary 
Economic Consulting Associates (ECA) and Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
(CEPA) have been engaged by ESMAP and the World Bank to prepare a policy 
paper for enhanced regional electricity trade involving the Economic Cooperation 
Council (ECO) countries.  
The study has reviewed the opportunities for increased electricity trade within the 
ECO region and exports outside the region, considered the types of trade that 
would be most likely to develop in the short and evolve over the medium and 
longer term, and made an assessment of the risks and obstacles to further trade 
development. Drawing on international experience of national and regional trading 
arrangements, as well as four case studies of regional trade, the study has reviewed 
the financing options including risk mitigation products, considered the 
requirements for good governance of international trade including dispute 
resolution procedures, and made an initial assessment of the proposed Tajikistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity trade project (TAP). Drawing on all aspects of the 
research, the final section of the report presents a roadmap for development of 
electricity trade in ECO. 
Trade opportunities and benefits 
The ten countries that together form the ECO include significant energy 
endowments and some fast growing demand centres with complementarities 
among energy usage patterns. Cooperation on energy trade both within the ECO 
region and with its neighbours could lead to high value economic gains and provide 
impetus to further regional integration. 
The region has internationally significant natural gas reserves around the Caspian 
Sea and in Iran (in addition to oil), large coal deposits in Kazakhstan and smaller 
reserves elsewhere, and considerable potential hydro-electric resources in the 
mountainous countries of Central Asia. The Central Asian countries also benefit 
from the presence of a number of partially completed generation projects, which 
favourably affect the economics of long distance trade from them.  
On the demand side, Pakistan is seeing annual electricity demand growth of as 
much as 7-8% and is now suffering supply shortages. Iran is also a large high 
growth country, currently averaging around 7% per annum, and although it has 
abundant fuel resources that could supply new domestic generation, it faces 
investment constraints and imports currently into the isolated eastern part of the 
country. Turkey also has fast growing electricity demand and is facing potential 
supply shortages. Outside the region, India has similar demand growth to Pakistan 
and current shortages and represents a very large potential export market. Also 
outside the region, western China, Russia and Europe are all potential destinations 
for energy from the ECO region.  
A number of energy trade opportunities are being considered across the region, in 
electricity as well as hydrocarbons. Among these are projects to transit natural gas 
and electricity from the resource-rich countries of Central Asia to the fast growing 
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and energy hungry economies of South Asia. In October 2006, a memorandum of 
understanding was signed among four governments interested in Central-South 
Asia electricity trade (the Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity project), with 
support from IFIs, including the World Bank, and potential project developers. 
Opportunities for trade within the region include many small scale bilateral trades 
utilising existing infrastructure or relatively modest transmission reinforcements.  
Strengthening the inter-connected grid has significant benefits (risk sharing, 
reduced reserve requirements, short-term trade opportunities and larger markets 
for private investors), but the main focus of this study is on the major projects which 
can be developed to export to the large, rapidly growing electricity markets in 
Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.  In this regard there are broadly two clusters of 
countries, each composed of predominantly exporting, transit or importing 
countries, with a further categorisation among exporting countries by fuel type: 
R East cluster consists of the following countries: 
R Pakistan (importing country with large, rapidly growing market) 
R Afghanistan (importing and transit country – existing 
interconnections with Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
the last two being strengthened, plus new 500 kV lines envisaged 
in TAP project)  
R Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (exporting countries – fossil fuel 
based generation)  
R Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan (exporting countries – 
hydropower based generation). 
R West cluster consists of the following countries:  
R Iran and Turkey (importing countries) 
R Turkmenistan (existing transit country) 
R Afghanistan (potential major transit country when 500 kV Herat 
line has been built) 
R Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (exporting countries – fossil fuel 
based generation). 
Recent gas price increases have a bearing on the relative economics of projects that 
may be carried out within many of the potential export markets. Both hydro power 
and coal generation have become relatively more attractive with the recent oil and 
gas price increases. A continuation of high gas prices will tend to enhance the 
attractiveness of the TAP project for exports to Pakistan. 
In addition to the TAP project, a number of hydro and thermal based projects could 
be financeable if the appropriate risk management and institutional support 
measures are taken. These further hydro generation in Tajikistan, coal fired plant in 
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Kazakhstan, the completion of the Talimadan gas fired plant in Uzbekistan. In 
addition, a gas-fired plant could be built at Bishkek in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Risks in cross-border electricity trade 
In the absence of a comprehensive framework of institutional arrangements, 
regulation and legal systems, there are high risks in cross-border trades, especially 
those involving third party transit countries. These can both raise the cost of 
financing and delay development, thus reducing the potential benefits of trade. 
Risks in electricity trade projects fall into three main areas: political and regulatory 
risks (country risks); commercial risks; and financing risks. These risk areas are 
inter-related, in particular by the state of the institutional, legal and regulatory 
frameworks for carrying out projects, as well as the legal system for enforcement of 
contracts.  
The availability of external finance and the cost of financing projects depends on the 
assessment of risks, in particular the country risk ratings. The study has noted high 
levels of country risk in many of the ECO countries and this, combined with 
relatively high commercial risks in cross-border trade projects, reduces the financing 
options for bilateral trade projects.  Private sector participation in financing will be 
unlikely for projects involving both high country risks and high commercial risks. 
The risks increase considerably when projects span more than one country and 
involve more than one major investment component, such as a power plant and 
cross-border transmission lines. Mechanisms to improve international coordination 
and cooperation are necessary to help manage these risks. Risk mitigation can be 
designed into the project itself, through careful planning and project structure, 
supported by strengthening the legal, governance and institutional capacities in the 
trading countries, or provided by third party risk insurers such as the World Bank 
Group. 
Once projects come to be implemented, the benefits arising from them will help to 
bolster specific risk mitigation instruments. Equitable sharing of the benefits will 
build constituencies in each country with a stake in cooperation in the electricity 
sector, and this will progressively provide an underlying environment promoting 
risk mitigation.   
Financing options in risky environments 
International and commercial financing institutions provide a range of funding and 
risk mitigation products. Their applicability to trade projects in ECO depends on the 
risk profile of the country(s) and the specific project. Commercially structured 
projects can, in principle, be funded with a blend of equity and debt. State utilities 
may finance new projects through taking on additional loans. Conversely, the 
private equity investor would typically look to engage in the development of a 
transmission and/or generation and transmission project by providing equity 
alongside a highly geared structure to maximise potential returns. This inherently 
more risky structure is not tenable within a high risk environment except at very 
high cost.  This limits the participation of the private sector as equity investors, but 
does not preclude other forms of private participation in electricity trade projects. 
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The higher the degree of political risk, the harder it will be to achieve any significant 
private equity stake, at least without significant guarantees as well as standard 
political risk insurance, which may not be available for all the countries. 
More complex arrangements are likely to be required for multi-country electricity 
trade, possibly involving ring-fencing of individual country components to separate 
the lower risk from the higher risk components.  
Governance of trade arrangements and institutional frameworks 
International projects have additional risks and complexity to domestic projects and 
therefore require a further set of rules on top of the national rules. A key concern of 
participants, and a test of the robustness of the governance framework, is the extent 
to which disputes are likely to be efficiently resolved through the structure of 
agreements.  
Two principle sets of rules will govern a cross-border electricity transaction or 
investment: inter-governmental agreements (IGAs) and private commercial 
contracts. The effectiveness of the contractual framework in reducing or mitigating 
risks will be influenced by a number of factors including the legal jurisdiction, the 
dispute resolution procedures, the enforceability of judgements (in different 
countries) and the creditworthiness of the parties (perhaps enhanced by 
guarantees). 
In projects involving PSP, the private parties will tend to prefer international 
arbitration to resolve disputes as it gives them greater predictability in the outcome 
which can reduce the project’s risk profile and hence lower the financing costs. A 
significant element of multilateral investment treaties such as the Energy Charter 
Treaty is that these treaties contain express consents by each State to the submission 
of disputes to international arbitration. 
The establishment of supportive institutional governance mechanisms and a 
transparent contractual framework consistent with international best practice can go 
a long way towards managing the wide range of risks in multi-country trade 
projects.   
Evolution of trading arrangements in the ECO region 
Trading arrangements in electricity markets tend to evolve from simple bilateral 
trades to more complex forms of multi-party and multi-country trading. The study 
has defined four main steps in the evolution of trading arrangements: bilateral trade 
between neighbouring countries; bilateral trade involving a third transit country; 
trade among synchronised national power systems; and multilateral trade within a 
regional pool mechanism. A further important distinction in terms of the risk profile 
of a project is whether it will mainly use existing facilities or require new investment 
in generation and/or transmission. 
In the ECO region trading arrangements in the short to medium term are likely to 
take the form of simpler bilateral exchanges and long-term PPAs. Multi-party 
trading (a regional pool) is likely to evolve from the initial establishment of national 
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competitive electricity markets to a regional market and additionally requires 
detailed rules for competitive cross-border trading and access to networks. The full 
evolution would typically take many years and is not an immediate prospect for the 
ECO region.  
Lessons from international experience of regional energy trade 
Four examples of regional energy trade were assessed to draw relevant lessons for 
ECO. They were chosen to reflect similar challenges to those in the ECO region, in 
particular the challenge of developing investment in new infrastructure:  
R The Nam Theun 2 hydro power, interconnection and trade project 
between Laos and Thailand,  
R The SIEPAC electricity transmission, regional market and trade project 
among six countries of Central America 
R The Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) to promote electricity trade 
among 12 countries in southern Africa 
R South Caucasus Pipeline constructed to transport natural gas from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia 
Each case presents a different but overlapping set of lessons for ECO and illustrate 
that it is possible to bring to market a large complex international energy project 
including new-build generation and transmission. At least two of the cases show 
that post-conflict environments are not necessarily a barrier to trade. Among the 
most relevant lessons are: 
R Strong political commitment is necessary to advance large projects and 
this is assisted by a favourable history of inter-governmental 
cooperation. It can be enhanced by creating powerful institutions at the 
regional level  
R The creation of a respected coordinating entity can serve to strengthen 
technical cooperation, act as a driver for integration, and provide a 
neutral forum for resolving disputes  
R The projects typically take at least a decade passing from the initial 
founding agreements to implementation and operation  
R The support provided by the external stakeholders such as the IFIs (eg 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank) is crucial to maintaining the 
momentum of project development and the resolution of critical issues.  
R The foundation of project implementation rests on legally enforceable 
agreements between governments. This may be by multi-country treaty 
or by bilateral inter-governmental agreements, or multi-lateral 
government agreements  
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R The creditworthiness of the main buyer is a prime consideration to 
reduce the payment risk to the project and facilitate financing of 
construction 
R The reduction of political risk through the involvement of international 
development institutions and their provision of risk guarantees is an 
important element in the financing package; a sovereign guarantee from 
a participating government is also usually a necessary risk reduction 
measure 
R Private sector participation can be an important component of the 
project, both for funding and operational expertise. This also improves 
the confidence of commercial lenders to the project 
The SAPP project, which has evolved rather slowly, also provides some negative 
lessons of aspects to avoid in ECO. 
The TAP project 
One component of this study is concerned with a more in-depth assessment of the 
TAP project. The project has considerable potential benefits but faces many 
challenges to become viable – from economic, political and security perspectives. 
The above lessons, both positive and negative, may be drawn on to improve the 
design and development of the TAP project. 
If Tajikistan and Pakistan shared a direct border there would still be significant risks 
in an electricity trade project. The involvement of Afghanistan as an unavoidable 
transit country adds a further level of major risks. Afghanistan would require 
extensive external support to establish the minimum necessary institutional 
development and security improvement to facilitate an investment project in 
electricity transit, and this will take time.  
Once the security situation in Afghanistan improves, many of the other project risks 
would be similar to those faced by regional trade projects elsewhere. The success of 
those projects shows that these risks can be overcome. Financial risk mitigation 
instruments will almost certainly be required for the financing. In addition, risk 
management efforts should focus on institutional development with involvement of 
external stakeholders, and ensuring inclusiveness and sharing of benefits within a 
long term development strategy to secure local population support. 
Roadmap for development of electricity trade in ECO 
The conclusions of the study have been summarised in a set of suggested steps that 
could be taken by the ECO countries and by external stakeholders such as the IFIs. 
These steps, and the associated timeframe for short to medium term 
implementation, constitute a simplified roadmap for trade development and its 
supporting institutional framework. The immediate prospects within ECO are for 
the strengthening of intra-regional trade within the CAR and of increased seasonal 
and base exports from both the west and east cluster exporters to Iran and Turkey.  
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Kazakhstan will be well placed to export to Russia and China once the North-South 
interconnector has been completed.  
Large-scale export projects from the west cluster countries to Iran and Turkey and 
from the east cluster to Pakistan will require the construction of new 500 kV 
transmission lines through Afghanistan. Such projects are longer term both because 
of the long lead times involved and the current security situation in Afghanistan. 
The evolution of electricity trade will be facilitated by the ECO countries, with the 
support of the IFIs and bilateral donors, working on strengthening the enabling 
environment for trade. The main areas on which the ECO countries can start work 
now are: 
R the investment climate - macro-economic conditions, legal framework, 
property rights etc 
R putting the electricity sector in each country onto a commercial basis, so 
as to offer creditworthy partners for trade projects 
R strengthening regional institutions, including creating new entities in 
the electricity sector to foster technical and regulatory cooperation.  
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1 Introduction 
Economic Consulting Associates (ECA) and Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
(CEPA) have been engaged by ESMAP and the World Bank to prepare a policy 
paper for enhanced regional electricity trade involving the Economic Cooperation 
Council (ECO) countries. The focus of this Final Report is on the arrangements for 
structuring international electricity trade, the risks inherent in cross-border trade 
and particularly trade in the region, and options available for mitigating the risks. 
The report identifies the trading arrangements, risk mitigation options and 
financing arrangements that are most likely to facilitate electricity trade in the 
region.  
1.1 Overview of study 
The objective of this study is the development of a set of recommendations and a 
roadmap for policy, institutional and regulatory measures to support the 
development of electricity trade among the ten member states1 of the Economic 
Cooperation Organisation (ECO) region (see Figure 1). These recommendations 
draw on international experience in developing regional trade in electricity, while at 
the same time taking account of the particular needs and state of development of 
electricity markets in the ECO region.  
Figure 1  ECO region countries 
 
 Source: ECO Secretariat web site - http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ 
The terms of reference (TOR, see annex A4) for the study require consideration of 
trade development among all of the ECO countries and their neighbours. The TOR 
also contains a particular emphasis on supporting the potential for exports from 
                                                     
1 Spanning the Middle East and Caucuses (Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan), and South Asia (Afghanistan and 
Pakistan). 
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Central Asia2 to South Asia (the TAP project). Specific export opportunities from 
Central Asia are: 
R Export of hydro power from the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan 
R Export of fossil fuel fired generation from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan 
The main potential import customers for Central Asian electricity are Pakistan, Iran, 
Russia and possibly China and Turkey (via Iran). Based on the experience of early 
trading in other regions, initial trade is likely to be on a bilateral basis, beginning 
with two types: 
R seasonal exchanges and peak time energy swaps to take advantage of 
seasonal supply and demand complementarities  
R some dedicated projects to meet bulk power purchase requirements 
utilising existing capacity.  
The TAP project would differ from the above types as it would require major 
investment in both generation and transmission. A key aspect of export to South 
Asia (less so for trade to Russia) is the need for new transmission capacity. In the 
longer term, these export opportunities may provide the basis for the development 
of a regional market. 
More broadly, the study will consider options for increased electricity trade from all 
the countries in the ECO region. The ECO region shares some characteristics and 
problems with other regions of the world (and for this reason the study includes 
some brief case studies – see section 7) but there are also particular features of ECO 
which need to be reflected in future arrangements: 
R Many of the countries of the region previously operated their power 
systems in coordination with Russia and other countries of the CIS. Both 
the infrastructure, and the institutions, that supported the trade are in 
‘disrepair’, though the legacy provides a starting point for some future 
arrangements 
R Energy rich countries of the region are already exporting some energy 
(electricity and gas) to countries outside the region and this is likely to 
grow in future3. In respect of electricity, the countries with the largest 
export potential are Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (in the western part 
                                                     
2 The five Central Asian countries, which have historically formed the Central Asian Power System 
(CAPS) are: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. However, 
Turkmenistan, which has chosen to isolate its electricity sector from the other CAPS countries, is often 
excluded from discussion of CAPS. 
3 The region includes major natural gas reserves in Central Asia and in Iran and Azerbaijan, and large 
coal reserves particularly in Kazakhstan. All the gas-rich countries either are exporting or intend to 
export to Europe (in some cases through the Russian pipeline system, as for Turkmenistan presently). 
There are also plans to export oil and gas to the East Asian markets, and ongoing discussions around 
pipelines to take gas to the markets of South Asia and onward by sea.  
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of the region) and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan (in the eastern part of the region).  Besides markets within 
ECO (as the regional electricity interdependence grows), external 
markets are principally Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, China and Russia. 
R The region contains conflict and post-conflict countries, and poorly 
developed legal, regulatory and commercial environments 
R Key transmission infrastructure is lacking, including interconnections 
between countries and internal transmission capacity within crucial 
transit countries (notably Afghanistan) 
R Major new trade will require new infrastructure, involving investment 
in multiple countries and jurisdictions; the risks are significant especially 
when more than two countries are involved and risk mitigation will 
require a range of new bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
The main elements to the work in this study are: 
R Identifying the options for trading arrangements that can be developed 
to support trade in the region 
R Identifying the legal and institutional arrangements required for 
differing levels of regional market development and how these can 
support the evolution from one stage to another.  
R Identifying the risks faced by electricity export projects, how to 
mitigate these through appropriate project structuring, and, in 
particular, how alternative market arrangements can contribute to this. 
This includes ensuring the enforceability of contracts and identifying 
mechanisms for dispute resolution. 
R Setting out options for financing electricity export projects and how 
these link to decisions on project structure. 
These strands of the analysis are brought together in the final chapter, which 
presentsthe conclusions of the study and a roadmap for the development of 
electricity trade in the region.  
1.2 Structure of the report 
The Final Report has a modular structure so it may be read through in full or 
approached in parts, depending on the reader’s intentions and interests. Several of 
the sections are self-contained, such as sections 6 and 7, and may be read 
independently of the rest of the report as background to the issues and experiences 
with international electricity trade. Other sections build on earlier parts of the 
reports (such as sections 8 and 9) and, while reading the referenced sections will 
give broad understanding of the discussion, readers may find it useful to jump to 
specific parts according to their interests.  
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The structure of the report, viewed in a modular form, is illustrated in Figure 2 
below.  
Figure 2  Report structure 
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The Report content is arranged as follows:  
R The basis for future trade is discussed in the following four sections: 
R Section 2 contains a summary of opportunities for trade in ECO 
and external export markets accessible to countries from the region 
R Section 3 covers generic risks related to international trade 
projects. These are referenced and expanded in subsequent 
sections of the report 
R Section 4 discusses the rules that govern international trade, 
disputes under those rules and options for dispute resolution  
R Section 5 considers the financing options open to international 
trade projects in countries and regions with the risk characteristics 
that prevail in the ECO region 
R The framework for developing various types of trade is described in 
sections 6 and 7: 
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R Section 6 describes four generic types of international electricity 
trading arrangements that together encompass a transition from 
simple to complex arrangements. The descriptions include the 
institutional requirements and risks and options for reducing risk  
R Section 7 presents four case studies of international trading 
arrangements, discusses the allocation of risk and approaches to 
risk mitigation, and considers lessons from each for the ECO 
region 
R The specific issues relating to opportunities in the ECO region are 
addressed in sections 8 and 9: 
R Section 8 provides an assessment of the proposed TAP electricity 
export project from Central Asia to South Asia  
R Section 9 draws on the opportunities for trade in section 2, 
typologies identified in section 6 and lessons from international 
experience in section 7 to provide a roadmap and conclusions for 
structuring electricity projects in the ECO region, including risks, 
risk mitigation, financing options and the role of the public and 
private sectors  
Further details on the international case studies and other supporting material is 
contained in the annexes.  
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2 Opportunities for trade 
The basis for future electricity trade in the ECO region is analysed in this report by 
considering four inter-related aspects: 
R The opportunities and challenges to trade between countries within the 
ECO region and with neighbouring countries 
R The analysis of risks in international trade  
R The equity structures and financing options for infrastructure 
investment to support trade, taking account of the risks 
R The rules that govern international trade, including the supporting 
institutional frameworks and dispute resolution mechanisms, designed 
to mitigate some of those risks 
We begin with a brief introduction to the first of these aspects, the opportunities to 
trade in the region. A more detailed assessment was provided in the Inception Report 
and which itself drew heavily on information in previous World Bank reports4. Our 
discussion includes an update from previous studies of the relative costs of 
competing generation options given changes in natural gas (and oil) prices during 
the past two years.  
2.1 Overview of opportunities 
At the aggregate level, the ECO region is well endowed with sufficient energy 
resources to meet current and projected future needs and is geographically placed to 
trade both surpluses and periodic shortages externally. In fact, the energy supply 
and demand balance in the region is such that trade is an obvious and, in the near 
term, the only path to unlocking the value of its significant energy resources: 
R Large energy sources are geographically separated from demand-
growth centres, in some cases by multiple international borders.  
R Seasonal hydro-electric production is asynchronous with demand in the 
generating countries, but is complementary to seasonal demand in other 
countries in the region.  
The region’s energy resources are summarised below, followed by a discussion of 
the potential trading countries and the infrastructure options to meet increased 
trade.  
                                                     
4 see Central Asia Regional Electricity Export Potential Study (REEPS), World Bank 2004 
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2.1.1 The regional energy and energy trade picture 
The ECO region contains countries that are relatively richly endowed in energy 
resources but have relatively low energy demand, and others that have high and 
growing energy demand but whose indigenous supply options are relatively 
limited.  
R The electricity demand and supply situation in the region may 
conveniently be divided into two clusters(east and west clusters) with 
each country having potential as a predominantly export, import or 
transit state. The east cluster (Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) is 
characterised by large and growing demand in Pakistan. Additions to 
capacity locally are struggling to keep pace with demand growth: 
imported electricity is an attractive alternative to domestic generation 
whether based on domestic or imported fuels. India also has a fast 
growing electricity system and could potentially trade with Central Asia 
via Pakistan in the future.  
R Low or no domestic demand growth is projected for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan 
R Kazakhstan by contrast is likely to experience some growth in demand 
(3% pa).  The completion of the north-south interconnector will greatly 
strengthen the national electricity system and will allow exports 
primarily to the north and east (Russia and China) but also to the south 
when periodic surpluses are available from the coal fired stations in the 
north 
R Large hydro power resources (both developed and potential) in 
Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, which provide the basis for these 
countries to become significant electricity exporters 
R Complementarities in timing of demand peaks and supply surpluses 
between countries, with winter peaks in Central Asian countries and 
summer peaks in South Asia and Iran: 
R The timing of the demand peaks in South Asia and Iran is 
complementary with summer surpluses from hydro generation in 
Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic 
R Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic face shortages during their winter 
peak 
The west cluster (Azerbaijan, Ira, Turkey and Turkmenistan5) is characterised by: 
R High rates of electricity demand growth in Iran and Turkey 
                                                     
5 Turkmenistan straddles the clusters and is placed in both 
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R Large fossil fuel deposits in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan which are set 
to become significant electricity exporting countries 
R Iran also has significant fossil fuel deposits, but requires electricity 
imports in part because of the seasonal fluctuations in demand 
identified above 
R Exports to meet the winter peak shortfalls in Tajikistan and Kyrgyz 
Republic are important so as to allow those countries to operate their 
hydro stations so as to minimise flooding and conserve water for 
summer irrigation in the downstream countries. 
Energy resources and demand  
Table 1 illustrates the rich gas reserves in the centrally located Caspian Sea 
countries, the significant coal reserves in the North and South of the ECO region, 
and the large hydro potential in the mountainous eastern area and also in Iran.  
Table 1  Major energy resources in ECO (reserves and potential) 
 Natural gas 
(tcf)
Coal 
(billion tons)
Oil  
(billion bbl) 
Hydro 
(MW potential,
developed)
Azerbaijan 1,370 76.0 
Kazakhstan 65-70 37.5 29.0 20,000 (2,000)
Turkmenistan 71 - 0.5 -
Uzbekistan 66 4.0 0.6 -
Tajikistan - 3.6 - 40,000 (4,000)
Kyrgyz Republic - 0.8 - 26,000 (3,000)
Iran 971 0.5 132.5 42,000 (2,000)
Pakistan 27 185.0 0.3 54,000 (6,500)
– indicates low or insignificant reserves.  
Sources: World Bank, BP.com 
On the energy demand side, the region has three high-growth centres in Pakistan, 
Iran and Turkey, as shown in Table 2. Pakistan is expected to experience worsening 
supply shortages for the remainder of the current decade and India also faces 
shortages now. On the other hand, in Central Asia only Kazakhstan is expected to 
see steady demand growth (around 3% per annum). Medium term growth in the 
other ECO countries is forecast to be low or flat6, except in Afghanistan which may 
see rapid growth (projected to be around 10% annually from the currently served 
level) but from a very low base. Outside the region, India is a very large and fast 
                                                     
6 See Central Asia Regional Electricity Export Potential Study (REEPS), World Bank 2004 
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growing potential market with existing supply shortages. The main demand centres 
and their projected growth rates are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2  Main electricity demand centres 
Main demand 
centre 
Existing total 
demand (TWh)
Projected annual 
growth rate
Current or projected 
supply shortage?
Pakistan 86 7-8% Now
Iran 145 7-9%
Turkey 120 7-8%
India 710 7-8% Now 
Source: World Bank, Energy Information Administration and TEDAS 
Central Asia as a whole has its annual demand peak in the winter (October-March). 
The largest seasonal demand swing is in Kyrgyz Republic, followed by Kazakhstan, 
while the other countries have a reasonably flat annual demand profile. Generation 
availability is seasonal in the hydro-dominated systems of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(79.5% hydro) and Tajikistan. These systems have excess generation capacity in the 
summer, due to the timing of water inflows and release regimes and, conversely, 
face shortages during the winter period when water release is restricted.  
In contrast to the Central Asian countries, Pakistan and Iran both experience their 
demand peaks in summer. It is estimated that there is 121 MW of suppressed 
demand at the peak in Afghanistan. Pakistan has developed about 12% of its 
potential hydro capacity (see Table 1).  Seasonality of this capacity leads to a 
reduced reserve margin during dry months.  
Among potential external trade partners, India is a very large and fast growing 
potential market. Russia’s demand is expected to grow by around 2.5% per annum 
to 2020. Although there is currently a capacity surplus in the Russian system, it is 
constrained by transmission bottlenecks and a number of large plants are nearing 
the end of their operating lifetimes. China’s Xingjian province is currently able to 
meet its demand through domestic production. However, with demand growth of 
8% per year and weak interconnections with neighbouring Chinese grids there may 
be an opportunity for increased export via Kazakhstan from Kyrgyz Republic 
(which currently exports around 5 GWh per year) and Tajikistan in the future. An 
export project would however need to prove its economic advantage over improved 
Chinese domestic interconnection, such as the 750 kV line announced as part of the 
11th 5-Year Plan (2006-10).  
2.1.2 Potential exporters and importers in Central and South Asia 
Within ECO, as already indicated, the group of countries that have greatest 
potential to develop electricity resources for export are the five Central Asian states. 
These are Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
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Uzbekistan. Electricity exports from these countries could be fuelled by the large 
reserves of natural gas, coal and hydro-potential.  
Figure 3 indicates the direction of potential increased cross-border electricity flows 
from the five Central Asian countries. The main potential export markets for this 
electricity are Pakistan, India, Russia, northwestern China (Xingjian), Iran and 
Turkey. Afghanistan is also likely to continue to import a large portion of its needs 
from its neighbours, although its demand is relatively small. A more stable and 
predictable contractual framework for existing imports from Iran, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan would be beneficial.  For the larger export markets, 
Afghanistan represents a potentially important transit country. The Central Asian 
states can also benefit from trade among themselves. 
Figure 3  Main trading opportunities in Central Asia 
 
  Source: World Bank, ECA graphic 
The World Bank has calculated that Central Asian electricity can be competitive in 
cost terms with marginal generation in potential export markets (see section 2.2 
below for an update of the estimated generation costs).  
Initial opportunities to gain from trade are likely to be trading peak energy at the 
margin to make more efficient capacity utilisation and to overcome winter shortages 
within the Central Asia7 region. Regional sharing of reserve would also allow 
individual country reserve margins to be reduced. Ancillary services are currently 
provided by the major hydro producing countries (Kyrgyz and Tajikistan) but these 
                                                     
7 The Central Asian states have existing interconnection capacity 
 
 
 
South Asia: Policy Paper for Regional Energy Trade, Final Report, March 2007  
Economic Consulting Associates, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Opportunities for trade 
 
18 
services are poorly priced. However, beyond these short-term trading opportunities, 
delivering higher volume trade to export markets will require large investment in 
new infrastructure.  For these projects to go ahead, ways of mitigating the 
associated risks will have to be found. 
Iran and Azerbaijan also have large hydrocarbon reserves. While these countries are 
yet to develop as significant electricity exporters, both are important exporters of 
energy in the form of natural gas and oil.  Besides the direct gains from any 
electricity trade which does develop, integrating the grids between the western 
cluster countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan) would provide the 
benefits of a larger, integrated network: sharing risks, reduced reserve margin 
requirements, opportunistic exchanges and a larger market area for private 
investors.  However, development of the interconnected grid is more likely to take 
place if there is the prospect of larger trade in the longer term. 
2.1.3 New supply options within the Central Asian Republics 
At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union there were a number of new 
electricity generation projects under construction in Central Asia. The major projects 
among these that are currently being taken toward completion are: 
R Northern Kazakhstan: Two new 500 MW coal-fired units at Ekibastuz 
are expected to be implemented between 2007 and 2011. There are also 
plans to rehabilitate the existing Ekibastuz I plant. The plant is owned 
by AES Energy, a private US company.  
R Uzbekistan: 800 MW Talimardjan I gas-fired steam plant (expected to be 
completed in the near future). A further three 800 MW units were 
planned and the facility could be progressively expanded with the 
addition of these. 
R Tajikistan: 670 MW Sangtuda I hydropower project. RAO UESR has 
formed a joint venture (holding a 75% stake) with the Tajik government 
to complete the project, which is expected in 2009.  
R Tajikistan: 220 MW Sangtuda II hydropower project. Iran has signed an 
MOU with the government of Tajikistan to develop this project on a 
joint venture basis. Output from the plant would be for export to Iran 
(and would need to transit either Turkmenistan or Afghanistan). 
R Kyrgyz Republic: 400 MW Bishkek II gas-fired CCGT plant. A new 
CCGT plant could be built on the site, which is largely prepared, using 
gas from the Tashkent-Almaty pipeline.  
In addition, there are large hydropower projects in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic that could be further developed in the medium- to long-term: 
R Tajikistan: 3,600 MW Rogun hydropower project. Part of Phase 1 
construction has been completed, but the project would need to 
overcome complex issues related to water sharing rights. 
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R Kyrgyz Republic: Kambarata I and II hydropower project. Kambarata I 
would be a 1,900 MW storage facility located upstream of the Toktogul 
reservoir8. Kambarata II would be a run of the river scheme located 
between Kambarata I and Toktogul (360 MW if Kamabarata I is built, 
240 MW on a stand alone basis). Construction of Kambarata II had 
begun and RAO UESR of Russia has provided assistance with feasibility 
studies into its completion. The storage capability at Kambarata I would 
have the advantage of overcoming the winter release restrictions on 
Toktogul. 
Given the low demand projections for the Central Asian region, it is likely that 
demand within the region outside of the winter period could be met with 
rehabilitation and energy efficiency initiatives. Each of the projects identified above 
would then be primarily for export outside the region.  
2.1.4 Possible future transmission lines for export from Central Asia 
The existing 500kV transmission system among the Central Asian countries (blue 
lines) and the main options for new high voltage transmission that could be built in 
the future to support large export from Central Asia (red lines) are shown in 
Figure 4 below.  
The map shows the existing 500kV system concentrated in the border regions 
between the five Central Asian countries (aside from the new line to Ekibastuz in 
Kazakhstan, which is discussed below). This was designed to allow operation of the 
Central Asia Power System in the Soviet era. In order to transport electricity to 
export markets beyond Central Asia the existing system would need to be extended 
with new transmission over significant distances.  
Afghanistan would clearly be a key transit country for exports to Pakistan and 
potentially also to Iran. Exports to Iran could also transit Turkmenistan by 
extending the existing line there. However, Turkmenistan has electrically 
disconnected itself from the rest of Central Asia, and distanced itself politically and 
economically in favour of closer ties with Iran. It could be that trade cooperation 
involving transit through Turkmenistan will remain difficult, further increasing the 
importance of Afghanistan as a transit route.  
                                                     
8 Toktogul is a multi-year regulating reservoir designed to smooth water availability for downstream 
irrigation across dry and wet years. It is located in and controlled by the Kyrgyz Republic, and plays a 
crucial role in supplying irrigation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  
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Figure 4  Options for future transmission to support trade from CA 
 Source: World Bank REEPS, 2004; ECA graphics 
Export to Pakistan: A line connecting southeastern Uzbekistan to northern Pakistan 
via a routing through Kabul in Afghanistan, as shown in Figure 4, would be around 
900 km long. There is a proposal for annual transmission capacity of 5 TWh on the 
Kabul section and 3 TWh on the Pakistan section. This project, known as TAP 
(Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan), is discussed further in section  8. This route could 
potentially extend to allow exports to India.  
Export to Iran: A potential line from Uzbekistan to Iran (Mashad), as shown in 
Figure 4, would be 1,150 km long. It would have annual transmission capability of 
10 TWh. Exports to Iran could also potentially transit further west.  
Kazakh grid interconnection and export to Russia: A 500 kV transmission line to 
strengthen the connection between northern and southern Kazakhstan is under 
construction. This could open the possibility of exports to Russia of surplus hydro 
electricity from the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. However, the expanded 
capacity may more likely be used for southward transfers from Northern 
Kazakhstan to meet demand in the south of the country9.  
Export to China: Exports to China’s northwestern province could be achieved by an 
interconnection with the existing grid near Almaty in Kazakhstan. 
                                                     
9 In this case, the development of the line appears contrary to open trade, which may have enabled 
Southern Kazakh demand to be met by imports from its neighbours, and more in step with the 
tendency to promote self-sufficiency.  
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2.1.5 Constraints to trade 
Constraints and barriers to trade development have two implications: they 
condition the types of trade that are likely to be successfully implemented; and they 
lead to the need to develop risk mitigation measures. Within the ECO region, a 
significant number of challenges exist to developing trade. These include: lack of 
infrastructure for transit, political and security issues, weak institutional and 
regulatory frameworks, complex issues around riparian water use and 
management, transmission access and pricing problems, including below-cost tariffs 
and low levels of payments being made for electricity. 
As an example, almost all of the constraints to trade are apparent in Afghanistan. 
This is a key issue for the region as Afghanistan’s geographic location makes it an 
important energy bridge for wheeling from Central Asian energy suppliers to the 
large potential markets in South Asia, including the proposed TAP project.  
The apparent cost advantage to Central Asian hydro (see section 2.2.3 below) faces 
two significant challenges:  
R The cost of transporting electricity from them may be significantly 
increased by transmission risks, such as the cost of providing security 
(this applies to non-hydro generation also) 
R Riparian water rights in the region have not been settled. This may 
result in higher costs (in the form of a risk premium passed to buyers) 
where there is a perceived risk of dispute over water use, and will delay 
development of some hydro-based projects 
The constraints to trade are further discussed in the following sections of the report. 
The issues in Afghanistan are specifically considered in section 8. 
2.1.6 Alternative energy transport options 
Energy export projects to deliver electricity to customers should demonstrate their 
economic competitiveness with alternative energy forms. In the ECO region, the 
main option to transporting electricity is to transport natural gas and use it for 
electricity generation closer to demand. The relative economics of electricity vs. 
natural gas transport depends to a large extent on the costs of the transmission 
infrastructure and the energy losses incurred in transport, both of which are related 
to the distance.  
There are a number of proposed gas export projects from the gas rich countries of 
the ECO region and for gas imports to the growing energy demand centres in the 
region, on its borders and further afield. These include: 
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R A proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP10) gas pipeline 
(see Box 15 for more details) has been under discussion for several years. 
India has expressed interest in receiving gas from the project. 
R India and Iran have signed an MOU to develop a proposed Iran-
Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Three possible routes have been suggested, 
including two offshore that would bypass Pakistan. This project has the 
benefit of not requiring transit through Afghanistan, although an 
overland route would need to transit areas of unrest in western Pakistan 
R Another proposed pipeline project would bring gas to Pakistan from 
Qatar 
R A proposal exists to develop a trans-Caspian pipeline to take Turkmen 
gas west to the markets of Europe 
R Both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have been pursuing possible export 
pipeline opportunities for natural gas and oil to China, Korea and 
Japan.  
Transporting natural gas has a physical security advantage over electricity 
transmission since the pipelines can be buried. However, meshed electricity 
transmission networks are more robust than a single pipeline as there are alternate 
paths to transport energy. 
The comparison of the economics of transit of electricity or gas (for subsequent 
conversion to electricity using similar technology) rests on two different factors: 
R The comparative costs of gas and electricity transportation over different 
distances and volumes 
R The comparative prices of gas in the two locations, taking account of 
transit fees and how much economic rent is captured by the transit 
countries. 
If the latter factor is set aside, transportation costs would be the main consideration, 
although the breakeven point (distance, volume) is likely to differ for different gas 
prices, due to the value of electricity losses. 
Since gas pipelines have major economies of scale for carrying larger volumes of 
energy, and loss rates are constant with distance (whereas electricity loss rates 
increase with distance), gas transportation tends to become more economic than 
electricity with larger volumes and longer distances. As a very rough guide, the 
economics of transmission tends to favour gas for distances greater than around 
1000 km, and volumes above 5-10 bcm/yr. For example, a recent study11 of 
                                                     
10 Confusingly, this project which has been under discussion for many years is also known under the 
acronym TAP 
11 ‘Study of Electricity Trade Potential in the Black Sea Region’, Economic Consulting Associates Ltd 
for World Bank, February 2006 
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electricity transmission and trade among the Black Sea region countries found that 
for distances of 1000 km electricity transmission would be more economic at 
volumes below 5000 MW (roughly 7 bcm of gas pa). For larger volumes of energy of 
13000 MW (16-18 bcm pa) gas pipelines would be economic at distances down to 
500 km, with electricity being economic for shorter distances. Gas pipelines become 
increasingly economic at longer distances above 1000 km.  
2.2 Costs of new generation projects 
The comparative cost of generation between the exporter and the importer is the 
main driver for trade. The cost difference must be large enough to compensate for 
the cost of transport. The latter depends on distance and on whether existing 
transmission infrastructure can be used or new investment is required. The cost 
differences must also be robust enough to have a reasonable expectation of 
persisting over the medium to long term, especially where the financing of new 
investment is involved. 
Allowing for the cost of transmission, several of the potential new generation 
projects in Central Asia mentioned in 2.1.3 above may be economic as export 
projects. These potential plants include two new gas-fired projects (including two 
stages at Talimardjan), which could serve exports to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. 
Calculations of the relative economic costs of the plants have previously been made 
and compared against the marginal generation cost in the potential export 
markets12. Previous estimates suggest the Talimardjan I (gas-fired plant in 
Uzbekistan) and Sangtuda I (hydro project in Tajikistan) are least cost for export to 
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. In addition to lower economic costs, an advantage 
of these projects compared with the larger hydro options is that they do not require 
riparian agreements.  
Gas prices in market economies have approximately doubled over the last two 
years13, through their linkage to the international oil price. Although gas producer 
and transit countries have historically benefited from preferentially lower gas 
prices, this situation is rapidly changing as gas price increases are being 
implemented very widely. The rising gas price is likely to have affected the relative 
costs of the new generation options in Central Asia, particularly those fuelled by gas 
compared to hydro, and potentially changed the ranking of viable export projects, 
                                                     
12 see World Bank REEPS report 
13 Another factor affecting gas prices from the region is the development of the gas market and 
infrastructure to bring gas to market. In particular, the Caspian Sea region, in which Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan all have gas reserves, has seen ongoing development toward linking it 
to international markets. Russia has recently signed new gas import contracts with both Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan, in furtherance of its aim to provide the main channel for Caspian gas to Europe. 
The recent prices have reportedly been around $100/mcm; 2 years ago Turkmenistan was receiving 
$30-50/mcm. Border gas prices in Turkey, which is soon to start receiving gas from Azerbaijan, are 
now approaching $250/mcm (Azeri gas will be capped at a significantly lower price for the initial 
contract). 
 
 
 
South Asia: Policy Paper for Regional Energy Trade, Final Report, March 2007  
Economic Consulting Associates, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Opportunities for trade 
 
24 
possibly making some non-viable (and vice versa). In contrast with gas, coal prices 
have not seen the same increases.  
We have calculated the average incremental cost of three gas-fired generation 
options taking into account recent increases in gas prices14. These generation options 
are Talimardjan I and II in Uzbekistan and Bishkek II in the Kyrgyz Republic. We 
begin with a discussion of the gas price assumptions.  
2.2.1 Gas price scenarios 
The historical relationship between oil, gas and coal prices is shown in Figure 5. 
While gas price trends have followed oil prices (with a slight dampening of rises 
after 2004) coal prices have moved more independently, particularly after 2004.  
Figure 5  Trends in international oil, gas and coal prices 
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Source: EIA historical data, World Bank commodity forecasts 
Gas prices in the Western European spot market are now around $250/mcm. 
Applying a similar percentage discount as was used in previous estimates to 
account for the isolation of Uzbekistan from international markets (see footnote 15) 
gives a price for Uzbek gas of $140-180/mcm.  
An alternative price indication is given by recent rises in the price of Turkmen gas 
and the preferential prices charged for Russian gas to neighbouring states.  
In September  2006 Turkmenistan announced a renegotiated price for sales to Russia 
of $100/mcm (the previous prices had risen from $30 to $65/mcm in recent years). 
During the past year, Gazprom has increased the prices it charges to a number of 
                                                     
14 The assumptions on other investment and operating costs and plant characteristics are the same as 
those used in REEPS. 
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FSU countries, indicating that in future prices may converge toward those paid in 
Western Europe. In January 2006, the price to Ukraine was increased to around 
$95/mcm using a formula that bundles Russian gas priced near Western European 
levels (around $230/mcm) with lower priced Turkmengas (under the contracts 
terms at the time). The price will increase further in 2007. Other transit countries are 
also experiencing gas price rises. Georgia has agreed to an increase from $110/mcm 
to $235/mcm in 2007. Even Belarus is now under pressure from Russia to have its 
gas price increased from $46 to $105/mcm. 
The increased Turkmen price and changes in international gas markets suggest that 
$100/mcm is a reasonable low case assumption for the long-term price of Uzbek 
gas. We have also considered the effect of $150/mcm and $200/mcm, allowing for 
further convergence to the international price.  
2.2.2 Cost of new gas-fired generation options 
The results of the cost calculations for new generation using higher gas prices in a 
range reflective of recent and possible future prices are given in Table 3 below, 
along with the low gas price range used in earlier cost estimates15. Prices are in 2004 
dollars.  
Table 3  Costs of new generation options 
   Economic cost (cents/kWh) at various gas 
prices 
Project Capacity 
(MW) 
Financial
Cost 
(c/kWh)
$35-
40/mcm
$100/mcm $150/mcm $200/mcm
Talimardjan I 800 2.44 1.68 3.79 5.41 7.03
Bishkek II 400 3.24 2.55 4.01 5.15 6.30
Talimardjan II 2,400 1.75 2.76 4.87 6.49 8.12
Source: World Bank REEPS, 2004 and ECA calculations with updated fuel prices.  
Stated gas prices are for Uzbek gas and apply to the Talimardjan (Uzbekistan) projects. Prices used for Bishkek II 
(Kyrgyz Republic) are for Uzbek gas with an additional $5/mcm for the cost of transmission.  
2.2.3 Effect of higher gas prices on project viability 
The effect on the cost ranking of generation projects is given in Table 4. It is clear 
that higher gas prices have a significant effect on the relative economics of 
generation. With a low gas price, two of the gas-fired options had previously been 
                                                     
15 The gas prices used in REEPS were $35/mcm for the Uzbekistan projects and $40/mcm in the 
Kyrgyz Republic (incorporating the cost of transmission from Uzbekistan). REEPS acknowledged that 
these prices were below those in international markets at the time ($80-120/mcm for Russian supply to 
Western Europe) but applied a discount to these prices to reflect Uzbekistan’s isolation from 
competitive and creditworthy markets. 
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ranked among the four least-cost options. If the gas price changes to $100/mcm all 
three gas projects would shift to be among the five highest-cost projects. The 
positions of the Talimardjan projects in Uzbekistan worsen further if gas prices are 
assumed to rise to even higher levels.  
For all higher gas prices considered, hydro power plants make up four of the five 
least-cost options. The cost advantage of the Sangtuda I and Rogun I hydro projects 
are reaffirmed by the analysis.  
The calculations do not adjust for changes in international coal prices, since there 
has been less change in them and the impacts would be much less than for gas 
prices. It is not surprising that the relative cost of coal-fired plants, in particular the 
Ekibastuz rehabilitation, is improved when higher gas prices are used. If gas prices 
remain high, the viability of new coal fired options either for export or located in the 
buyer’s country improves16.  
In each higher gas price scenario, the Rogun II and Kambarata II hydro projects 
became the fourth- and fifth-ranked projects respectively. However, while the 
economics suggest that these projects would become more viable than the 
competing gas-fired options, their viability in practice will be challenged by the 
need to settle issues relating to water usage.  
Table 4  Cost ranking of new CA generation options 
    Ranking by economic cost 
Project Fuel Capacity 
(MW)
Financial
cost*
(c/kWh)
$35-40/ 
mcm 
$100/
mcm 
$150/
mcm
$200/
mcm
Talimardjan I (Uzbekistan) Gas 800 1.75 1 6 8 8
Sangtuda I (Tajikistan) Hydro 670 2.44 2 1 1 1
Rogun I (Tajikistan) Hydro 1,200 2.91 3 2 2 2
Bishkek II (Kyrgyz Republic) Gas 400 2.67 4 7 7 7
Ekibastuz I Rehab (Kazakh) Coal 2,000 2.66 5 3 3 3
Talimardjan II (Uzbekistan) Gas 2,400 2.92 6 9 9 10
Rogun I & II (Tajikistan) Hydro 2,400 3.24 7 4 4 4
Kambarata II (Kyrgyz) Hydro 240 3.95 8 5 5 5
Ekibastuz new (Kazakhstan) Coal 1,000 5.05 9 8 6 6
Kambarata I (Kyrgyz) Hydro 1,900 8.54 10 10 10 9
Source: World Bank REEPS, 2004 (columns 4 and 5); ECA calculations (columns 6-8).  
*Financial cost is a levelised tariff over 20 years (see REEPS for underlying assumptions). 
                                                     
16 Subject to environmental constraints 
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This analysis considers relative costs among competing export projects within the 
Central Asia region. A more complete analysis of export projects should also 
consider the cost relative to domestic options in the consuming markets. The 
competitiveness of hydro-power vs. gas or coal will be affected not just by fuel and 
operating cost, but also by water availability, the impact of seasonal inflows on the 
system reserve margin and by environmental costs of the gas and coal options.  
In Pakistan, where hydro is a relatively high proportion of the fuel mix, the 
available capacity in the system is below the name plate installed capacity for part 
of the year due to seasonality in water availability. Further development of hydro-
power in Pakistan (which could anyway be delayed by inter-provincial 
disagreements) is therefore unlikely to be to serve peak demand during these 
periods. The timing of water availability to Central Asian hydro plants is 
complementary to peak demand in Pakistan. This, combined with the cost 
advantage in the presence of high gas prices, suggests a continued cost advantage to 
Central Asian hydro projects for export to Pakistan. However, these projects will 
have to contend with the constraints to trade from the region.  
2.3 Conclusions on trade opportunities 
The review of opportunities for trade within the region as well as exports from the 
region have revealed a range of options, including small scale bilateral trades 
utilising existing infrastructure, as well as large scale export projects requiring major 
new investments.  
There is complementarity within the region since some countries have rapidly 
growing demand (eg Pakistan) while others are relatively resource rich (eg hydro 
power resources in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic; fossil fuels in Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). On the export front, potential demand is growing in 
large neighbouring countries including China, Russia, Iran and India. Nevertheless, 
there are significant barriers to expansion of trade which must be addressed. 
As the market for gas matures and prices become more internationalised, gas price 
increases will also have a bearing on the relative economics of projects that may be 
carried out within many of the potential export markets. Both hydropower and coal 
generation have become relatively more attractive with the recent oil and gas price 
increases.  The competitiveness of hydro-power vs. gas or coal will be affected not 
just by fuel and operating cost but also by water availability and the impact of 
seasonal inflows on the system reserve margin and environmental considerations.  
 The analysis suggests a continued cost advantage to Central Asian hydro projects 
for export to Pakistan. However, these projects will have to contend with the 
constraints to trade from the region.  
As gas prices rise, the improvement in comparative economic ranking of the 
Rogun I and Sangtuda I hydro projects in Tajikistan will tend to increase the 
attractiveness of the TAP project for exports to Pakistan.  This is discussed in more 
detail in section 8. 
 
 
 
South Asia: Policy Paper for Regional Energy Trade, Final Report, March 2007  
Economic Consulting Associates, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Risks in international energy trade 
projects  
28 
3 Risks in international energy trade projects 
The previous section summarised the trade opportunities both within ECO and for 
exports outside the region. It was also noted that significant barriers to trade exist, 
which add to the risks of trade and new investment. These must be identified and 
addressed in order to create a framework for sustainable trade expansion. This 
report addresses the assessment of risk by firstly reviewing the generic types of risk 
in electricity trade (this section), secondly reviewing governance and dispute 
resolution procedures (section 4), and thirdly reviewing risk mitigation options in 
financing mechanisms (section 5). 
The aim of this section is to provide a general review of risks in international 
electricity projects, particularly those involving two or more countries. The general 
risk analysis will be developed in subsequent sections to consider specific risks in 
trade between the ECO countries, particularly in relation to the types of trade likely 
in the short and medium term, and in the proposed TAP project. 
The range of alternative trade arrangements that are possible vary in the way in 
which they assign risk among parties and the degree to which they are able to 
mitigate those risks. A number of the project risks themselves are generic among the 
different types of trade arrangement. We discuss these generic risks in this section 
and refer back to them in the sections that follow. 
We group these risks and set those groups out in order of their potential impact on 
international trade projects in emerging markets. The three groups, which are 
analysed below, are: 
R Political/regulatory risks, which derive from the institutional, 
governance, legal and regulatory framework in the country and so are 
also referred to as ‘country risk’ 
R Commercial risks, which relate to the characteristics of the project and 
the market 
R Financial risks, which reflect the creditworthiness of the borrowers and 
their ability to repay the loans, also dependent on the security of the 
projected project revenues 
These risks and the sub-risks that accompany them are listed in Table 5 and 
discussed further below.  If the highest level risks are not allocated satisfactorily, 
then the project is unlikely to proceed. 
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Table 5 Types of generic project risk and risk mitigation 
Political risk mitigation matrix 
Risk type Potential mitigation  Mitigation agent 
Reputational impact of government 
expropriation 
Host government Expropriation risk 
Diplomatic ramifications Foreign 
government/trade 
agency 
 Contract specifies compensation from 
government for loss of earnings 
Government 
 Political risk insurance Contracting parties 
 Involvement of IFIs IFIs  
Security risk Law and order and military action Government 
 Private security force Contracting parties 
 Address underlying cause Government 
 Political risk insurance Contracting parties 
Carefully structure contracts to ensure fairness Contracting parties Breach of contract 
risk Support contracts with investment treaties (eg. 
ECT) 
Governments and 
contracting parties 
 Political risk insurance Contracting parties 
 Involvement of IFIs IFIs  
Legal and 
regulatory risk 
Clear, comprehensive legal framework and 
strong judiciary 
Host government 
 Agreement with government to ‘freeze’ current 
legal environment 
Host government and 
contracting parties 
 Allow pass-through of costs due to change in 
regulations 
Government 
 Host government takes a financial stake Host government and 
contracting parties 
Payment in commonly traded currency Contracting parties Currency transfer 
restrictions risk Open financial system and independent 
monetary authority 
Host government 
 Political risk insurance Contracting parties 
 Involvement of IFIs IFIs  
Dispute resolution 
risk 
Strengthen regulatory regime, independence of 
judiciary 
Host government 
 Arbitration in neutral third-country 
Use third-country law as substantive law of 
contract and to govern arbitral proceedings 
Host government and 
contracting parties 
 Ensure project is economically viable and 
contract terms are fair and agreed transparently 
Contracting parties 
 Use ICSID arbitration Host government and 
contracting parties 
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Commercial risk mitigation matrix 
Risk type Potential mitigation  Mitigation agent 
Planning risk Perform careful due diligence on site Project sponsors 
 Project agreements and finance are contingent 
on planning approval 
All contracting parties 
 Government assists fast-track approval, 
coordinates planning authorities, provides 
streamlined planning process 
Government 
 Include government as joint-venture partner Government and other 
project sponsors 
Design risk Pass cost overruns to contractor through EPC 
contract 
Project contractor 
Construction risk Pass cost overruns to contractor through EPC 
contract 
Project contractor 
Volume risk Long-term firm power sales or take-or-pay 
agreements 
Buyers and sellers 
 Sovereign guarantee to back-up long-term 
contract 
Government 
 Include a premium in price for non-firm energy Buyers and sellers 
Supply risk Routine maintenance Operator 
 Prudent management of hydro resource; 
provision of alternative supply in case of low 
water inflows 
Operator 
 Coordinate regional water sharing Regional governments 
 Law enforcement or military protection against 
sabotage 
Governments, possibly 
private operators 
Payment risk Sovereign guarantees Government 
 Credit guarantees or other securities Buyers 
 Escrow account, advance payment Buyers and sellers 
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Financial risk mitigation matrix 
Risk type Potential mitigation  Mitigation agent 
Financing risk Sovereign guarantees Government 
 Protection against payment risk, volume and 
supply risk, regulatory risk 
As for mitigation of 
these risk types 
 Financial close contingent on finalisation of 
planning and design 
Planning and design 
agents 
Exchange rate risk Index payment to commonly traded currency Contracting parties 
 Use commercially available exchange rate 
hedging products 
Party with exchange 
rate exposure 
 Use domestically sourced components and 
labour where possible 
Construction contractor
Funding risk Government provides finance support Government 
 IFIs provide finance support IFIs 
 
3.1 Political and regulatory risks 
Political risk (or country risk) arises wherever political intervention can over-ride or 
change the ‘rules’ of the market to the disadvantage of the project. Regulatory risk is 
included in this category because even where ‘independent’ regulators exist, 
experience suggests that it takes several years before they are able to exercise the 
decision-making powers independently of the government. Political risk is likely to 
be a major concern for projects in most countries of the ECO region. The experience 
elsewhere in the world, for example in electricity projects in southern Africa (see 
discussion in section 7.4.6), illustrate that political risk can be the factor that holds 
back otherwise economically attractive projects from proceeding. 
The level of political risk in the region is illustrated in the Table 6 below, which 
shows country risk ratings for the region: 
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Table 6  Country risk ratings 
Country Risk rating 
Afghanistan High 
Azerbaijan Medium high 
Iran High 
Kazakhstan Medium 
Kyrgyztan High 
Pakistan High 
Tajikistan High 
Turkey  Medium 
Turkmenistan High 
Uzbekistan High 
Source: Oxford Analytica: Political and Economic Risk Map 2006 
It is useful to consider the types of political risks that will need to be assessed before 
a project can proceed. Political risks have been analysed into specific sub-risks, most 
commonly by providers of political risk insurance. For this purpose, as the projects 
under consideration may not be attractive to private providers of political risk 
insurance, we have used the categorisation employed by MIGA and then added 
further specific political risks that need to be dealt with in international trade 
projects. 
MIGA is able to provide four point cover for eligible projects17. The four points of 
cover, which equate to four specific sub-sets of political risk, are: 
R Expropriation 
R War and civil disturbance 
R Breach of contract 
R Currency transfer restrictions 
Each of these and two further types of political risk is discussed further below. 
Where disputes arise, enforcement of contract will preferably be through arbitration 
or other judicial process. This will be supported where there is an independent 
judiciary and strong rule of law, but as discussed this is often not the case where 
there is political risk. Also, in some countries arbitration may not yet be available for 
contracts between an investor and the state (or only domestic arbitration may be 
permitted), or the relevant State may not be party to the New York Convention on 
                                                     
17 New cross-border investments originating in any MIGA member country – all ECO members are 
MIGA members as are the countries of likely project sponsors. 
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the recognition of international arbitral awards18. In these cases enforcement may 
ultimately be diplomatic, economic, or even military.  
The involvement of MIGA and other IFIs provides a route to diplomatic 
enforcement, as does direct engagement between governments of the parties 
involved.  
The contractual terms may specify compensation from government in cases such as 
expropriation or breach of contract. However, the value of such clauses is limited in 
the context of political risk, which by its nature may involve the government 
reneging on contract terms.  
The selling country government may also take an interest in resolving cross-border 
disputes. An example of economic enforcement is the Laos-Thailand trade where 
Thailand is Laos’ main partner in other trade, most trade routes are across the Thai 
border, and Thailand acts as a financial centre for Laos business. Each of these 
factors affords Thailand opposing leverage against deliberate interruption to supply 
on the Laos side. In the case of projects to supply electricity to South Africa, the 
South African military is a deterrent since it is the dominant force in the region. 
South African armed forces have taken steps in the past to ensure continued supply 
from hydro plants in Lesotho during civil unrest in that country.  
In the case of cross-border trade, fixed assets that are located in neighbouring 
countries have greater insulation from political risk in the buying country. 
Expropriation 
Expropriation refers to loss of control, ownership or rights to an investment as a 
result of acts by the host government. In extreme cases of government policy 
change, there is a risk of asset nationalisation.  
Host governments should be aware of the potential impact of expropriation 
decisions on their international reputation and on the availability and cost of inward 
investment in the future. Where investors are choosing among alternatives the 
reputational impact can act as a strong control on expropriation.  
In cross-border investments there are likely to be diplomatic ramifications of 
expropriation actions. This will also be the case if a foreign government takes an 
ownership interest in the project or has an active and influential trade promotion 
agency.  
As with other political risks, IFI involvement can encourage governments to respect 
property rights. 
                                                     
18 New York Convention on enforcement of arbitral awards (1958), the promotion of which is a key 
aspect of UNCITRAL. The Convention requires contracting States to enable arbitration clauses in 
contracts that they are a party to and to recognise through their courts decisions made in such 
arbitration.  
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War and civil disturbance risk (security risk) 
A major risk for transmission projects in many of the countries in the ECO region is 
physical security risk arising from war, terrorism or civil disturbance. The clearest 
example of this is the TAP project that would transit politically unstable regions in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
Unlike gas pipelines, it is not economically viable to bury electricity transmission 
lines. An electricity transmission line transiting a country is vulnerable to physical 
disruption due to its length, the fact that it will be elevated above ground, and the 
susceptibility to disrupting attack at any point along it (for an example, see Box 1 
and section 7.4.7 on sabotage of power lines). The increased risk of interruption to 
supply contributes to increased project cost, due to the lost supply during 
interruptions, the need to provide physical security in an unstable environment, and 
a higher cost of finance to cover the additional risk (or by limiting finance options). 
These costs inevitably raise the transmission tariffs and reduce the economic benefit 
of the project.  
While there is also physical security risk to a generation facility, the single 
concentrated location of these assets makes it easier to provide security for them, 
although their fuel supply lines may be vulnerable.  
Security risk will be affected by the country’s law and order and military capability 
and effectiveness. In multi-country projects the protection responsibilities may be 
shared among the governments. In some cases civil unrest may be largely contained 
by security forces and the project may suffer only minor disruption. Security risk 
will also be affected by underlying social and political factors, which are generally 
outside of the control of non-government project sponsors and need to be addressed 
as part of broad social dialogue.  
Private project sponsors may engage their own security forces, subject to sovereign 
government agreement, to protect assets and assist in investigations. 
International agencies, such as MIGA, can provide insurance for these specific risks 
(although in practice available cover may be limited, as discussed further in 
section 5.5).  
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Box 1  Cahora Bassa: A large electricity project in a war zone 
 
The Cahora Bassa project in Northern Mozambique includes a 2,075 MW hydro electric 
plant connected to South Africa by a 1,360km dual HVDC transmission line. The project 
entered service in 1977 (see Box 8 for further detail on the project). 
When construction began in 1969 a conflict that was to be the Mozambican war of 
independence was already well underway. Following independence in 1975, 
Mozambique entered a period of civil war that lasted until 1992.  
During the civil war the transmission line was severely damaged and transfers to 
customers in South Africa were stopped for 17 years. The original agreement and supply 
contract were suspended under force majeure and amended in the Cape Town Agreement 
of 1984.  
The 1984 agreement included new commitments to the security of the transmission line. 
The governments of Mozambique and South Africa agreed to take necessary measures to 
protect the line and its staff against attack and to share the protection costs between them. 
However, the damaged lines remained out of service and their rehabilitation did not 
begin until 1995 when a construction contract was awarded to a consortium of 
international engineering firms. Work on the first line was completed in 1997 and full 
operation was restored in 1998.  
 
Breach of contract 
A key risk for project sponsors is breach of contract, whereby the relevant contract 
counterparty, in particular the host government or government entities/state 
owned enterprises breaches or repudiates a contractual agreement. Where host-
governments are involved in the contract structure, this also raises complex issues of 
sovereign immunity and attribution of actions to the State, increasing the risks 
surrounding contract performance.  
The risk of breach of contract will be greater where the environment in which the 
contract is to operate is subject to significant changes or instability – for example, 
foreign exchange crisis, political instability, or privatisation processes – or where the 
contract is perceived to be imbalanced in the assignment of risks and rewards.  
Crucially, MIGA requires that in the event of such a breach of contract the investor 
can invoke a dispute resolution mechanism, and such an arbitration mechanism is a 
key risk mitigant. However, a series of recent rulings (see, for example, dispute 
resolution risk discussed below) have highlighted the limitations on the 
effectiveness of arbitration to reduce the risks of unilateral breach of contract, 
including a refusal to respect or apply the agreed dispute resolution mechanism as 
set forth in the contract (see section 4.3.1 below).  
Bilateral and multilateral investment treaties (such as the Energy Charter Treaty) 
that address the responsibility of the host-government for respecting investment 
agreements and for actions of sub-national government and state-owned enterprises 
can offer an additional level of protection (see section 4.1 below).  
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Legal and regulatory risk 
In addition to the sub-risks identified in the MIGA categorisation, there remains the 
additional risk for international trade projects of adverse legal and regulatory 
change, application or enforcement, both at the economy wide and the industry- or 
project-specific level. The risk is that the legal or regulatory environment will 
change in a way that affects the operation, costs, payments to or receipts from the 
project, so impacting the potential returns for investors.  
An uncertain legal or institutional environment or unfair legal or regulatory 
decisions are often directly a result of the political environment prevailing in a 
country.  
Legal and regulatory risk may arise from deficiencies in existing laws or sector 
regulation (the absence of clear rules), uncertainty as to the content of the laws, or 
unpredictability as to their application (particularly where some degree of discretion 
is involved, as is the case in ‘independent regulation’ of utility sectors) or 
uncertainty as to the ability to enforce those laws. Minimising this risk requires a 
clear, comprehensive legal framework that supports and protects infrastructure 
investments.  
Other legal and regulatory risks include the major restructuring of the market or the 
creation of a competitive power market to replace a state run monopoly. Operating 
costs can be affected by changes to regulations such as safety or labour law. Risks 
arising from the application of the regulatory framework become greater where the 
relevant project is cross-border, and operating in more than one regulatory 
framework.  
Legal and regulatory risk is present at each phase of the project. It is of particular 
concern during the operational phase due to the length of this phase (running over 
several decades) and the fact that the physical investments are sunk and may not be 
removable from the installed location. Changes to the legal environment resulting 
from market reform may result in reduced asset values or stranded assets. 
Cross-border electricity trade is likely to be most successful where operating across 
similar jurisdictions, and consistent regulatory and legal frameworks for operation 
and regulation of electricity sectors (including basic common principles regarding 
market access, market structure and fair competition).  
Finally, legal and regulatory risk will extend to risks associated with the 
competency, efficiency and independence of the judiciary, their ability to resolve 
disputes in an unbiased manner or without inordinate delay.  
The risk of adverse legal and regulatory change may be limited by careful 
structuring of the initial contracts to include agreements with the host government 
to ‘freeze’ the current legal environment. This might specify the current legal and 
regulatory environment as applicable to the project and allow future changes to 
apply only with agreement between the parties. This would require close discussion 
between the project sponsors and government. 
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Where the government has a financial stake in the project, as an equity partner or 
debt provider, it may be discouraged from allowing legal or regulatory change that 
impacts adversely on the cost of the project. As with other political risks, the host 
government should also be aware of the reputational effects of an unstable legal and 
regulatory environment.  
Currency transfer restrictions 
Currency transfer restrictions limit the ability to convert local currency into foreign 
exchange to transfer outside of the country. The level of risk arising from potential 
restrictions will vary by country and according to governments’ macro-economic 
policy and currency availability.  
To mitigate this risk payment may be specified in a commonly traded (ie. Liquid) 
foreign currency, such as US dollars, and paid into a foreign country account (this 
can also help to manage exchange rate risk). This can be specified in the contract 
terms. A common currency and locating payment in a country with an open 
financial system is the approach taken in SAPP (see section 7.4). The nature of the 
risk is then transformed into any underlying payment risk.  
The involvement of IFIs can assist in discouraging governments from imposing 
monetary restrictions on investors, as this will impact on the availability of future 
IFI assistance.  
Currency transfer restrictions are imposed by the government and it is up to 
governments that want to promote foreign investment and trade to demonstrate 
that they do not pose this risk. Relaxing restrictions on convertibility and granting 
independence to monetary authorities will assist with this.  
Dispute resolution risk 
In an attempt to protect against both contract breach risk and risk of arbitrary 
changes or application of local laws and regulations, international investors have 
traditionally looked to mandatory dispute resolution through arbitration. The 
availability of arbitration (and particularly international arbitration) to resolve 
disputes is seen as an important risk mitigation tool (this is discussed further in 
section 4).    
However, even where arbitration is available, a number of recent cases have 
illustrated some limits to arbitration in cases involving large scale infrastructure 
investment. These include the Hubco project in Pakistan and the Dabhol IPP in 
India, which is summarised in Box 2 below.  
In each of these cases, the project documents provided for resolution of disputes by 
mandatory arbitration. Notwithstanding this, in each case courts in the host country 
either enjoined the international arbitration proceedings or assumed jurisdiction 
over disputes. The local courts have assumed jurisdiction on the basis of local laws 
that are argued to apply to the projects not-withstanding the strict contractual terms 
– including an assertion of exclusive state regulatory jurisdiction (Dabhol), 
arguments that force majeure events or changes in local law override the project 
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documents, or that the project documents were invalid or from the outset violated 
an applicable local law. For example, in the case of Hubco the contractual 
arrangements underpinning the project were judged by local jurisdictions to have 
been founded on corruption and violations of local law and arbitration on the basis 
of the initial contracts was blocked. These cases highlight the continuing risks to a 
project of the application of local laws.  
The Dabhol experience also illustrates the importance of economically viable project 
fundamentals from the outset including, crucially, a willingness and ability to pay. 
It is up to the project sponsors, including buyers who may be state entities that are 
required to on-sell to users at subsidised prices, to ensure that the project 
fundamentals are sound and that it is able to stand on its own feet economically. 
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Box 2  PPA payment dispute and local court intervention 
India – Dabhol Power Project 
The Dabhol power project is a large (over 2,000 MW in two phases) liquefied natural gas-
fired plant to the south of the Indian city of Mumbai. It was originally developed as an 
IPP by a consortium of US investors led by Enron (DPC) and Indian financial institutions, 
under a memorandum of understanding signed with the government of the State of 
Maharashtra in 1992. The total project cost is around US$2.65 billion (reduced from the 
initially planned $US3 billion), with complex financing arrangements for the second 
phase (US$1.8 billion) involving more than 40 Indian and international commercial and 
governmental parties.  
The project agreements included guarantees from both the State of Maharashtra and the 
Indian government, including the waiving of sovereign immunity (claims could be made 
against any of their assets), take or pay conditions for the 20-year lifetime of the 
agreement, and international dispute arbitration with English law as the procedural law. 
The US government’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provided loan 
guarantees and political risk insurance to the project.   
The project entered a long-running legal dispute in 2001 following financial difficulties on 
the part of the offtaker, Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB). The tariff for offtake 
from the first phase specified in the original PPA was higher than the mandated retail 
tariff chargeable to MSEB’s customers, which was set below cost, leading MSEB to default 
on payments. In 2001, DPC attempted to take the issue to international arbitration but was 
blocked by injunctions from Indian courts. In all, injunctions were issued against five 
arbitrations between the project company and Maharashtra and Indian governments. 
Work on phase II of the project, which was near completion, was suspended (in part due 
to the bankruptcy of Enron, the major private sector party). 
The local regulatory authorities claimed jurisdiction over disputes. The Indian legal 
position was that the original contract formation violated a number of local legal 
requirements, including that it be competitively and transparently tendered, and that the 
project award process was corrupt. The project company claimed that the intervention of 
local courts was politically motivated and without legal justification.  
The project structure had been criticised by opponents for being unbalanced in favour of 
the project company, for being prepared in haste and without proper public consultation 
and expertise on the government side. The World Bank refused funding for the project on 
the basis that it was uneconomic and poorly structured and exposed the MSEB to 
significant uncontrolled risk. 
In 2005, the remaining shareholders reached an agreement for transfer of their share in the 
project to publicly owned companies, thereby shifting what had been the largest single 
foreign private sector-led project in India to the public sector. The two main foreign 
private shareholders called on the OPIC loan guarantees.  
  
Where the project documents specify local law to be the governing law of the 
contracts, the risk that changes in local law will flow through onto the project 
structure is greater. Local laws may legitimately be used as an argument for the 
assertion of jurisdiction by local courts, and this is true also in developed markets 
such as the US and Europe. In the case of large energy projects, which often have a 
high profile particularly in developing and growing markets, changes to local law 
that affect the initial project terms may have political motivations.  
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Even where the project agreements specify a law other than the law of the host 
country as the governing law of the contract, changes in local laws may impact on 
the project, and mandatory local laws may be used as a basis for local courts 
assuming jurisdiction. In particular, in energy projects that involve large assets 
(such as generation or transmission facilities) that are essentially physically 
stranded in the host country, local regulations (such as safety, labour or 
environmental regulations) can have a significant impact on project operation. The 
choice of location for the arbitration proceedings (and therefore the law that will 
govern the arbitral proceedings, as opposed to the substantive law of the contract) 
will also affect the level of risk arising from local court interference (on the basis of 
local arbitration laws which may give the local courts a supervisory role).  
Host governments may be reluctant, for political as well as practical reasons, to 
accept foreign substantive law (or even international arbitration in a neutral third 
country) for projects that are entirely domestic in nature. However, in the case of 
cross-border projects, such as those under consideration in this study, such choice 
should be more acceptable (and precedents exist in the case studies considered in 
section 7, such as SCP, NT2) and should be considered as a means of reducing risks 
of both contract breach and change of law. Close consultation between project 
sponsors and government is required at the time of contract formation to reach 
agreement on the applicable law and location.  
It should be noted that even where a neutral third country is chosen as the seat of 
arbitration, the effectiveness of an arbitration award may be impacted by local 
courts, through the power to review and annul awards on certain limited grounds 
(under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards). The use of the ICSID arbitration for disputes between investors 
and states is specifically designed to mitigate this risk and consent to use of ICSID 
(for example in the ECT, or other investment treaties) provides an additional risk 
mitigation mechanism for potential investors (see Box 6 for an overview of the 
ICSID). 
3.2 Commercial risks 
Commercial risks arise from the characteristics of the sector (ie electricity), the 
market (ie electricity buyers, as well as fuel markets) and the specific project 
characteristics (eg hydro projects take a long time to build with added risks during 
construction). In the case of trade projects different conditions in the exporter and 
importer countries can complicate the process for developing and operating the 
project in a timely and profitable manner. 
A number of commercial risks will need to be considered and allocated before the 
project can commence. These are described below and approximately follow the 
sequence of the project life cycle. Hence payment risk is at the end of this sub-
section although it is probably the most critical commercial risk area to most 
projects. 
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Planning risk 
Planning risk relates to administrative delays in gaining planning approval for the 
construction of project facilities. It is affected by the regulatory and institutional 
environment, although major projects like power plants and transmission lines will 
generally require high-level government approval and backing in addition to the 
normal approval mechanisms. Specific regulations and requirements that can cause 
planning delay include licensing, land use permission, environmental and social 
impact controls. Delays and risks of failure increase with the number of permits and 
approvals required and the number of agencies involved in providing planning 
approvals. 
China was an early proponent of aiming to develop power projects in a PPI 
framework with private sector funding. Due to the complexity of the planning 
process and the related risks, many projects were developed as joint ventures with 
national and local authorities, rather than as BOTs (see Box 3). The inclusion of 
government agents in JVs encouraged them to try to limit planning delays, but risk 
transfer to the private sector was more limited.  
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Box 3  Power project planning and approval process, China (2000) 
The risks of delay and approval failure increase with the number and complexity of steps 
involved, the number of permits required and the number of separate agencies required 
to give approvals or reviews. The planning and approval process for large projects in 
China in 2000 involved 18 major steps and 10 key agencies (national, regional and 
provincial) as summarised in the diagram below: 
During the mid to late 1990s China was an 
early proponent of developing power projects 
in a PPI framework with private sector 
funding. Private participation in the power 
sector started in 1984 but only became 
formalised with the Electricity Law in 1995. By 
early 2000 there had been 45 large power 
projects involving private developers with a 
total installed capacity of 35 GW, about 12% of 
total capacity in China at that time. Large 
projects are those over 100 MW which require 
central government approval. There were also 
estimated to be up to 200 small projects with 
an installed capacity of about 6000 MW, 
mostly implemented by local organisations. 
Lack of clarity in the framework led some 
projects to experience problems after they 
knowingly or unknowingly short-circuited 
parts of the formal approval process. Due to 
the complexity of the planning process and the 
related risks, many projects were developed as 
joint ventures (JV) with national and local 
authorities, rather than as BOTs. The presence 
of the state organisation as a JV partner 
reduces planning and regulatory risk in the 
absence of a fully developed regulatory 
framework. The local partner would build 
consensus for the project and assure a smooth 
passage through the approval process. 
However, the prevalence of JVs resulted in 
limited transfer of risk to the private partner. 
Source: ‘Power Sector PPI Framework Initiative in China’, ECA for the World Bank, July 2000 
For projects involving two or more countries, additional delays can arise due to the 
different processes and procedures required in each country, including the 
sequencing of steps in the approval process. An option for reducing project risk 
early on is to make signing the IGA contingent on the necessary planning 
permission being provided by both governments. 
Measures for gaining fast-track approvals once the government has given overall 
policy approval to a project include the government taking some responsibility for 
obtaining some of the land access and other planning approvals, and the 
government setting up an inter-agency task force among relevant planning 
authorities to ensure co-ordination and rapid consideration of applications. 
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Design risk 
Design risk concerns delays or costs arising at later stages of the project due to 
problems that were not foreseen or allowed for in the initial project design. A source 
of design risk can be inadequately specified standards for construction and safety, 
with tighter standards being imposed after initial project approval. In projects 
spanning two or more countries, incompatibility of construction or operating 
standards can be an added source of risk. 
These problems can lead to delays due to such things as re-routing a transmission 
line, re-sizing of components, increases in security or environmental protection, 
with consequent additional cost. 
Project sponsors must take care to check that designs meet standards in all countries 
and to use best practice design from the outset. The involvement of private sector 
design contractors can assist in providing up to date expertise, as well as 
international experience. The responsibility for cost overruns due to poor design can 
be passed to the contractor through the EPC contract.  
Construction risk 
Construction risk is the risk of delays or cost overruns during construction. It is 
affected by design risk. In addition to the effect of design risk, cost overruns can 
result from poor project management and implementation, labour disputes, 
exchange rate fluctuations, unforeseen technical problems encountered during 
construction, and changes in the project environment such as regulatory or 
economic conditions. 
Construction delays create a financial cost to project developers by extending the 
period of construction, during which interest is charged but not matched by 
incoming cashflow. There is also a cost created in delay to the start-up of trade and 
therefore affects the other party as buyer or seller who is not able to complete the 
transaction as planned. 
Hydro electric projects have been found to be particularly prone to cost overruns (or 
underestimates in cost) when compared with thermal electric projects. Among 
specific issues, large dams suffer from uncertainty related to the geotechnical 
conditions, which are often difficult to assess before actual construction begins. The 
study carried out by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) found an average cost 
overrun in real terms of 21% (56% in nominal terms) among 81 large dam projects19. 
Among 248 dam construction projects the average (nominal) overrun was 50%.  
The WCD study also found a tendency toward project delays. Half of 99 dams 
surveyed saw commissioning delays, with 30% of projects delayed by one or two 
years. Surveys of thermal plant commissioning have also found regular occurrence 
of delay.  
                                                     
19 The Report of the World Commission on Dams (Chapter 2), November 2000. Available at 
www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdch2.pdf 
The study found a large variation around the average 
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Construction risk is affected by two conflicting approaches for multi-country 
projects. Each country can be responsible for construction of the segment in its own 
territory: this can minimise delays due to local problems, but can exacerbate 
coordination risks; or a single EPC contract can be given, but this can lead to 
complexity of dealing with a number of different countries/administrations. In the 
SPC project (see section 7.5) both approaches were used in part. 
The cost of construction risks should be attributed to the party undertaking the 
construction through the EPC contract. They will be responsible for contracting for 
labour and materials and managing the construction. To ensure this risk is 
transferred to the delaying party, the construction contract may include penalties or 
compensation for overruns.  
Construction delays can also have a knock-on effect to fuel supply agreements and 
other related agreements. An example of fuel supply take-or-pay penalties is given 
in Box 4. Such penalties can also be passed-through to the EPC contractor.  
Box 4  Power plant construction delay and gas supply take-or-pay penalties 
Thailand - Ratchaburi Power Plants 
The Ratchaburi power plant, 100km southwest of Bangkok, is an Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) project with a generation capacity of 3200 MW from a mix 
of both combined-cycle and conventional duel oil and gas thermal plant. Fuel for the 
plant is supplied under take-or-pay contracts from the Yadana gas field in the Andaman 
Sea off the Myanmar coast. The take-or-pay contract was signed in mid-1998 between the 
Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) and the Yadana consortium, a mix of foreign 
investors and the Myanmar and Thai state oil groups. The take-or-pay (ToP) contract 
allows PTT to take in later years any gas it fails to lift initially, but nevertheless has severe 
ToP penalties. 
The Ratchaburi plant suffered construction delays caused by the late arrival of key 
components and the need to modify the burners to suit the Yadana gas. This meant the 
plant was unable to take gas from the Yadana gas field when delivery was planned to 
begin. As a result PTT was fined by the Yadana group for breach of contract and made to 
pay interest to cover the delay. For the first contract year that began in July 1998, PTT paid 
the Yadana group approximately US$50 million. PTT in turn called on EGAT to cover part 
of the liability for the delay.  
 
Volume risk 
Volume risk (also referred to as demand or market risk) is the risk of downward 
fluctuations in the volumes actually required by the offtaker. Downward volume 
fluctuations create costs for the supply and transmission parties. The lower cash 
flows create payment problems for generation and transmission asset financing 
charges and generation fuel charges where fuel is supplied on a take-or-pay 
contract.  
This risk mainly applies to non-firm energy, for which there is not a specified 
contract volume and total payment. The risk of volume risk in firm energy contracts 
would be covered in the payment terms decided between buyer and seller. This can 
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be supported by a sovereign guarantee from the government. For non-firm energy, 
the seller may require a premium in the price to cover the risk of lower demand.  
Supply risk 
Supply risk relates to interruptions in supply from the generator or the transmission 
system. Interruptions impose costs on demand customers equal to the value of their 
lost load. Security of energy supply is a common cause limiting international trade. 
Supply outages may result from equipment failure or unavoidable causes such as 
severe weather. The operator should have an obligation to make reasonable efforts 
to avoid such outages, for example through planned maintenance, and to re-
establish supply as quickly as possible once an interruption occurs. Supply outages 
may also occur due to failure or delays in delivery of fuels, for fuel-fired generation 
(the reverse problem may also occur, as shown in Box 4). 
In the case of hydro power projects, supply risk is affected by variability in 
hydrological conditions. This can be reduced through prudent management of 
storage facilities but a degree of natural variability remains, particularly for run-of-
river facilities. This risk may be managed by the generation operator by allowing a 
non-firm supply component related to average inflows, or making provision for 
alternative sources of supply (eg Thermal capacity).  
A further and potentially more fundamental risk relates to changes in the usage and 
sharing of upstream water assets. This is a real concern among the riparian states of 
the Central Asian river systems and represents a significant barrier to the 
development of potential new hydro facilities in the region. This issue brings into 
stark focus the role and importance of coordination and cooperation among 
governments of the riparian region. 
Supply may also be interrupted due to deliberate action with political motivation. 
This sort of security of supply risk is difficult to mitigate through commercial or 
contractual arrangements. It is a potentially serious impediment to international 
trade where supply reliance is viewed as a potential political and economic 
vulnerability. Governments are best placed to provide protection against sabotage, 
although project operators may also contract private security forces.  
Payment risk 
Payment risk is the risk that the counterparty to a trade will not make its contracted 
payments. It affects the project on an ongoing basis during the operation phase, but 
is also a risk to contractors during the design and construction phases.  
This is probably the single most important risk in energy (or other) trade projects, 
though it is not independent of other factors (such as the legal and regulatory 
environment). Trading arrangements cannot be put in place unless there is a 
creditworthy buyer, or adequate guarantee support (credit enhancement) can be 
provided. 
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Payment risk is directly related to creditworthiness of the trade partners, and all 
buyers should be carefully vetted prior to contracting. Private sector participants 
will require greater assurances of payment since they are unlikely to hold the 
political influence that the state-owned utilities may use to enforce payment. 
Sovereign guarantees, as well as other measures to enhance credit such as bank 
credit guarantees or secured deposits, will be required where there is a question of 
insufficient creditworthiness.  
Short-term delays in payment may be avoided by use of an escrow account or 
advance payment.  
Payment risk impacts on the next major risk category discussed below: financing 
risk. 
3.3 Financial risks 
Financing risk 
Financing risk relates to the ability of financiers to recover their investment and 
make a return on capital. The main risk elements are the project’s commercial 
viability (mainly dependent on prices, market risk and payment risk; prices are in 
turn affected by regulatory risks), the securities provided and the enforceability of 
contracts. As a result, protections against these risks are also protections against 
financing risk.  
In most cases financing risk is directly related to payment risk since the cost of 
capital is repaid through the cash flows generated over the lifetime of the project. 
However, in projects such as power plants where the capacity cost is paid separately 
from the energy cost, low (or zero) levels of operation can exacerbate the 
unwillingness or inability of the offtaker to continue to make the capacity payments. 
Delayed or upheld payment can result in default on investment repayments.  
Where the private sector provides finance to the project, the level of financing risk 
will directly affect the cost of capital. Perceived risk is greater during the 
construction phase and early production (while volume risk is still quite large). It is 
common for such projects to be re-financed at lower rate once operation has settled 
down and a cash flow track record can be seen.  
Given the relatively short tenors of most commercial and some development finance 
institution debt products and the perceived level of risk, high short term financing 
costs can arise. There is thus a risk that transmission charges (and tariffs for 
associated generation projects) will be unacceptably high in the early years of a 
project’s life. Where end-user prices are controlled or subsidised from state revenues 
it may be possible for government to structure tariffs that smooth the higher initial 
level into later years while still meeting the project’s repayment requirements. 
Where there are concerns about creditworthiness the sovereign guarantees extended 
to mitigate payment risk also provide coverage against financing risk. 
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Financial closure will normally be contingent on the completion and agreement of 
all aspects in the planning phase. Where there is IFI involvement in financing, there 
is an opportunity for the IFI to apply some pressure to encourage agreement among 
the parties and to contribute momentum to the process. The SIEPAC project (see 
case study in section 7.2) provides an example of where the implicit threat of 
withdrawal of IFI financing evidently helped to ensure that contracts and 
institutional arrangements were agreed and finalised.  
Exchange rate risk 
Exchange rate risk relates to fluctuations in the value of project components, fuel or 
payments denominated in a foreign currency and availability of foreign currency eg 
to make cross-border payments. This risk applies especially to purchases during the 
construction phase for capital intensive projects. Exchange rate risk is greater 
depending on the size of the foreign component in construction. Exchange rate risk 
affects all the revenues of cross-border trade. 
Exchange rate risk may be managed by indexing payment to a commonly traded 
foreign currency, such as US Dollars or hedging instruments. The indexation terms 
would be included in the contract pricing formulae. However, hedging instruments 
may only be available for short tenors, creating currency mis-matches, higher costs 
and potentially unacceptable exposures for potential investors.  
The construction contractor may lessen exchange rate exposure during the 
construction phase by using locally sourced components and labour where 
available.  
Funding risk 
Finally, the funding risk is the risk that the necessary mix of project funding, 
whether grant, loan, mezzanine or equity product will not be available20. This will 
most likely be due to the above political, commercial and financial risks having been 
inadequately addressed. It may also be due to inadequacies in local financial 
markets or relate to government’s individual budget programmes and the 
programmes of development and/or commercial institutions not being open for 
particular projects or territories or having limited availability. 
Where private financing is not available the government may provide capital 
support (if it is not limited in its own budget). Alternatively, IFIs can provide grant 
or loan funding assistance or can assist in mobilizing private sector finance.  
                                                     
20 Mezzanine finance is used to describe a form of finance which has characteristics that place it 
between debt and equity (hence the term 'mezzanine'). It is typically unsecured and ranks behind 
senior debt (but ahead of equity) in cash waterfall terms (ie payment hierarchy), and is therefore 
higher risk but offers a commensurately higher return. 
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3.4 Conclusions on risks in electricity trade 
Risks in electricity trade projects can be categorised in a way similar to many other 
infrastructure projects into three main areas: political and regulatory risks (country 
risks), commercial risks, and financial risks. These risk areas are inter-related, in 
particular by the state of the institutional, legal and regulatory framework in which 
projects are carried out, the legal system for enforcing contracts, and the 
commitment of governments and other actors to respecting contract terms and 
property rights. The cost of financing projects depends on the assessment of risk, in 
particular the country risk ratings. 
A starting point for risk mitigation is to ensure projects show sound underlying 
economic and financial viability. Equitable sharing of those benefits will build 
constituencies in each country with a stake in cooperation in the electricity sector, 
and this will progressively provide an underlying environment promoting risk 
mitigation.   
Many of the commercial risks can be borne by contractors or parties to the trade 
with risk allocated appropriately in the contract terms. The risk of politically 
motivated intervention can be reduced by ensuring fairly structured contract terms, 
especially prices, from the outset.  
Where it is difficult to reduce risk through contractual terms or project 
fundamentals, sovereign guarantees can provide reassurance, particularly to the 
private sector. Governments may also offer project developers compensation in the 
event of loss of assets or income.  
More fundamental risks related to the political, legal and regulatory environment 
can be reduced over time by the actions of motivated governments to strengthen 
their institutions and demonstrate a favourable investment environment. The 
international reputation of a government can provide a valuable check on political 
risk and this can be backed up with diplomatic efforts by foreign governments and 
IFIs. Failing this, political risk insurance is available from international agencies 
such as MIGA.  
Severe security risks are difficult to mitigate for electricity transmission projects. 
Where the investment environment remains weak, risk reduction may ultimately 
depend on the threat of diplomatic, economic or even military consequences.  
The risks are compounded when projects span more than one country and involve 
more than one major investment component, such as a power plant and cross-
border transmission lines. 
Specific risk characteristics in potential projects among ECO countries are discussed 
in subsequent sections. However, in relation to multi-country trade, it is clearly 
important to strengthen inter-country coordination as a potential political risk 
mitigant. The complexity and financial commitments in international trade projects 
requires coordination among the parties to reach consensus on the planning and 
construction of projects, conditions for project start-up, monitoring and dispute 
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resolution. A common coordinating body consisting of representatives from the 
participating utilities, governments and investors is best suited to this role.  
 
 
 
South Asia: Policy Paper for Regional Energy Trade, Final Report, March 2007  
Economic Consulting Associates, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Governance in international trade 
arrangements  
50 
4 Governance in international trade arrangements 
The term ‘Governance’ is used here to denote the set of rules, regulations, laws 
institutions and procedures which formalise the framework for carrying out 
international electricity trade projects and determine the degree of predictability of 
commercial outcome for the participants. As international trade involves a level of 
risks beyond those in national projects, some international rules are needed on top 
of the domestic rules. A key concern of participants, and a test of the robustness of 
the governance framework, is the extent to which disputes can be efficiently and 
fairly resolved. 
 This section introduces the over-arching rules that can be agreed between trading 
parties to govern international electricity projects, the types of disputes that can 
arise within these agreements, and the options for resolving these disputes.  
4.1 Rules governing international trade 
Two principle sets of rules will govern a cross-border electricity transaction or 
investment: 
R Inter-governmental agreements (IGA) 
R Private commercial contracts 
Inter-Governmental Agreements 
The first set of rules is that contained in international agreements between states 
involved in trade and in customary international law. The interpretation and 
application of these agreements will be governed by issues of public international 
law21.  
Inter-governmental agreements (IGAs) may take a number of forms including: 
R Treaties or bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning general 
issues of investment protection and promotion (both within the host 
country and cross-border), trade and transit. These agreements might be 
concluded not only between States within the particular region, but also 
with States outside the region, whose nationals may be investors into the 
region. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a key example of such treaty, 
covering issues concerning investment, transit access and non-
                                                     
21 Public international law, also referred to as simply International Law, is the supranational system of 
law that governs relations between states and international institutions. It is distinct from private 
international law, which deals with relations between legal and natural persons (for example, 
companies operating internationally) where there is potentially a difference between the outcomes of 
laws applicable in their home jurisdictions. Private international law is likely to be used in the case of 
private commercial contracts.  
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interference, and trade barriers (further discussion of the ECT is 
provided in section 9.4.2 and in annex A2).  
R Inter-governmental agreements in relation to a specific project, 
providing overriding norms or principles governing the project (which 
may or may not be a joint investment), governing only the conduct of 
the specific States involved in that transaction. The SCP project (see 
section 7.5) was implemented through two IGAs between the three 
countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey) together with a set of host 
government agreements (HGAs) between each government and the 
private parties to tie all the parties together.  
R Multilateral agreements or treaties concerning the detailed operation of 
an electricity trading market, and establishing the market institutions 
and rules. The rules in these agreements will generally only govern the 
actions of members of the relevant market/region. The SIEPAC 
electricity market project (see section 7.3) was implemented through a 
set of multi-party agreements. 
 
Box 5  The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
The most important multi-lateral energy agreement to which ECO member states have 
already subscribed is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The Contracting Parties to the 
ECT include most of the ECO countries, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The remaining ECO states are 
observers to the Treaty. The ECT was the first binding multilateral investor protection 
treaty to cover investment and trade and the first to apply transit rules to energy 
networks. It was also one of the early investor protection treaties to provide binding 
international dispute settlement, between State parties and between States and non-States.
The ECO countries are therefore already parties to or observers of a significant agreement 
that provides an important component for building a favourable investment climate for 
electricity trade. The key elements of the ECT are as follows (further details of the ECT are 
given in annex A2: 
R Investment protection  
R A basis for trade in energy, energy products and energy related 
equipment, based on the WTO rules 
R Freedom of energy transit 
R International dispute settlement, including investor-state arbitration 
and inter-state arbitration. 
The ECT also contains commitments on governmental co-operation, for instance with 
regard to transfer of technology, opening of financial markets, and the development of 
competition rules. 
The ECT includes several international dispute resolution mechanisms. The two basic 
forms of binding dispute settlement are: 
R State -state arbitration for basically all disputes arising under the ECT 
(Article 27) 
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Box 5  The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
R Investor-state arbitration for investment disputes only (Article 26). 
Special provisions have been developed for the resolution of inter-state disputes in the 
area of trade (Article 29, Annex D) and transit (Article 7). These derogate from the 
otherwise applicable provisions on state-to-state dispute settlement.  
The ECT dispute resolution mechanisms were included in the IGAs for the SCP 
project. 
 
Traditionally, the only entities with standing in public international law are States, 
so that the rules arising under the above types of agreements must be enforced by 
and resolved between States. States will rarely take up actions on behalf of their 
nationals under such treaties. However, as discussed below, in many modern 
treaties (commonly referred to as ‘Investment Treaties’) States have agreed to 
extend to investors that qualify as a national of the other State certain assurances 
and guarantees and consent to the submission of disputes regarding such 
guarantees to independent third party dispute resolution mechanisms. This 
represents a significant limitation on the relevant State’s sovereign immunity. Such 
rights are commonly referred to as ‘diagonal’.   
Private Commercial Contracts 
The second sets of rules are those in private commercial contracts between market 
participants including governments and state companies. These will involve issues 
of, and be interpreted in accordance with, domestic/national laws. In the absence of 
a choice of law provisions, the most relevant laws will be those of the State in which 
a particular investment or transaction occurs (the ‘Host State’). Even where another 
governing law is chosen, mandatory and overriding rules of the Host State may 
apply, including rules contained in a relevant regulatory framework.  
An important subcategory of such contracts is any agreement entered between an 
investor and the host government (host government agreement, HGA), or project 
agreements in the form of a licence, concession or affermage (the NT2 case study in 
section 7.2 provides an example of where a concession agreement has recently been 
used in an international electricity trade project). It is important to note that, in most 
civil law countries, the project/investment agreement is governed by administrative 
law, while in other countries, while it may be governed by contract law, it may 
supplemented by special provisions developed for government contracts for the 
provision of public services. 
Enforcement of agreements 
A key aspect of the set of agreements that have been put in place is the extent to 
which the parties’ performance of their obligations can be effectively enforced. A 
number of important elements of the contractual framework enter into this, 
including: 
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R The legal jurisdiction of the contracts 
R Dispute resolution procedures (see next sub-section) 
R The enforceability of judgements (in different countries) 
R Creditworthiness of the parties. 
4.2 Disputes in international electricity trade 
4.2.1 Types of Disputes  
As a result of the different rules that govern cross-border electricity trade, disputes 
can arise at three key levels and these will need to be accommodated within the 
dispute resolution mechanisms: 
R State to state 
R Investor to state 
R Private party to private party 
State to State  
The first category concerns disputes between States. This may arise over the 
interpretation or application of general bilateral or multilateral treaty obligations or 
obligations under customary international law (eg concerning principles of 
expropriation, state responsibility) as well as under project specific IGAs. 
As noted above, these disputes are governed by principles of international public 
law. They raise complex issues of sovereign immunity and attribution, and 
resolution of such disputes can be long and cumbersome. States are generally 
reluctant to take up the cause of an individual investor of their nationality.  
Investor to State (or State subsidiarities) 
In relation to investor to state disputes, two sub-categories of dispute arise:  
R Disputes where there is no direct prior relationship between state and 
investor (eg in form of project agreement, licence or other host-
government agreement). The government interferes instead in the 
project by exercising its regulatory, administrative or permitting powers. 
R Where there is a contract-based relationship (sometimes the qualification 
of a ‘licence’ as a contract can pose problems). Such contracts are 
generally not with the State but with one of its instrumentalities, state 
enterprises or sub-national governments. 
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In the second category, the dispute concerns issues of domestic laws (either of the 
host country or, if different, the governing law of the contract). 
In relation to the first kind of dispute, traditionally the rights of a private investors 
(including an SOE of another country) are limited to an action against the 
government in the domestic courts of the Host Government, under private laws of 
the Host state (for example, on the basis that the Host Government has breached 
some domestic investment promotion or other law, has acted ultra-vires etc).  
However, where, under a relevant inter-governmental agreement or in domestic 
legislation the State has bestowed rights directly on the national of another State 
and given its consent to submit such dispute to a dispute resolution mechanism 
(‘diagonal rights’), the investor will be entitled to bring a claim directly against the 
State under public international law. In this case, the relevant dispute concerns not 
any contract the investor has with the state instrumentality but the host 
Government’s treaty obligations.  
There is generally no requirement in this case to exhaust domestic remedies 
whether under the contract or domestic law provisions, even where such remedies 
are stated to be exhaustive.  
The establishment of such rights is an important aspect of creating a favourable 
investment climate. However, the exercise of such rights is not straightforward. 
Complex issues of State responsibility and attribution come into play - for example, 
whether the actions of a SOE, or other governmental entity can be attributed to the 
State. 
Private party to private party 
In addition to relations between private companies or individuals, this category 
would include disputes with or between SOEs acting in a commercial manner (not 
performing a government function). This may include contracts between various 
SOEs acting as market agents in a cross-border electricity project or trade.  
In the absence of a multilateral framework establishing a required dispute 
resolution mechanism for such transactions, the mechanism for resolution of such 
disputes will be provided for in the contract. 
4.3 Dispute resolution 
An essential element of promoting investment into and trade in electricity in the 
ECO region is the development of neutral, effective and binding dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  
International investors will value (and may require) the ability to submit disputes 
under international arbitration. The key reasons for this are: 
R Arbitration is under tried and tested rules which are well understood by 
international parties 
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R The procedures can be made neutral with respect to the various 
countries and parties involved 
R Enforcement is through international treaties 
An effective dispute resolution mechanism is particularly important in the case of 
cross-border trade, given the increased complexities involved, and multiple legal 
jurisdictions of relevance. However, the multiple layers of rules add to the difficulty 
of developing effective mechanisms.  
In choosing the dispute resolution arrangements, various elements need to be 
agreed, including: 
R the governing law of the subject matter of the dispute (this will depend 
on whether the dispute is an investment treaty dispute or a dispute 
under a private contract) 
R the forum  (courts, arbitration, a specialist tribunal) 
R the seat of the arbitration  
Disputes between States will typically be resolved through diplomatic channels (IFIs 
may also play a role as arbiters in disputes such as those regarding international 
trade), but failing this, may either be resolved under international arbitration or by 
an international court.  
The principle option in the case of disputes based on private commercial contracts 
or administrative law is between judicial (court) proceedings and arbitration 
(domestic or international). 
In the case of an agreement between an investor and a state instrumentality (such as 
a concession or licence) the ability to choose international dispute resolution 
mechanisms may be limited. Certain legal systems provide that the settlement of 
disputes arising out of agreements related to the provision of public services is a 
matter of exclusive competence of domestic judiciary or administrative courts. Even 
where this is not the case, contracting authorities will be reluctant to submit to non-
domestic court processes for dispute resolution, at least in relation to contracts 
concerning investments within the borders of the host country.  
In cross border contracts, on the other hand, parties may be more open to 
submission of the contracts to arbitration, particularly international arbitration. 
International arbitration is typically only available where a dispute involves two or 
more parties from different states (or otherwise involves foreign elements) and is 
decided in a final and binding manner, by private tribunals, rather than litigated in 
national courts (see section 3.1 for a discussion of the risk that domestic courts will 
refuse to recognise international arbitration clauses). 
Investment treaty arbitration is a sub-category of such arbitration, and serves to 
resolves disputes between investors and foreign states in which they have invested, 
outside of the terms of any relevant contract.  
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4.3.1 International arbitration options 
The principle options for international arbitration are between: 
R Ad hoc arbitration  
R Institutional arbitration 
In the case of Ad hoc Arbitration the Parties specify in the agreement all aspects of 
arbitration, including:  
R applicable law 
R rules under which arbitration will be carried out 
R method for selecting arbitrator 
R language 
R place of arbitration  
R issues subject to arbitration. 
The rules of an existing arbitration institution may be used without submitting to 
administration by that institution. 
In the case of Institutional Arbitration the parties specify in the agreement an 
arbitration institution to administer the arbitration from time of demand for 
arbitration through award. The principle institutions include: 
R The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of Arbitration 
R International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (see 
Box 6 for further discussion of ICSID) 
R American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
R The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(particularly in contracts dealing with East-West trade) 
R The London Court of International Arbitration 
However, institutional arbitration may also be through specialist tribunals 
established to deal with the specific types of disputes. For example, the designation 
of the regional Regulatory Commission (CRIE) as the international dispute 
resolution tribunal for specific types of disputes arising under the MER market in 
Central American electricity trade, and the SADC Tribunal in the case of SAPP in 
Southern Africa (these are discussed in more detail in the case studies in section 7).  
In either case, the parties must select rules to be applied. Unless an arbitral 
institution is selected to administer the arbitration under its rules, parties must 
develop their own rules or select rules of a specific arbitral institution, such as: 
R Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (1976), which are widely accepted, ‘off the 
shelf’ rules designed to be used in ad hoc arbitrations; they are not 
related to an arbitral institution 
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R Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). These Rules cover only state/investor disputes 
R Rules of other relevant institutions, such as the ICC, the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce 
Some institutions may administer arbitration according to their own rules or the 
rules of another institution (ICC will only administer according to its own rules). 
4.3.2 Submission to arbitration 
A key factor to bear in mind is that jurisdiction in international arbitration is based 
exclusively upon consent of parties (unlike personal and subject matter jurisdiction 
required in courts).  
In order for an investor to be able to take disputes with a State (whether under a 
contract or under public international law or treaty obligations) the State must 
consent to submit such disputes to arbitration. This is relatively straightforward in 
terms of obligations under a specific contract.  
The significant element of multilateral investment treaties such as the Energy Charter 
Treaty is that these treaties contain express consents by each State to the submission 
of disputes to international arbitration in the event that an investor in an energy 
project chooses this course. This submission covers dispute in relation to the 
obligations of the State under the treaty, regardless of whether these obligations are 
also reflected in a contract between the Investor and the State. In the case of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, the investor, if it chooses the path of international 
arbitration, may elect from one of three dispute resolution mechanisms:  
R The ICSID (if both the home state of the investor and the host state are 
parties to the ICSID Convention) or to the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules for the Administration of Proceedings by the Centre 
R A sole arbitrator or an ad hoc arbitration tribunal established under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration rules 
R The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
 
Box 6  ICSID Arbitration 
The ICSID Convention, an initiative of the World Bank established in 1966, provides a 
mechanism for arbitration of disputes between investors and States in relation to breach 
of international law (treaty) obligations concerning investment22.  
The jurisdiction of the Centre extends to (1) any legal dispute (2) arising directly out of an 
investment, (3) between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
                                                     
22 Among the ECO countries, Iran and Tajikistan are not Contracting States to ICSID, while the Kyrgyz 
Republic is a signatory to but has not ratified the Convention.  
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Box 6  ICSID Arbitration 
Contracting State that has been designated to the Centre by that State) and (4) a national 
of another Contracting State, (5) which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to 
submit to the Centre. 
Parties may agree that such local company because of foreign control will be treated as a 
national of another Contracting State for purposes of the Convention. A ‘national of 
another state’ may be a state-owned entity of the other State, provided that that SOE was 
not performing essentially governmental functions nor acting as agent for the government 
in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. 
Consent to Jurisdiction 
The parties’ written consent to arbitration under ICSID need not be expressed in a single 
instrument; and once the parties have given their consent, neither party may withdraw its 
consent unilaterally. A host State may “offer” to submit disputes to ICSID arbitration in 
investment promotion legislation or a treaty, which an investor may “accept” by 
submitting a request for arbitration with the Centre.  
Self contained system   
ICSID is a ’self-contained‘ system that, unlike, for example, ICC or arbitration conducted 
under the UNCITRAL Rules, is entirely removed from domestic court systems. There is 
no ‘location’ of the arbitration, and an ICSID arbitration is conducted solely in accordance 
with the international law provisions of the Convention and of the regulations and rules 
adopted pursuant to it. 
Arbitral awards rendered pursuant to the Convention are binding on the parties and not 
subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in the Convention 
itself. Unlike awards under other arbitral tribunals, enforced in accordance with New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
national courts have no power to review the awards in any way. They must enforce the 
pecuniary obligations imposed by the award as if it were a final judgment of the national 
courts. 
It is not possible, therefore, either to resist recognition and enforcement of an ICSID 
Convention award in any national court or to seek to vacate, annul or set aside an ICSID 
Convention award in a national court. The only remedies available against an award 
rendered under the ICSID Convention are those contained in the Convention (annulment 
through application to the ICSID tribunal, on one or more specified grounds – that the 
tribunal was not properly constituted, that it manifestly exceeded its powers, that one of 
its members was corrupt, that there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure and that the award failed to state the reasons on which it was based). 
4.4 Conclusions on governance 
International projects have additional risks and complexity to domestic projects and 
therefore require a set of rules on top of the national rules. A key concern of 
participants, and a test of the robustness of the governance framework, is the extent 
to which disputes can be efficiently and fairly resolved. Two principle sets of rules 
will govern a cross-border electricity transaction or investment: 
R Inter-governmental agreements (IGA) 
R Private commercial contracts 
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A key aspect of the set of agreements and their impact in reducing risk is the extent 
to which the parties’ performance of their obligations can be effectively enforced. 
This depends on a number of elements of the contractual framework including: 
R The legal jurisdiction of the contracts 
R Dispute resolution procedures  
R The enforceability of judgements (in different countries) 
R Creditworthiness of the parties. 
Disputes in projects involving private sector participants may arise between states, 
between states and private parties, or solely between private parties. Resolution 
may be by ad hoc arbitration procedures – in which case the parties specify in the 
agreement all aspects of arbitration – or by institutional arbitration under a set of 
international rules (eg ICSID, UNCITRAL or Stockholm ICC). Private parties will 
tend to prefer international arbitration to resolve disputes. The key reasons for this 
are: 
R Arbitration is under tried and tested rules which are well understood by 
international parties 
R The procedures can be carried out neutrally with respect to the various 
countries and parties involved 
R Enforcement is through international treaties 
The significant element of multilateral investment treaties such as the Energy Charter 
Treaty is that these treaties contain express consents by each State to the submission 
of disputes to international arbitration in the event that an investor in an energy 
project chooses this course. Such an approach has the potential to reduce the 
project’s risk profile and hence lower the financing costs. 
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5 Financing options for international trade projects 
5.1 Introduction 
The risk profile of a project and the allocation of those risks among the project 
parties are the key determinants of a project’s ability to attract private financing. As 
noted in section 3.4, the assessment of all risks, but in particular the country risk 
ratings, affect the cost of financing. The range of barriers to creating bankable 
projects in the ECO countries are compounded by the added risks of cross-border 
trading, especially when the involvement of the private sector is sought. This 
section considers the options for financing international electricity trade projects in 
the ECO region, taking account of the potential project types and risks. It covers the 
following topics: 
R Background on private sector participation 
R The investment context and country risk ratings 
R The potential financing parties and their investment products in the 
areas of: 
R Funding 
R Risk mitigation 
R The potential application of those products to different types of projects 
and countries 
Some terms which apply to the financing and structuring of electricity projects are 
summarised and defined in Table 7 
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Table 7  Definition of electricity project financing and structuring terms 
Term Definition 
PRG: Partial Risk Guarantee In privatization transactions, PRGs cover debt amounts 
against specific risks. PRGs typically cover private lenders 
against the risk of a public entity failing to perform its 
obligations with respect to a private project 
PRI: Political Risk Insurance 
 
Political risk insurance is insurance which covers various 
types of political risk, including (among others) political 
violence (such as revolution, insurrection, civil unrest, 
terrorism or war); governmental expropriation or 
confiscation of assets; governmental frustration or 
repudiation of contracts; wrongful calling of letters of 
credit or similar on-demand guarantees; and 
inconvertibility of foreign currency or the inability to 
repatriate funds 
ECA: Export Credit Agreement, 
or Export Credit Agency 
ECG: Export Credit Guarantee 
 
Export credit agreements are designed for medium and 
long-term export financing. They are granted directly by a 
Bank (or a group of Banks) to a foreign buyer (or a 
borrower acting on behalf of a buyer) who has signed a 
contract with an exporter.  The repayment of the loan is 
often guaranteed by an export credit guarantee agency 
based in the exporting country.  
HGA: Host Government 
Agreement 
 
An HGA is a legal agreement between a foreign investor 
and the local government which is designed to reduce 
financial and political risks posed to investors by sudden 
changes in national law. If a country breaks an agreement 
by interrupting or modifying a project it must pay a 
penalty, which can risk deterring interventions necessary 
to protect rights and enforce national laws that apply 
elsewhere in the country. 
FSA: Fuel Supply Agreement 
 
A FSA is a contract involving the supply of fuel for 
electricity generation.  It is normally developed between 
the entity supplying fuel and the owner of the power 
plant generating the electricity. 
PPA: Power Purchase 
Agreement 
A PPA is a contract involving the generation and sales of 
electricity.  It is normally developed between the owner of 
a power plant generating the electricity and the buyer of 
the electricity. 
 
5.2 Background on private sector participation 
Private investment in power projects has proved difficult in many countries and, as 
cross-border projects are considerably more complex, electricity trade carries more 
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risk for the project sponsors. These are some of the reasons behind the patchy record 
of private sector participation (PSP) in power during the last 10 years.  
Figure 6 illustrates the low and lumpy level of private participation in electricity 
over the ten year period to 2005 in the target region. No data was found for 
Afghanistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, so it is possible 
that no private participation was recorded over the period in those countries. A 
minimal level of investment was recorded in Tajikistan and the only countries to 
have recorded any private participation in electricity over the period 2003-2005 were 
Iran and Pakistan. 
Figure 6  Total investment in electricity infrastructure projects with private sector 
participation 1995-2005 
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Source: The World Bank PPI website 
It should be noted that Figure 6 shows the total investment in projects with some 
PSP – the value of private participation will be a fraction of this.  
The figure illustrates that investment involving PSP has been difficult in these 
countries as the risks are high. This suggests that the private sector is unlikely to 
finance the very highest risk projects, even if political risk insurance was available, 
although it may be more willing to fund medium and lower political and 
commercial risk projects. This indicates that there is likely to be a slow build-up, 
within the current risk and investment environments in the region, to the level of 
private sector involvement in electricity projects.  
5.3 Investment context and risk ratings 
The options for financing international electricity trade projects will largely be 
driven by the perceived risk profile of the projects put forward. As described in 
section  3, these risks can be grouped into political risks, commercial risks, and 
financial risks. Political risk will be the initial driver for project financing in the ECO 
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region. In this section we classify countries by sub-category of political risk. 
Whereas in advanced economies precise risk rating categories are available, for the 
ECO countries only a very broad rating classification is possible. The sub-categories 
used are Very High Risk, High Risk and Medium risk. Within the ECO region, we 
do not consider any of the likely trade projects to involve solely low risk countries. 
5.3.1 Risk classification 
From a financing perspective, energy trade projects may be classified as high risk if 
they have either of: 
R high levels of political risk due to the levels of political risk in either the 
originating, transit (if applicable) or recipient country  
R high levels of commercial risk, such as very weak off-taker 
creditworthiness.  
Political risk will be the dominant factor and high political risk countries (buyer, 
seller or transit countries) will have difficulty supporting any energy trade project 
involving private finance (without risk mitigation measures from parties outside the 
private sector), however low the commercial risk. Moderately high risk countries 
will only be able to support commercial projects involving private finance if the 
commercial risks are low and then, typically, with specific risk mitigation support. 
Conversely, countries with low political risk should be able to find funding on 
commercial terms for projects with moderate to high commercial risk. The analysis 
below sets out a framework for classifying risks. 
In Figure 7 below, we use the Rule of Law criterion from the Governance Matters V 
study23 as the best single indicator of political risk for the energy trade projects 
considered in this section. The Rule of Law is defined as:  
“the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence”.  
The bars in the chart indicate the percentage of countries in the world which ranked 
lower in the Rule of Law indicators. Low country percentile ranks indicate a low 
relative rule of law24. The chart covers both the ECO countries and some of the 
major likely importers of ECO generated electricity. 
                                                     
23 Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2006: Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 
1996-2005, World Bank 
24 The thin black lines extending from either side of the end of each country’s governance indicator bar 
indicate the range of statistical significance (within a 90% confidence interval).  
 
 
 
South Asia: Policy Paper for Regional Energy Trade, Final Report, March 2007  
Economic Consulting Associates, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Financing options for international trade 
projects  
64 
Figure 7  Relative governance rankings 
 
Source: Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005 
From the above we can rank the ECO countries as to their ‘Kaufmann scores’ and 
into the following groups: 
R Very High Risk: Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan ie below 
15th percentile 
R High Risk: Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Pakistan25 ie 
below 25th percentile 
R Medium-High Risk: Kazakhstan and Iran ie between 25th and 50th 
percentile, although recent events in Iran may cause the ranking for Iran 
to be down graded 
R Medium Risk: Turkey (like India) is ‘medium’ risk, ie over 50th 
percentile. 
These risk classifications are used below. For future projects, say 10-15 years from 
today, it is necessary to consider likely direction of the political environment in 
terms of its ability to attract private participation. 
                                                     
25 The rating for Pakistan is perhaps low considering its large number of IPPs, its recent good 
performance in payment, and the transparent implementation of a private power policy managed by 
the Private Power Investment Board. However, it suffered a damaging contract dispute with the Hub 
River power plant operators during the late 1990s. 
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5.3.2 Very High Risk countries 
Based on our knowledge and experience of project finance transactions, we think it 
is highly likely that projects in Very High Risk countries will only be funded by 
governments, donors, and bilateral / multilateral agencies or state utilities on a 
grant or concessional basis. It should be observed that this would therefore present 
major challenges to private participation in the financing of the TAP project (see 
section 8) unless the project is structured to ring fence certain components, at least 
until the risk profile of Afghanistan improves. 
This judgement is also likely to apply to higher commercial risk projects in High 
and possibly Medium-High risk countries. 
5.3.3 High Risk countries 
For projects which are located in countries that are below the very highest level of 
political risk, projects can then be classified as below: 
Medium or medium-high levels of commercial risk 
These projects are likely to be considered only by donors as per very high risk 
projects. 
Low levels of commercial risk 
These projects can attract a fuller range of funding options, including senior debt 
provided by IFIs / bilaterals and potentially market-based lenders with strong risk 
mitigation, soft loans and public and private equity chasing high risk and high 
return projects. 
5.3.4 Medium or Medium-High Risk countries 
For these countries, projects of both medium or medium-high and low levels of 
commercial risk will be considered by a full range of funders. But as noted above, 
[none of] the electricity trade projects under review involve exclusively medium risk 
countries. 
5.4 Potential funders and their products 
Participants in funding could include: 
R Donors 
R International financial institutions 
R National utilities 
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R Potential private sector participants: developers, contractors, private 
equity funds and market-based lenders 
5.4.1 Donor funding 
Donor funding for the highest risk projects is likely to take the form of providing 
grants for technical assistance or grants for government budget support, although 
the latter will only tend to be available once certain levels of governance have been 
attained, otherwise support will remain purely project based.  
Donor funding for the medium risk projects is likely to take the form of providing a 
blend of grants and soft loans. In some instances, grant components can effectively 
be used to ‘buy down’ the cost and risk profile of projects, facilitating public and 
private sector lending. Soft loans can be provided at sub-market interest rates and 
with non-commercial door to door tenors, including grace periods. Such loans are 
likely to be on a government to government basis. 
5.4.2 International Financial Institutions 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) include multilateral, bilateral and 
national/regional development banks and funds, which can be broadly grouped 
into: 
R ‘development banks’, which are largely state funded, 
R ‘development finance institutions’ (DFIs) which may include private 
sector funders.  
Development banks will often have both public sector and private sector windows, 
with projects being funded by one or the other depending on availability. A number 
of development banks are active in the target region, including the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), European Development Bank (EBRD) and World Bank. 
As an example, ADB has a significant technical assistance and lending programme 
in the energy sector26, typically with the relevant government ministry acting as 
client, and with loans on-lent from the relevant ministry to a project. ADB provides 
approximately 90% of its funding to sovereign governments with the remaining 
10% going to private sector projects. 
DFIs and private sector windows of development banks may be willing to provide 
project finance to high and medium risk projects by way of long term loans, partial 
equity funding and local currency funding mechanisms, as below: 
R Foreign currency loans can be provided on a standalone basis or can be 
packaged alongside commercial lenders: both the IFC and EBRD, for 
example, typically use A and B loan structures for senior debt 
investments, with the A loan being provided by IFIs and the related B 
loan provided by commercial lenders, such as the established 
                                                     
26 See www.adb.org for details 
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international banks, on a pari passu basis. Investment terms, including 
loan tenor, margin and repayment profile, will vary according to the 
exact nature of political risk cover provided and the commercial risk 
profile. 
R Equity funding can be provided alongside the majority of equity 
provided by the project sponsor. 
R Local currency can be provided either directly or by way of local 
currency guarantees, although availability of either will be highly 
dependent on specific country and project characteristics. 
DFIs and private sector windows of development banks will tolerate certain levels 
of political risk, but will be concerned with the commercial risks identified in 
Section 3. 
It should be noted that some IFIs (including the World Bank) have developed 
regulatory risk mitigation methods, including regulatory risk guarantees, which are 
intended to address this problem. These are discussed further in section 5.5 below. 
5.4.3 National utilities 
A state utility may itself act as a project funder, but most utilities in the ECO region 
will be cash constrained. A utility’s ability to raise third party funding will typically 
be constrained by a relatively weak balance sheet and lack of internationally 
recognised credit rating. In Pakistan, the transmission company (National 
Transmission and Dispatch Company, NTDC) has recently succeeded for the first 
time to raise a small commercial loan for a transmission project, although the 
revenues from that transmission service have been ring-fenced for debt servicing. 
The loan has a short tenor and is for a purely domestic project. 
Most ECO national utilities will therefore be more dependent on state funding, 
whether from ministry of finance or government backed development banks / 
funds, or indirectly by donors and bilateral / multilateral agencies. 
5.4.4 Potential private sector participants 
In principle, the private sector can provide funding through a number of routes: 
R Developers providing risk capital (equity and sub-debt) 
R Contractors providing risk capital (typically equity, but also supplier 
credit with export guarantees from their own governments) 
R Private sector venture capital and private equity funds 
R Market-based lenders 
Private participation is likely to be only partial for most projects under 
consideration in the region, as most private sector investors will not accept the level 
of political risk in Very High Risk countries and will only consider medium or low 
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risk commercial risks in High Risk countries with full political risk insurance (PRI). 
PRI has restricted availability and limited appeal to certain private investors, due to 
the potentially lengthy and uncertain pay-out process (see below). 
5.5 Providers of risk mitigation products 
Potential risk mitigation products can be divided into those which are:  
R event specific, that is they pay out when a given event triggers a loss, 
such as PRI and Partial Risk Guarantees (PRGs) 
R more general default guarantees, such as partial credit guarantees 
PRGs of the type offered by World Bank, can be seen as an enhanced form of PRI - 
development banks are able to provide this degree of cover because their exposure 
is normally counter-guaranteed by the host government of the country in which the 
investment takes place. 
Note that in theory, PRI can provide protection against adverse regulatory actions, 
but the difficulty lies in proving that specific events have occurred to trigger payout 
under the PRI cover. Most PRI providers effectively include ‘denial of justice’ 
clauses ie they only pay out after an arbitration, or when justice has been denied, or 
when the government entity has failed to pay out. 
PRGs are offered by many development banks, including the ADB in addition to the 
World Bank. They are event specific products and differ from PRI (such as provided 
by MIGA) due to the broader range of risks offered, such as enhanced breach of 
contract and covering host country obligations. Certain providers, such as [ADB] 
can offer PRG’s without a counter-guarantee, albeit at more market related pricing. 
It was noted in section 3 that actual availability of cover can be a limiting factor: for 
example, MIGA can insure up to USD 200 million per project and could seek to 
syndicate for higher amounts, but as there may be few willing insurers (ADB and 
OPIC are possible candidates), availability may in practice be constrained for larger 
transmission and distribution projects in higher risk countries, and without that 
cover the project may well not attract any form of commercial or development 
finance.  
Commercial investors would typically require full cover for the types of projects 
under consideration - MIGA can cover equity investors up to 90% and debt up to 
95% - but that cover will be an additional cost to the project. Pricing for political risk 
will depend on the points of cover (political risk sub-sets) required: it ranges from 
45 basis points (bps) to 175 bps for the first three points of cover listed in section 3.1. 
Breach of contract might add a further 30-50 bps. 
Partial Credit Guarantees will normally only cover the back end years of any loans, 
their aim being to increase tenors.  
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5.6 Potential application – conclusions on financing 
options 
The applicability of funding and risk mitigation options depends on the risk profile 
of the country(s) and the project. Project structure will vary depending on whether 
the ownership (equity financing) is predominantly in the hands of the government 
and state-owned entities, or predominantly in the hands of private firms. 
Commercially structured projects can, in principle, be funded with a blend of equity 
and debt. At one end of the project risk profile, state utilities may finance new 
projects through taking on additional loans, some of which may come via local 
banks with the backing of government guarantees (see Figure 8.  
Figure 8  Illustrative predominantly state-owned project financing structure 
Government
Domestic banks
State Utility Export market
IFIs                
Development Banks
Foreign banksExport Credit Agencies
PPA
PRIPRGs
ECG
Govt guarantee
 
PRG = Partial Risk Guarantee, PRI = Political Risk Insurance, ECG = Export Credit Guarantee, PPA = Power 
Purchase Agreement.  For definitions of these terms, see  Table 7 
At the other end of the risk profile, the private sector would typically look to engage 
in the development of a transmission and / or generation and transmission project 
by providing equity alongside a highly geared structure to maximise potential 
returns (although we recognise that high levels of gearing can increase the risk of a 
project breaching its covenants and going into default).  The higher the degree of 
political risk, the harder it will be to achieve any significant private equity stake, at 
least without significant guarantees as well as standard political risk insurance. 
Figure 9 below illustrates a possible project structure for a commercially viable 
project in a medium or high risk country. 
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Figure 9  Illustrative predominantly private project financing structure 
 
Project 
company
Lead contractor
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PRG = Partial Risk Guarantee, PRI = Political Risk Insurance, ECA = Export Credit Agreement, DFI = 
Development Financial Institution, HGA = Host Government Agreement, FSA = Fuel Supply Agreement, PPA 
= Power Purchase Agreement.  For definitions of these terms, see  Table 7 
More complex arrangements are likely to be required for multi-country electricity 
trade, possibly involving ring-fencing of individual country components. The 
Nabucco gas pipeline project27 is an example of a 5 country project in which each of 
the national utilities is responsible for the financing, construction and operation of 
the segment within their own borders. However, this project is currently proving 
difficult to bring to financial close. 
 
The likely financing options for different combinations of political and commercial 
risk are summarised in Table 8 below. 
                                                     
27 The proposed Nabucco pipeline would transport natural gas from Turkey to Austria, passing 
through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.  
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Table 8 Financing options in the presence of risk 
Political risk > Very High High Medium 
Medium/high, 
medium 
 Medium/high, 
medium 
 
Commercial risk > Any level 
 Low  Low 
Donors, IFIs, 
bilateral agencies 
Grant finance 
May provide limited foreign currency risk 
mitigation (if private sector involved. 
Could provide to state utility) 
Grant / 
concessionary 
finance (soft loans) 
Senior debt finance 
Risk mitigation 
Senior debt, partial 
equity 
Risk mitigation role 
Mainly risk 
mitigation role 
Governments / 
State utilities 
Finance if available  
Sovereign guarantees (if private sector 
involved. Could provide to counterparty 
state utility) 
Finance if available, 
Sovereign guarantees
Finance if available, 
Sovereign guarantees
Finance if available, 
Sovereign guarantees
Finance if available, 
Sovereign guarantees 
Commercial 
lenders 
Very low or none – require very strong 
mitigation (eg Political risk insurance) 
Low or none – 
require very strong 
risk mitigation 
High-risk appetite 
lenders supported by 
risk mitigation 
Medium-risk 
appetite lenders 
supported by risk 
mitigation 
Medium-risk 
appetite lenders 
supported by risk 
mitigation 
Provision of 
financing and 
risk mitigation 
Private equity Very low or none – require very strong 
risk mitigation 
Low or none – 
require very strong 
risk mitigation 
High-risk appetite 
investors supported 
by partial risk 
mitigation 
Medium-risk 
appetite investors, 
possibly no risk 
mitigation 
Medium-risk 
appetite investors 
State utilities Project leader, main commercial partner 
(ie buyer or seller) 
Project leader, main 
commercial partner 
Project leader, main 
commercial partner 
Smaller project role, 
but large commercial 
role 
Smaller project role, 
possibly commercial 
role Project 
participation Private 
participants 
Very low or none – require very strong 
risk protection assurances 
Low level (eg 
Contracting, supply) 
Larger contracting, 
supply role 
May take project lead 
(eg NT2) supported 
by risk mitigation 
Project lead 
supported by risk 
mitigation 
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6 Types of international trading arrangements 
International (as well as national) electricity trading tends to evolve from simple 
types of transactions involving two parties to more complex forms of multi-party 
and multi-country trading. Simple bilateral trade can be between a buyer and seller 
within a country, or between national utilities across a border. Multi-party trading 
can involve multiple buyers and sellers, including independent suppliers and 
traders, and pooling arrangements. These generally evolve from national electricity 
markets to regional markets involving detailed rules for competitive cross-border 
trading and access to networks. 
The full evolution will typically take many years, during which time the various 
elements of the supporting institutional framework can be gradually developed 
both nationally and internationally. This section sets out a general typology of four 
main types of trading arrangements for international electricity projects, which 
characterise the principle stages in the evolution of a regional market. It discusses 
them in terms of their main characteristics, the supporting institutional and legal 
framework, and the specific risk characteristics. This typology is later used to 
discuss the case studies (section 7) and the potential options for trade in the ECO 
region (section 9). 
As international electricity trade evolves from simple arrangements toward 
increasing integration, allowing higher levels of complexity of trading methods, it 
may facilitate realisation of greater benefits from trade through the efficient sharing 
of resources and capacities. The pace and extent of this evolution depends on the 
specific characteristics of the parties, requirements, objectives, opportunities and 
constraints to trade in each case. Risks to trading parties may increase with greater 
trading complexity – this must be offset by developing the framework of rules and 
governance arrangements to support it (eg legal and institutional coordination 
within the region). These steps take time and there are likely to be higher risks in 
by-passing the intermediate evolutionary steps.  
Among the key determinants of the form of trading arrangements will be all of the 
considerations that contribute to project risk including the capacity in the 
institutional, legal, and commercial framework in the partner countries, as well as 
the technical capacity for trade.  
At each stage of the evolution of the market, the benefits and risks should be 
examined by considering: 
R Why increase trade? 
R What is the potential scope and scale of trade and what is the 
existing level of trade 
R What are the overall benefits of increasing trade and how they 
may be shared among the partner countries 
R How to trade? 
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R Who are the buyers (offtakers) and are they sufficiently 
creditworthy to facilitate efficient project financing 
R Is the existing level of institutional, legal, technical and commercial 
development within and between the potential trade partner 
countries adequate to support more complex trade 
R What is the profile of risks impacting on the trading arrangements 
and what is the most effective way to manage the mitigation of 
risk 
Growth in volume of trade will tend to be lead over a period of time to changes in 
the types of trading arrangement, bringing with it a change in risk profile and 
consequent need for appropriate risk mitigation measures. These are best 
understood by considering in detail the main types of trade, their specific risk 
characteristics and typical supporting institutional framework. We therefore 
consider firstly, the international experience in types of trade and their place within 
the evolution towards integrated markets; and secondly, the types of trade most 
relevant to the ECO region. These are discussed below for four main types of 
trading arrangement applicable to ECO over a number of evolutionary stages. 
6.1 Forms of trading arrangement 
6.1.1 General forms – international experience 
The form and arrangements in place around the world for international electricity 
trade vary between countries and regions depending on the scale and degree of 
complexity of the trade, and the resulting level of integration required between the 
trading partners. While the evolution of trading arrangements is slightly different in 
each case, the move from simple bilateral contracting to more integrated  forms of 
multi-country trading tends involve a simulataneous development of onstitutional, 
commercial and operational rules and mechanisms with their associated entities 
(such as national regulators). 
A simplified picture of some of the commonly found elements within the spectrum 
of arrangements for electricity trade between countries and within regions along 
with the required supporting structures and arrangements is illustrated in 
Figure 10. This highlights the increasing integration between the markets and 
technical operations as the complexity of trading arrangements increases, but also 
the necessary changes in the supporting framework for the coordination of 
institutional, commercial and operational structures and procedures.  Evolution to a 
single market would take a considerable period in the ECO region, so the immediate 
interest is in the earlier stages. It is nonetheless useful to have an indication of the 
direction of longer term development. 
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Figure 10  Spectrum of international electricity trading arrangements 
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6.1.2 Factors affecting trading arrangements in ECO 
In the ECO region, and in particular within Central Asia and between it and its 
neighbours, trading arrangements in the short to medium term are likely to take the 
form of the first two shown in Figure 10: bilateral exchanges and long-term PPAs. 
For larger trade projects including those where e some generation investment might 
be needed, these could be backed by inter-governmental agreements and, 
particularly where there is involvement of the private sector, sovereign government 
investment and revenue guarantees.  Characteristics influencing the pace of 
evolution of trading arrangements to the more complex forms likely to develop in 
the ECO region include: 
R The need for new-build transmission lines  
R The involvement of third-party transit countries 
R Weak institutional, legal and commercial environments  
R Creditworthiness problems of some potential offtakers 
R Post-conflict countries 
The requirement for large-scale investments and a desire to introduce international 
best practice make participation of the private sector desirable. However, it is likely 
that while trade relations develop the governments in the region will need to take a 
prominent role throughout the project lifetime in order to mitigate the project risks.  
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6.1.3 Four trade typologies for ECO 
In the sections that follow we categorise typical international trading arrangements 
into four typologies relevant to the ECO region. The arrangements differ in the level 
of trade they support and the degree of sophistication and coordination required of 
the supporting institutions and agreements. The four typologies, some of which are 
subdivided into sub-typologies, are: 
R Typology 1: Bilateral trade between neighbours 
R Sub-case 1a: state-to-state utility transfers 
R Sub-case 1b: dedicated trade from new facilities 
R Sub-case 1c: private sector involvement 
R Typology 2: Bilateral trade via a transit country 
R Typology 3: Trade among synchronised systems 
R Typology 4: Multilateral trade within a pool mechanism  
The remainder of this section describes the characteristics of each of these typologies 
and sub-cases in turn. For each, we discuss: 
R Key characteristics of the form of trade 
R Supporting framework requirements 
R Specific risk characteristics 
We also provide examples from international practice and indicate the relevance of 
the form of trade to the ECO region. 
Throughout the discussion the party that is on the selling side of trade is referred to 
as the Supplier, while the party who is the buying on behalf of the ultimate 
consumer is referred to as the Offtaker.  
6.2 Bilateral trade between neighbours (Typology 1) 
6.2.1 Overview 
The least complex arrangement for cross-border electricity trade is direct bilateral 
trade between two neighbouring countries. This is commonly the starting point for 
the development of international trade, often motivated by mutual security of 
supply benefits. In its simplest form, small cross-border bilateral trade is quite 
common, and there are several examples within the ECO countries. 
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Direct bilateral trade is an appropriate first step where the trading countries have 
poorly developed institutional, legal and commercial frameworks. For this reason, 
we refer to this arrangement as Typology 1. We consider three sub-cases: 
R State-to-state trade involving nationalised utilities and existing facilities 
R Larger dedicated projects involving new facilities (generation and/or 
transmission) 
R Private sector involvement 
The complexity increases progressively as trade moves from simple state-to-state 
transfers toward large dedicated cross-border projects. As the volume of trade 
increases technical, and related institutional and economic, issues need to be 
addressed for the interconnection of the systems. Systems that are not synchronised 
may trade between parts of their systems that are electrically islanded (ie enclave 
projects), or be connected by a direct current (DC) link. A key step-change in 
complexity with larger projects, technically, institutionally and in cost terms, is the 
synchronisation of parts or all of neighbouring systems.  
Initially, agreements for small mutually beneficial transfers develop at the utility-to-
utility level, with authorisation at the outset from governmental level. As transfers 
increase or larger transfers are proposed, greater involvement and communication 
may be established at the inter-governmental level. This may involve meetings 
between the respective energy or trade ministries and the establishment of a trade 
working group. The working group will include experts from the electricity sectors 
and representatives from the interested ministries. Most large dedicated projects in 
new markets are underpinned by Inter-governmental Agreements (this is also often 
true for other larger and more complex forms of trade). The degree of high-level 
governmental involvement will reflect and affect the scale and speed at which trade 
arrangements develop.  
Each of the three sub-cases is discussed in greater detail below. 
6.2.2 Sub-case 1a: State-to-state utility transfers 
Key characteristics 
The state-to-state utility transfer sub-case is usually characterised by small-scale 
imbalance trading of existing surpluses through existing border crossings. This may 
be at high voltage transmission to provide occasional support to system reliability 
but more typically will develop in an ad hoc manner at the local level, usually at 
low voltage, using the sub-transmission or distribution networks. The recipients in 
this case are small areas that are (or can easily be made) electrically part of the 
supplying country and may be isolated from the main grid within their own 
country. The trade is peripheral to the capacity of two systems which are otherwise 
intended to continue their independence. The motivation for trade at this early stage 
of evolution is to take advantage of conveniently located and timed surpluses rather 
than to increase interdependence or trade for larger economic benefit.  
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The features of this sub-case are: 
R Trade is carried out between state-owned utilities, often local utilities 
R Trade is generally for small quantities of non-firm energy 
R There is often complementarity between the demand-supply balances in 
the two countries that give security of supply benefits and cost benefits 
at the margin 
R Trade is often to serve demand centres close to the border that are 
isolated from or poorly connected to the main grid in their country 
R Settlement arrangements are quite simple, with payment often for the 
difference in net transfers only. Equal volumes in opposite directions are 
deemed to cancel each other 
R Trade may be governed by agreements between utilities and between 
governments or begin with relatively informal agreements between 
utilities 
R Trade is between electrically islanded parts of the system: that is, the 
systems are not synchronised for the purpose of facilitating trade 
The inter-utility and inter-government links established during this stage of trade 
development can form the first steps toward greater integration. Trade 
arrangements in this category may progress beyond small imbalance transfers to 
larger and firmer trade as relationships and agreements between the utilities and 
respective governments develop. However, trade remains within the capacity of 
existing infrastructure and trade facilitation is not a driver for system expansion.  
This type of trade is suited to situations where the transfers are small or where there 
are roughly matched flows in both directions so that the net transfers are small.  
Examples of small cross-border transfers within ECO at present include:  
R Between the isolated grid in eastern Iran and western Pakistan 
(Balochistan) to the south and Turkmenistan to the north 
R Between Afghanistan and its neighbours Iran, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
R Azerbaijan with Turkey and Iran 
The case of Turkmenistan – Iran is an example where trade is increasing from the 
state-to-state case toward larger scale dedicated trade under more formalised 
arrangements. Exports to Iran from Turkmenistan are currently as high as 
230 GWh pa. 
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Supporting framework 
The supporting framework in the state-to-state case consists of agreements at the 
utility level supported by authorisation from government. Although transfers are 
small, and therefore security of supply is not a large concern, political sensitivities 
often mean that government involvement (at the Ministerial or even higher level, as 
was the case for the development of Nepal-India trade – see Box 7) is required from 
the outset. The arrangements are likely to be utility to utility at the detail of 
metering and accounting.  
Box 7 Small cross-border trade  
Small scale trade between Nepal and India 
Cross border electricity trade takes place between Nepal and India at a number of points 
along the border. In the financial year ending 2006, the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) 
imported 266 GWh from India and exported 101 GWh. Imports are used to cover 
domestic capacity shortfalls. 
Trade of around 5 MW initially developed in the 1970s to supply customers not connected 
to the Nepalese national grid from India and to improve security of supply to the 
bordering Indian states through backup supply from Nepal. Interconnections are now at 
11, 33 and 132 kV, providing a cross-border capacity of around 50 MW and there are 
plans to upgrade it to 150 MW through new 132 kV connections. 
The Power Trade Department within NEA negotiates and manages PPAs and short-term 
trade with the Power Trading Corporation of India. Payment for short-term trades and 
small cross-border transfers is only made for the net imbalances. 
Developing trade from a small base 
An inter-governmental agreement signed in 1991 created the India-Nepal Power 
Exchange Committee, headed by the Managing Director of NEA. Its role is to coordinate 
improvements in existing trade and to pursue larger-scale hydro projects.. The legal and 
institutional arrangements for larger-scale trade were further developed in the 1997 Indo-
Nepal Power Trade agreement, which frees licensed private sector parties to arrange 
cross-border trade. Other enabling agreements have also been reached with the aim of 
furthering larger-scale trade.  
However, exports to India have been declining in recent years and the large-scale trade 
opportunities have yet to yield fruit. This is partly due to a failure or inability to deal with 
construction and political risk in Nepal and concerns about the creditworthiness of 
counterparties on the Indian side.  
 
The agreements to support this level of trade will include: 
R A commitment, possibly at the governmental level, between the sides to 
supply the stated areas  
R agreements on metering covering issues such as timing and how 
differences between meter readings on either side of the border will be 
handled  
R tariffs and how payment will be made  
 
 
 
South Asia: Policy Paper for Regional Energy Trade, Final Report, March 2007  
Economic Consulting Associates, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Types of international trading 
arrangements  
79 
When volumes begin to increase the arrangements evolve toward the more complex 
cases discussed below.  
At this nascent stage of trade development, payment is often only for the net 
difference in transfers with equal flows in opposite directions cancelling each other 
out. For trade of this type, which is primarily out of convenience, pricing is likely to 
be simple. Depending on the conditions and status of the supplying electricity 
system, there may be minimum but not strict commitments on the quality of supply. 
Material changes to these arrangements will be largely unnecessary unless the 
conditions change. If demand grows to create more of a supply burden or more 
significant reliance there is likely to be pressure to increase the complexity of the 
arrangements, particularly concerning metering and tariffs.  
Specific risk characteristics 
Volumes traded in this sub-case are small with the result that risk at the aggregate 
level is low. Security of supply concerns are limited to the border areas whose 
electricity consumption is proportionally a small part of the consumption within the 
country’s system, and supply is a small part of the counterparty’s system. In the 
extreme case that supply was interrupted temporary supply could be provided from 
portable diesel or truck-mounted generators.  
Payment risk is also limited by the small-scale nature of the transfers. Again, 
payments for this level of trade are low relative to the total system costs on the 
supplying side of the border, making the relative risk small. In cases where transfers 
are made in both directions the net payment risk will be further reduced.  
Since this sub-case sees no system expansion (aside from minor local system 
reinforcement if necessary) there is no planning, construction, or financing risk.  
6.2.3 Sub-case 1b: Dedicated trade from new facilities 
Key characteristics 
Trade in this sub-case involves a larger volume requiring new facilities to be built, 
and consequently introducing much higher levels of risk (eg planning, construction 
and financing risks). This may be new generation where existing surpluses are 
insufficient to meet planned trade, new transmission to carry existing surpluses or 
increased volumes from new generation and ensure stability, or both. In this case 
trade remains limited to direct transfers between two neighbouring countries.  
This situation may occur between neighbours where one has a growing demand 
and the other has potential supply capacity due to an abundance of fuel or 
hydropower resources or an installed capacity surplus. In the simplest case, these 
conditions create clear benefits to trade for both sides.  
The development of larger dedicated projects may evolve from small confidence 
building projects that have low risk. This provides valuable working experience 
between the sides where there is little history of trade or cooperation. It also allows 
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the trade arrangements to be tested and, where problems are encountered, adapted 
to more effective approaches. An example of this confidence building evolution is 
given by the large Nam Theun 2 project, which was preceded by a number of 
smaller hydro projects such as the Theun-Hinboun IPP (see Box 9). 
A number of technical alternatives are available for interconnection of the dedicated 
projects with the offtaking system: 
R Enclave or islanded basis 
R Direct current (DC) link 
R Synchronised systems 
In projects developed on an enclave basis the generation28 is electrically islanded 
from the transmission system in the supplying country and directly connected to 
the receiving country’s system. In this case the generation source is in effect a part of 
the Offtaker’s system, but happens to be located in the Supplier country.  
Another interconnection option is a direct current (DC) link between the generation 
source and the demand offtake. A voltage converter station is required at each end 
of the line. A DC link is a technically complex option with high associated 
equipment and operation costs. An example of a dedicated generation project 
connected to the demand centre by a DC link is the Cahora Bassa project between 
Mozambique and South Africa (see Box 8).  
Under a more advanced stage of interconnection the two countries’ electricity 
systems can be synchronized for trade, essentially operated as a single system 
(although scheduling and transmission planning can continue to take place from 
locations in both countries). This usually requires significant investment in technical 
capacity as well as in system operation. The trade and security of supply benefits 
from this arrangement must be sufficient to outweigh the high associated costs. 
International trade within the SAPP arrangements in Southern Africa provides 
examples of all three interconnection option (see 7.4 for more details of SAPP). 
UCTE in Europe is an example of an advanced synchronous area (see Box 10).  
Box 8  Cahora Bassa hydro and transmission project 
 
The Cahora Bassa project involves a 2,075 MW hydro electric plant on the Zambezi river 
in Northern Mozambique connected to South Africa by a 1,360 km, 533 kV dual HVDC 
transmission line. The second line, located 1 km parallel to the first, provides backup. The 
line is capable of transporting 1,920 MW to the converter station near Pretoria. At the time 
of commissioning in 1977 it was the largest hydro scheme in Southern Africa. In 1999 the 
project provided 3.5% of Eskom’s total supply. Since the late 1990s some energy from the 
station has also been supplied to Zimbabwe. 
The project was developed under power purchase and sale agreements signed between 
the Portuguese (the colonial rulers of Mozambique) and South African governments 
                                                     
28 less often, the demand centre can be served through the converse arrangement  
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Box 8  Cahora Bassa hydro and transmission project 
(represented by state-owned utility Eskom) in 1969. A construction joint venture was 
formed between Eskom and a company (Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa, HCB) part 
owned by the Portuguese (82%) and Mozambican (18%) governments. HCB entered into a 
BOO contract for the generation facilities and transmission to the border. Eskom were 
obliged to build the transmission line and converter station in South Africa.  
The supply agreement included some electricity swaps between Eskom and Electricidade 
de Moçambique whereby Eskom supplied southern Mozambique from its network in 
Eastern Transvaal and netted these transfers off the total imports to South Africa from 
Cahora Bassa.  
Supply from the project was stopped for 17 years as a result of damage during the 
Mozambican civil war (see Box 1). The 1984 Cape Town Agreement, which suspended 
and revised the original supply agreement, established a Permanent Joint Committee of 
experts whose role was to advise the two governments on issues related to technical, 
maintenance and economic aspects of the project. The Committee was formed of an equal 
number of experts from both sides and operated according to a set of jointly agreed rules. 
The Committee was also granted authority to review and advise on tariffs. 
Following Mozambican independence from Portugal in 1974, majority ownership in HCB 
remained with the Portuguese government in the original proportions. Considerable 
outstanding debt remained a barrier to the transfer of the asset to the Mozambican 
government. Due diligence on the sale was completed in 2006 and in October the two 
governments signed an agreement whereby Portugal reduced its ownership stake to 15% 
and transferred the remainder to Mozambique for a sum of US$ 950 million.  
 
The increased scale and financing requirements make projects of this type targets 
for International Financial Institution (IFIs) involvement. In addition to their role in 
providing finance, IFIs can play an important role through technical assistance and 
as neutral coordination and mediation parties. IFIs can also provide planning and 
institutional discipline and add momentum to the project.  
Supporting framework 
The larger scale of trade and investment under this sub-case require a more detailed 
set of supporting institutions and agreements at the governmental level. The 
supporting framework must now provide protection and mitigation against the 
increased risks. The supporting framework of agreements will include: 
R Inter-governmental Agreements with all countries as parties to 
guarantee: 
R Investments in new facilities (in the form of a concession 
agreement) 
R Offtakes 
R Power purchase agreement between Supplier and Offtaker 
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Larger scale trade of this type is usually given legal underpinning by an inter-
governmental agreement (IGA), sometimes in the form of a treaty29. This is the 
framework agreement for the project that specifies the intent of the parties, 
establishes the legal context and jurisdiction, and provides a reference for the 
derivative agreements that will enable the planning, execution and ongoing 
operation of the project as well as incorporating the allocation of risk among the 
parties.  
The framework agreement usually requires ratification in each country’s legislature 
and entry into force through enabling legislation. It thus becomes a law and takes 
precedence over all/most previously enacted laws of the country. This was the case 
with the SCP projects (see section 7.5) where the IGAs (and HGAs) become public 
documents once they became laws. 
The power purchase agreement (PPA) will specify in detail the terms for the trade 
including firm volumes and timing of supply and price. The delivered price will 
incorporate the cost of transporting the electricity from the generation facility to the 
point of delivery. 
The development of the necessary supporting agreements and structures should 
involve meetings between the respective government representatives, including the 
energy and finance ministries, and the utilities. An international trade working 
group, representing experts from both sides, is usually established to coordinate 
feasibility studies and develop the project concept that will form the basis of 
negotiations on the IGA.  
Formalised supporting institutional arrangements are required at the project level 
following the signing of the IGA. The key decision makers in government may be 
represented by a high level committee. The working group structure can be 
continued, expanding where necessary, incorporating a secretariat and project 
management function and acting as a central pool of expertise to advise the high 
level committee. This project management organisation can be delegated a 
coordinating role under the terms of the IGA for the various tasks that require 
common agreement between the trading parties. These include facilitating 
discussion and agreement on issues such as metering, reconciliation and payment 
arrangements. This organisation provides a forum in which differences of view can 
be discussed and resolved.  
At this increased level of trade the formalised agreements must ultimately be 
backed by dispute resolution procedures (see section 4.3) that are acceptable to all 
parties and are credible. A neutral country (that is, one that has no commercial or 
other interest in the trade arrangement) is often chosen to locate the dispute process 
especially arbitration proceedings. For example, arbitration for the Laos-Thailand 
Nam Theun 2 project (see section 7.2) is located in Singapore.  
                                                     
29 For example, the Marco Treaty of the Electrical Market of Central America, which forms the 
Framework Agreement for the SIEPAC project. See section 7.3.3 for further details. 
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Specific risk characteristics 
At the level of complexity represented by this sub-case it is necessary to consider the 
range of issues and risks related to international electricity trade. Planning, 
construction, financing, supply and payment risk all become relevant.  
In projects of this type each of the two trading utilities take responsibility for the 
parts of the project that fall within their territory. One utility builds part of a new 
transmission line to its side of the border where it meets the part of the line built by 
the other utility. Similarly, new generation is the responsibility of the utility in 
whose territory it is being built.  
In this case the first clear delineation of risk between the parties is on the basis of 
location. This leads to splitting of those risks associated with parts of the project that 
lie on both sides of the border, notably transmission related risks. This highlights a 
further risk, that of coordination between the parts of the project being carried out 
by different organisations. This is also a dependency risk. 
Planning risk – the close involvement of the state in projects of this type should 
enable planning risk to be reduced early in project development.  
Financing risk – the state-owned utilities that are the parties in this sub-case have 
the financial backing of the state which is able to draw on lower cost sovereign rated 
financing. Project financing arrangements should be stated in the IGA. Whether the 
utilities are named as equity financiers or parties to debt, it remains the 
governments who ultimately bear the financing risk, since the utilities are their 
agents. Having committed themselves to the project through the IGA the respective 
governments in effect agree to financially backing the project. Governments should 
also be the appropriate party to bear foreign exchange risk.  
Construction risk – The utility may have some advantage over a non-utility 
developer in reducing construction risk due to its local knowledge and existing 
capacity in the country. The ability of the construction utility to mitigate delays due 
to labour disputes will depend on the specific labour market and laws. The state-
owned utility will not necessarily be better able to reduce this risk, or the risk of 
other construction delays, than a non-state utility.  
Supply risk - Under the larger transfers the buying side is accepting a degree of 
dependence as part of that country’s electricity supply (or fuel supply to dependent 
local generation) is now originating from its neighbour. Interruptions can occur for 
reasons related to outages or events beyond the operator’s control, or due to 
deliberate interruptions. It is often the case that a country will be reluctant to open 
itself to a supply vulnerability without corresponding leverage over its trade 
partner.  
Dedicated new build generation projects are typically the case for hydropower 
facilities, since the fuel resource is location specific. Where generation is to be by 
fossil fuels there is the option of transporting the fuel for generation within the 
demand country. This reduces a number of sovereignty risks that arise due to the 
location of the generation assets. However, the fuel supply risk, which cannot be 
diversified in this way, then remains (see Box 4).  
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Payment risk – the risk of non-payment is more serious in this case than in sub-case 
1a. The fixed costs of dedicated facilities involving multi-million dollar investments 
will be financed on projected income streams as laid out in the PPA. An interruption 
to payment presents financial costs to the financiers and may threaten project 
continuity.  
6.2.4 Sub-case 1c: Private sector involvement 
The third sub-case within arrangements for bilateral trade between neighbours 
considers the entry of the private sector. This sub-case builds from either of the 
previous two but is made more complex by the need to contract with private parties 
and ensure their performance. 
Small cross-border transfers 
The private sector may be involved in small cross-border trade where an existing 
concession is held in a border area and this is extended to include service to 
customers on the other side of the border. The private sector in this case may be 
serving energy to a rural electrification concession or an off-grid town, or may be 
delivering energy from the state-owned utility over a privately developed network. 
Such small private operators are likely to have relatively unsophisticated 
commercial resources, although it could conceivably be a larger operator where 
there is a larger border settlement. The private sector may also be on the customer 
side (in which case many of the risks discussed below are still relevant). 
A private party selling across the border will seek to relate cross-border sales clearly 
to costs and to make a return on the activity. They will require well defined and 
verifiable metering arrangements and certainty of settlement. The private sector is 
unlikely to be satisfied with the relatively informal relationships, which may be in 
place between state-utilities. 
The arrangements that develop for private sector involvement in cross-border trade 
at this level will depend on who the counterparty to trade is: the utility in the 
receiving country or the utility in the operating country. Which of these the private 
party will prefer is likely to depend on the specific circumstances of the trade: 
R The creditworthiness of the purchaser in the receiving country (payment 
risk) 
R Ease of billing and payment arrangements, and whether these are 
already in place (transaction costs, as well as exchange rate risk) 
R The extent to which regulations governing trade within the two counties 
allow and facilitate private sector cross-border trades 
R Whether the contract is for firm or non-firm energy (volume risk) 
In the ideal case where cross-border trade is facilitated by the legal environment, 
commercial arrangements are in place or can be established without difficulty, and 
there is little payment risk, the private sector party will be willing to trade directly 
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with customers across the border on mutually agreed terms. Where one or more of 
these conditions is not met additional risk will be introduced, prompting the private 
sector to seek assurances that its investment will be protected, or barriers will exist 
to trade, whose resolution may require the involvement of the state-owned utility.  
Where there is a payment risk in the purchasing country, the state-utility in the 
selling country may be in a stronger position to mitigate this than a small private 
sector party. This will be particularly so where there are exchanges in both 
directions between the state-utilities.  
A private party may mitigate many of its cross-border sales risks by contracting 
with its host country utility, rather than directly with the final purchaser. The utility 
would in turn have a back-to-back agreement with the purchaser in the receiving 
country. This would also remove the need for a small private operator to arrange 
cross-border payment and billing (which the state-utility may already have in 
place), and may overcome issues in the existing legal framework that restrict private 
trade.  
The private party may have an existing relationship, including for payment, with 
the utility in its country and, assuming that it has been satisfied with this 
relationship in the past, it will be willing to enter into further commercial terms with 
the utility. It should be easier to expand terms between existing partners than to 
establish new terms with the receiving country utility. This arrangement is then 
very similar to the case of utility-to-utility exchange of small quantities across the 
border but with one side contracting part of the exchange to the private sector. The 
state-owned utility is choosing to contract with the private party because it has an 
existing supply capacity in the border area which is able to meet the cross-border 
demand at a lower cost than either utility or an alternative private supplier. 
If the contract is for small non-firm trades the private party may be willing to 
contract directly with the receiving country customer and accept the risk on a small 
volume. Indeed, this may provide a valuable learning period during which the 
commercial relations between the two sides can be tested before trade is increased 
to a larger scale. 
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Box 9  Precursor to a larger export project (Theun-Hinboun IPP) 
Completed in 1998, the Theun-Hinboun was one of the first hydro IPPs in Asia (Laos 
PDR) whose output is dedicated to a buyer in another country (Thailand). The project was 
developed on a build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) basis under a 30 year concession by a 
public-private partnership. It provided an important learning and confidence building 
experience as a precursor to the larger Nam-Theun 2 (NT2) hydro project (described in 
section 7.2). NT2 was also structured on a BOOT basis and included the private sector.  
The project is a 210 MW run-of-river involving a 5.2 km diversion from the Theun to 
Hinboun River and a 85 km 230 kV transmission link to the Thai border. The Thai buyer 
(EGAT) is responsible for transmission on the Thai side.  
The project was developed by a consortium formed of Nordic Hydropower—a JV of 
Statkraft SF (Norway) and Vattenfall AB (Sweden) -- with 20% of the equity; the 
Government of Laos (60%, held by the Laos utility Electricite de Laos) and the MDX 
Corporation of Thailand (20%). The Asian Development Bank provided a loan to the 
Government of Laos to help finance its portion of the equity. 
The total cost was $240 million, with a 61:39 debt:equity ratio. $58.6 million in debt was 
provided by Export Credits, $14.8 million by the Nordic Investment Bank, and the balance 
in commercial credits provided by six Thai banks ($62.8m).  
There is no sovereign guarantee from the Thai Government. 
The PPA obliges EGAT to purchase between 95 and 100% of the output. The base tariff 
(set in 1994) was 4.3 cents/kWh, escalated at 3% p.a. for the four-year construction period, 
then by 1% per year for 10 years thereafter. The tariff is denominated in both US$ and 
Thai Baht with payments split equally between the two currencies. A similar dual-
currency split was used for NT2. 
Project implementation was relatively smooth, without significant construction delays. 
This was partly due to the absence of major environmental impacts. In this sense the 
smaller project differs from NT2, whose development was delayed for consideration of 
the environmental and social consequences. 
 
New facilities for larger dedicated trade 
For larger projects the private sector will have higher risk perception, especially 
concerning political risk, than state owned utilities and will require assurances that 
this risk can be mitigated and suitably compensated.  
The ability to attract private involvement to larger projects and the level of 
involvement will depend on the ability to reduce risk to an acceptable level. We can 
distinguish between two cases: 
R Where trade arrangements are poorly established and perceived risk is 
high 
R Where trade is established or there are close and robust commercial and 
legal ties between the trading countries 
Where a trade project is among the first of its kind and there is little history of large 
scale energy trade or private sector participation, it is likely that the private sector 
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will be willing to take only a minor role and bear limited risk. In such cases, the 
private sector may be willing to act as a contractor for specific design or 
construction services, bid to supply components, or be involved in providing 
maintenance services during operation of the project. The private party will prefer a 
contractual structure that clearly specifies roles and responsibilities and limits 
liability for unforeseen events. They are likely also to want payment security, 
perhaps through a payment structure that provides some advanced payment and is 
weighted toward the beginning of the contract or where payment is secured against 
performance.  
In most cases where there is not an established history of international trade and 
cooperation and strong contract enforcement through the courts private parties will 
require sovereign guarantees to cover their exposure to payment risk. This will be 
increasingly so for larger projects.  
An IFI may have some role in providing the security guarantee. The involvement of 
IFIs can also encourage private sector debt participation through the reduction in 
perceived risk by association with IFIs’ creditworthiness and political influence. 
The Nam Theun 2 project (see section 7.2) provides a recent example of substantial 
private sector participation in building large dedicated facilities for cross-border 
trade from a developing country (Laos PDR). This project was partly facilitated by a 
number of political risk mitigation measures provided by IFIs and international 
bilateral institutions. Other important features for attracting private finance were:  
R a creditworthy purchaser 
R a considerable period of project preparation which contributed to an 
overall lower-risk project design 
R a track record of smaller projects which served to build confidence in the 
trade relationships 
Nam Theun 2 illustrates that with appropriate risk mitigation it is possible for the 
private sector to take a large role. However, it also indicates that this is not likely in 
a large project without first taking the intermediate steps to reduce risk in the 
overall political, regulatory and commercial environment, and that this process can 
take several years. Large-scale projects that seek private participation will benefit if 
they are built on a foundation of progressive development of smaller capacity 
building initiatives.  
Where trade relations are more established and there is a history of legal settlement 
of disputes the private sector will be willing to take a larger role, and may in fact 
take full project responsibility. This is frequently the case in advanced markets such 
as Europe and North America. The critical factor here is confidence in strong 
contract enforcement through the legal system. Where there is a dispute that can not 
be resolved directly between the parties the case would proceed through the agreed 
legal channels. In the meantime trade would continue in the expectation of a fair 
settlement according to the contracted terms.  
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A current example of private sector involvement in a large trade project is a new 
interconnecting transmission line being built between the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. However, this line is to connect advanced markets where there is 
no need for government backing. The fact that the new line will carry non-firm 
energy trades further illustrates the confidence of the parties in the viability of the 
project. However, it should be noted that there are well-established competitive 
markets on either side of the link, providing a predictable revenue stream. 
6.3 Bilateral trade via a transit country (Typology 2) 
This type of trade arrangement follows from the direct bilateral trade type except 
the buyer and seller country are separated by a third country through which traded 
energy must transit. The transit country may also take some of the energy for its 
own use.  
The discussion of this trading type begins with an overview of the supporting 
framework and risk characteristics that are general to the trading arrangement. This 
is followed by discussions of the supporting contractual arrangements and specific 
risk characteristics for the different transit transmission operator roles.  
6.3.1 Key characteristics 
The crucial difference between this and the previous case is the requirement for 
transmission through the transit country and the extension of the contracting and 
institutional framework to include an additional country which may or may not buy 
or sell electricity itself. The risk structure is changed under this scenario, and the 
inclusion of a new transmission owner/operator introduces the need for new 
contractual arrangements. The key new risks that are introduced relate to the transit 
transmission. 
For the purposes of transiting electricity a Transit Transmission Operator (TTO) will 
be required. Three possibilities for the role of the transit country in the trade project 
and in relation to the TTO are: 
R The transit country’s transmission utility takes the role of TTO and 
owner of the transit transmission assets. It builds the transmission line 
and provides transit services. As TTO it is paid a fee by the two trading 
parties for transporting the energy.  
R A variant on this arrangement could see a specialist trader acting 
as an intermediary among the two trading parties and the 
transmission owner. In this case, the transit transmission owner 
(and perhaps also the owners of other transmission assets that are 
used in the trade) would be paid by the trader who would pass 
these costs to the trading parties through its charges to them.  
R The transit country utility is the TTO and owner but the commercial and 
contractual arrangement sees it act as a trader, with a more high profile 
commercial involvement in the project. It buys the energy at the point of 
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entry to the transit system (seller country border) and sells it at the exit 
(buyer country border). Its costs and return are provided through the 
difference in price.  
R The transit country grants a concession to an independent TTO to build 
and operate the transmission line through its territory. The transit 
country takes a concession fee for granting this right but otherwise is not 
commercially involved in the transmission activity. The transmission 
line under this arrangement could be built on a BOO or BOOT basis.  
There are therefore two roles that the TTO might have: 
R A transfer role in which it provides a service to the trading parties 
R A trader role in which it is a party to trade 
Variations on these then concern whether the TTO is owned by the state or 
privately. In most cases in transition economies and where international trade is in 
the early stages of development ownership will be taken by the state utility. This is 
most likely to be the case in the ECO region  
Variations are also possible if outside contractors are employed to provide design, 
construction and operation (eg management and maintenance) services. Outside 
contractors may be private contractors or parties to the trades, or the state-owned 
utilities in the buyer or seller countries.  
The options for financing the line will be heavily influenced by the risk profile in the 
investment and operating environment. In each case the level of perceived risk will 
be a deciding factor in attracting project partners.  
For early projects in risky environments, the private sector is unlikely to take a large 
finance or project role unless the risks can be sufficiently mitigated. Other financing 
options in high risk environments include one or a consortium of the three national 
utilities, directly by governments, and by IFIs or bilateral donors and funders. If 
sufficient risk mitigation can be provided it may also be possible to attract private 
sector lenders in addition to equity partners.  
In projects with lower risk that are deemed commercially viable by investors, joint-
venture or consortium arrangements may allow an increased number of financing 
partners. These arrangements allow risk to be pooled and spread among 
participants. For example, for the Nam Theun 2 project, a joint-venture project 
company was formed among the national utility and two private sector companies. 
Participants with interests up or downstream of the transmission (ie as generators 
or customers) may be willing to participate in a joint-venture to fund and build the 
transmission line.  
If the host utility is unwilling or unable to finance the project a concession can be 
granted to the supply or offtake utility, a third party or a consortium to plan, 
construct and operate the line. In the SCP pipeline project, this was undertaken by a 
consortium of largely private companies (see section 7.5).  
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Where a new transmission line is built it will be designed to supply a specified 
volume of firm energy. This will determine the sizing of the line and the tariff level. 
The tariff in the PPA can include both a capacity and energy charge.  
A transmission line that is built to carry seasonal surpluses will face an uneven load 
factor at different times of the year and a lower annual load factor than one built to 
carry firm non-seasonally dependent loads. The cost per unit transported in this 
case will be higher and the tariff will need to reflect this. The higher cost for low 
load factor lines is likely to affect the economics of seasonally derived trade projects.  
Further transfers on a non-firm basis are also possible where there is additional 
capacity. This will be charged at a different tariff to account for the uncertain nature 
of the demand. 
The more complex three- (or more) party arrangement that arises with the inclusion 
of a transit country requires more complex payment systems. A regional bank may 
act as a settlements agent or provider of an escrow account to manage coordinated 
payments and cash flows. 
6.3.2 Supporting framework overview 
The supporting framework must take account of the additional party to the trade. 
The changes that are needed depend on the role played by the transit country. The 
supporting framework of agreements will include: 
R Inter-governmental agreement with all three countries as parties (or 
several IGAs between pairs of countries) 
R PPA between the buyer(s) and seller(s) of electricity 
R Transmission agreement (TA) between transit service operator and the 
utility or utilities that require access and delivery. 
If the transmission assets are financed or operated by a joint-venture company there 
would also be a shareholders agreement among the parties. There will also be 
financing agreements, which will contain references to the terms of the main project 
agreements.  
The transit country government will be party to the inter-governmental agreement. 
At the simplest level, the IGA will grant a transmission corridor across its territory. 
For transit trade it is necessary that the IGA also contains: 
R The commitments of the transit government as determined by its role in 
the trade arrangements  
R Access guarantees to the transmission line and to its interconnections 
with the supplying and receiving transmission systems 
R Undertakings to protect the physical security of the transmission line 
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These undertakings and requirements will be detailed in the transmission 
agreements, guaranteed by the IGAs. The counterparty to the agreements on the 
transit side will depend on who is the TTO. Where the transit is to be provided by 
the transit country in most cases that country’s transmission utility (most likely 
state-owned in ECO) will act as TTO and agent to the government for executing the 
agreements.  
Dispute resolution arrangements will be expanded to include the transit country.  
The supporting frameworks and specific risk characteristics for the two TTO role 
cases are further discussed in sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5 below. First, the generic risks 
for this type of trading arrangement are discussed in the next section.  
6.3.3 General risk characteristics 
Many of the transit case risks related to the Supplier and Offtake parties are the 
same as under the direct cross-border bilateral trade case (Type 1b). In particular, 
the supply (including fuel supply), demand, payment and financing, planning and 
construction risks remain for these parties. With the addition of transit and a third 
party country most of the key new risks introduced in each project phase relate to 
the transmission line. In addition, the inter-party dynamic is expanded so that the 
counterparty to some risks is shifted. 
As with the direct bilateral case, the key financial risks of payment and financing or 
default risk are connected. The flow of these risks among the parties is the direct 
reverse of the flow of electricity. The cash flows are therefore connected in a chain, 
which in the ECO region is likely to require the underpinning of a chain of 
sovereign guarantees anchored by the Offtaker.  
In the case where the transit party is one or both of the Supplier and Offtaker the 
risk profile for some risks is simplified to something more like the two party case 
and much of the risk allocation is placed on them. However, the additional 
transmission risks associated with transiting a third country will remain.  
A joint venture or cross shareholding arrangement can be used to share risk among 
the parties. The interdependence created by the mixing of ownership across the 
countries and project components leads to risk sharing among the parties and a 
common interest in avoiding interruption and dispute. However, JVs also have the 
disadvantage that they may reduce the level of transparency in the transactions (eg 
see Box 3)  
Types of risk 
As mentioned, many of the risks in Type 1 bilateral arrangements also apply to this 
case, and these are not discussed again here. Most of the risks that differentiate the 
transit case relate to the transmission line. This is particularly the case for a line 
through a country with high political and security risk, such as Afghanistan. 
Physical security risk – If the transmission line runs through territory where there 
is a security risk this will be one of the most significant barriers to its development.  
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There is some international experience with security forces dedicated to protecting 
energy corridors (for an example, see section 7.5). Most governments would not be 
willing to allow foreign armed security guards on their territory. For example, 
during the negotiation of the SCP pipeline, the project sponsors wanted to provide 
security by their own armed guards, but this was eventually not permitted by the 
Georgian government. However, many governments may also have difficulties in 
guaranteeing security and covering the potentially very large liability of sabotage 
with their own security and financial resources (this is likely to be the case in 
Afghanistan under the current circumstances there, as discussed in section 8). 
Payment risk – the TTO is exposed to the risk of non-payment by the users of the 
transit service. The counterparty to this risk will depend on the commercial and 
contractual arrangement. It is likely that mitigation will require a sovereign 
guarantee to cover the financing of the transmission line.  
The parties may seek to reduce payment risk by requiring collateral be posted in an 
independent account, such as a bank acting as settlements agent. In the case of 
default by one party this collateral can be called on to maintain working capital 
among the other parties while the issue is resolved. The requirement for collateral 
will contribute to the cost of the project, and is unlikely to be sufficient in the case of 
serious default or ongoing payment delay.  
Finance or default risk – This is borne by the party who finances the transmission 
assets. As with financing risk for generation this risk is related to payment risk and 
it may be necessary that it is underpinned by a sovereign guarantee. This additional 
risk can be reduced where the Supplier or Offtaker takes an ownership or financing 
participation in the TTO, although most countries will not permit this. 
Planning risk – The construction of a transmission line is a large project that 
requires planning permission along its corridor. Commitment of all parties to the 
overall project is likely to require prior planning approval for new transmission as 
well as generation.  
Construction risk – The need for new-build transmission for transit creates 
additional construction completion risk and the risk of delay to the start of energy 
trade.  
The timing and completion deadline for construction will be determined by the 
planned start date for trade. The supporting agreements can include penalties for 
failing to meet deadlines. Construction must be coordinated among generation, 
transmission and connecting transmission in the Supplier and Offtake countries.  
Coordination risk –The complexity of a project of this type requires coordination 
among the parties through the common coordinating body. In the absence of a 
history of successful trade projects, construction is unlikely to begin until the 
planning phase of the project is completed. This will include gaining planning 
permissions to minimise planning risk, conducting feasibility and design studies, 
and reaching agreement on the power purchase and transmission agreements. 
Transmission losses – The risk allocation and mitigation framework needs to 
account for transmission losses in the transit country. Responsibility for minimising 
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this risk is best assigned to the TTO and is best achieved by aligning the incentives 
of the transmission operator with the goal of minimising losses.  
6.3.4 TTO provides transfer service only 
In the case where the TTO takes a transfer role the transit country transmission 
utility is TTO with responsibility for building and operating the transmission line 
and providing a transit service to either the Supplier or Offtaker or both jointly.  
Supporting framework 
The PPA contractual arrangement in this case is:  
R PPA: Between the Supplier and Offtaker 
Transmission access and use of system agreements are also needed (the precise 
arrangement of agreements will depend on the point of delivery for transfer of title 
in the electricity): 
R TA1: between the Supplier and the TTO, in which the TTO agrees to 
provide the Supplier access to its transmission line (or system)  
R TA2: between the TTO and Offtaker, in which the TTO agrees to provide 
the Offtaker access to its transmission line (or system) and to transmit 
and supply a specified quantity to the Offtaker’s network 
The access capacity and delivered volumes in the transmission agreements will be 
set in relation to the traded volumes specified in the PPA. Each TA will also cover 
operating and quality standards, metering, maintenance scheduling and agreed 
tariffs.  
The tariff for energy delivered to the Offtaker will be the sum of the total energy 
tariff and the transmission tariff. The PPA will specify a tariff for electricity to be 
paid by the Offtaker to the Supplier. The tariff for the transmission service may be 
treated in a number of ways in the transmission agreement depending on who is 
assigned the payment responsibility (ie whether it is the Supplier, Offtaker or both 
that is deemed to be the customer of the transmission service). This will depend on 
the delivery location specified in the PPA, which may be at the Supplier/transit 
border or at the transit/Offtaker border.   
In the case where the Offtaker is contracted to pay the TTO to transport the energy 
the PPA delivery point is at the Supplier’s border with the transit country. Where 
the Supplier is responsible for paying the TTO the PPA delivery point is at the 
Offtaker’s border with the transit country. Alternatively, the transmission charge 
can be shared in an agreed split between the Supplier and Offtaker at a virtual 
delivery point specified somewhere along the transit line. 
The contracting relationships and payment flow options are summarised in 
Figure 11 below. 
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Figure 11  Contracting and payment links (TTO provides transfer service) 
Offtake 
(Buyer)
Transmission/access 
Agreement (TA1)
Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA)
Payment for energy
Payment for 
access/transit
Energy Energy
Payment for 
access/transit
Generation
(Seller) 
Transmission/offtake 
Agreement (TA2)
Transmission
(TTO)
Transit countryOrigin 
country
Buying 
country
 
Specific risk characteristics 
The general risks listed above cover many of the risks related to the TTO acting as 
provider of the transfer role. In particular, planning, construction, financing and 
security risk. 
Among the most significant risks is payment risk, and finance risk is closely 
dependent on this. Under the transfer role the TTO faces payment risk from 
whichever party is specified in the transmission agreement and is likely to require a 
sovereign guarantee.  
A specified standard for transmission losses will be included in the transmission 
agreement. The TTO will face penalties for exceeding the agreed level.  
6.3.5 TTO is a trader 
In the case where the transit country is TTO and acts as a trader the commercial 
arrangements and supporting contractual framework are more complex. In this case 
the TTO takes a position in the trade itself, purchasing the electricity from the 
Supplier, having ownership while it transits its transmission system and on-selling 
it to the Offtaker at the exit point from the system.  
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Supporting framework 
Two PPAs are now required, with back-to-back provisions: 
R PPA1: Between the Supplier and the TTO, in which the Supplier agrees 
to sell a specified volume to the TTO at the entry to the transit 
transmission system 
R PPA2: Between the TTO and the Offtaker, in which the TTO agrees to 
sell a specified volume to the Offtaker at the exit from the transit 
transmission system  
No transmission agreement is required since the TTO takes the responsibility for 
transmission and the terms of connection to the transmission system and conditions 
of supply are contained in the PPAs.  
The Supplier is likely to require a sovereign guarantee to cover the payment risk in 
PPA1. This will be most readily available where the TTO is the transit country 
utility (or other government agent).  
The contracting relationships and payment flow options where the TTO acts as a 
trader are summarised in Figure 12 below. 
Figure 12  Contracting and payment links (TTO is a trader) 
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Specific risk characteristics 
By taking ownership of the electricity for delivery through the trading role the TTO 
internalises the performance risks related to transmission. Failure to deliver or sub-
standard delivered quality will be penalised through the PPA with the Offtaker, 
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with non-delivery potentially met with non-payment and the resultant significant 
financial exposure for the TTO through its liability to the Supplier.  
In paying and receiving set tariffs for the electricity it trades, the TTO has incentives 
to reduce transmission losses as much as possible in order to maximise its margin. 
This arrangement creates effective incentives for loss minimisation.  
The parties to payment risk under the two-PPA structure are shifted. A payment 
chain is created from the Offtaker to the TTO to the Supplier. The Supplier is now 
concerned with the TTO’s creditworthiness, rather than the Offtaker’s as under the 
single PPA arrangement. The Supplier’s preference for the single or two-PPA 
arrangement will be influenced in part by the relative creditworthiness of the 
alternative counterparties.  
Where non-firm energy is traded the TTO is also a party to volume risk, which for 
the transmission line creates load factor risk. As discussed elsewhere, non-firm 
energy is likely to be a relatively small volume under this trading arrangement as a 
dedicated transmission line will be sized for firm contracted energy.  
A variant case is where the two energy trades are treated as an energy swap. In this 
case there is no specific allocation of the physical transit risk (and indeed the 
transmission capacity need not exist); the transit TTO's obligation is to purchase at 
one border and sell at the other. This will then be firm energy. 
6.3.6 Concession arrangement 
Where the transit country involvement is limited to granting a concession and does 
not get directly involved in the construction or operation of the line the framework 
agreement will contain the outline of the minimum construction and operation 
standards and agreed tariff structure. These will then be reflected in the concession 
contract.  
A significant difference in this case is that financing for the project does not come 
from the state owned utility in the transit country. It may be provided by a private 
party or by one or both of the trading utilities. In any case, it is less likely that the 
transit country government will be willing to provide a sovereign guarantee 
without having recourse to the transmission assets. The other countries may be 
willing to guarantee the transmission project with the exception of specific country 
related risks over which they have little control.  
6.4 Trade among synchronised systems (Typology 3) 
6.4.1 Key characteristics 
Under this trading type the member system operators agree to synchronise their 
electricity systems in a common operating environment. This closely coordinated 
arrangement supports energy swaps and other trades (of energy and capacity) 
between multiple system operators or among markets and market traders. 
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Synchronisation can be an important step towards the more advanced arrangements 
embodied in multilateral markets or pools.  
The former Soviet ICS operated in this fashion in a number of synchronised control 
blocks (see Figure 13). Included among these was the synchronised United Power 
System in Central Asia (discussed further below). 
Figure 13  Electricity interconnection among CIS and bordering states 
 
Source: Transmission and Distribution World, Jan 2003 
Synchronised interconnected electricity systems are operated as a common 
electrically interdependent system with a central control centre. Electrical conditions 
in one part of the system affect conditions elsewhere in the system. Unnecessary 
transmission or generation investment can be reduced through coordinated 
investment planning at the interconnected system level. It is the conceptual 
extension across international borders of the centrally controlled national grid 
within a country. 
Synchronised systems are usually governed by technical rules and standards agreed 
through a common coordinating body. The governing body facilitates the intimate 
cooperation required among the participating system operators and interconnected 
parties. The commonly agreed rules include: 
R Rules governing energy exchange (balance rules) 
R Procedures and standards for maintaining system security throughout 
the synchronised area, including reserve requirements and black start 
R Settlement rules  
R Procedures for maintaining and expanding the system, including some 
coordination of planning 
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R Governance rules for the coordinating body itself 
The system security standards are likely to include reserve requirements, frequency 
regulation and voltage control.  
An example of a very large area of synchronised systems is the Union for the Co-
ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) in Europe (see Box 10). A summary 
of the UCTE definitions and use of reserves is given in annex A3. 
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Box 10  UCTE synchronous area 
The Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) is an association of 
synchronised transmission system operators of 23 countries in Europe (see map below). In 
2004, international exchanges within the UCTE area were almost 300 TWh. 
 
Source: www.ucte.org. The Operation Handbook may be downloaded from 
http://www.ucte.org/ohb/cur_status.asp 
The stated aim of UCTE is to maintain system control and quality and security of supply 
in the interconnected area, and relatedly, to provide a sound platform for the operation 
and development of the single European electricity market envisaged by the European 
Union. Among its goals are the provision of non-discriminatory access to transmission 
networks to facilitate trade and the encouragement of trade to increase technical and 
economic efficiency. It also seeks to speed the process of planning and authorising new 
transmission investment. 
UCTE carries out the following functions: 
• Coordinates system planning and operation  
• Issues technical rules and procedures, including detailed system security standards 
(eg Reserve requirements, frequency keeping, voltage control) 
• Oversees the development and expansion of the synchronised area  
• Monitors the supply/demand balance and publishes statistics  
The very large UCTE synchronised system is operated through a number of decentralised, 
but interrelated, regional control blocks. Two coordination centres handle metering and 
accounting for balancing energy. 
The UCTE is governed by a set of operational standards that are enforced by a legally 
binding Multilateral Agreement (MLA) among the member TSOs.  
The main bodies in UCTE are: 
• Steering Committee, made up of a representative from each member country, is the 
executive body 
• Assembly, containing representatives of all member countries, has final decision 
making authority on organisational matters  
• Secretariat and UCTE Bureau, performing administrative and managerial roles 
• A number of working groups, technical committees and task forces.  
Significantly for the ECO region, in 2005 UCTE began studying the possible future 
inclusion of Turkey and hopes to achieve synchronisation in 2007. There is also an 
ongoing expansion project to include the Russian unified system.  
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As a trade arrangement synchronisation represents an advanced stage of evolution. 
The organisational and institutional requirements lend themselves to being 
established out of existing cooperative bodies. The associated costs mean that 
realising net benefits of synchronisation requires a relatively high base level of 
trade. The technical and settlements requirements are also likely to develop from 
established trading arrangements.  
Advantages of synchronisation 
The main advantage of synchronisation is that it can enable more efficient system 
operation and energy resource use within the synchronised area. 
Synchronously operated areas can more effectively support a high level of inter-
system trade and the purpose of synchronisation is usually to enable and facilitate 
trade. In areas with fast growing trade the centralised coordination also minimises 
reserves, protects system reliability and can identify transmission bottlenecks and 
investment requirements to facilitate coordinated system expansion planning. Each 
of these factors can have associated benefits in terms of overall cost reduction.  
Synchronisation and the improved SO coordination it brings will assist cross-border 
trade in long-term contracts sold well in advance of the dispatch time. The degree of 
sophistication of the market mechanisms required to support this sort of trade 
would be relatively low (more advanced trade tends toward the pooling 
arrangements discussed under typology 4 below). This may be the case in the early 
stages of regional market development.  
Long-term contracts can be traded bilaterally or through an organised exchange, 
perhaps facilitating an auction. It will still be necessary to allocate transmission 
capacity and to provide scheduling information to the system operators in the 
trading areas.  
At real-time there will need to be some arrangement between system operators for 
managing imbalance. At the simplest level SOs may settle imbalances between 
themselves in kind or by netting them off over time with some relatively informal 
pricing and payment process for residuals. Alternatively, SOs may make 
arrangements to provide balancing energy and collect payment from the generators 
or customers. Increased balancing sophistication also tends toward the pooling 
arrangements under typology 4. 
6.4.2 Supporting framework 
Achieving system synchronisation is a large task requiring significant resources. 
Investment in technical facilities and system strengthening is required to reliably 
allow common operation to the agreed standard. Additionally, developing, agreeing 
and implementing the technical rules require a high level of technical and project 
management capacity among staff in the participating system operators. If this 
capacity is not available external experts are required and skills training or new staff 
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will be needed. Furthermore, the ongoing operation of the synchronised area also 
requires a high level of organisational capacity.  
Direct costs are associated with all of these requirements. Indirect costs are also 
significant in terms of staff time diverted to a synchronisation project.  
6.4.3 Specific risk characteristics 
Among the disadvantages of synchronisation is the risk of cascading failure, which 
results from an outage in one part of the system causing overload and subsequent 
failure in the remaining parts, which in turn leads to further overload and so on. 
Cascading outages are a risk even in advanced systems, as was shown by the 2003 
outages in the interconnected systems of eastern Canada and northeastern United 
States that affected some 50 million customers and the outages in Italy and parts of 
Switzerland in the same year30.  
Synchronised areas such as UCTE have extensive technical standards and 
procedures to protect system security. UCTE has a good record of managing this 
risk in a very large synchronised area without failure or fault.  
Some system operators may be concerned about the loss of independence implied 
by joining a synchronised and centrally coordinated area. Proposals for 
synchronising the systems of Nepal and India to facilitate larger scale export to 
India have been resisted by the Nepalese side. Among the concerns has been the 
high cost of implementing synchronisation and concerns about the loss of system 
sovereignty.  
However, as in many parts of ECO, there are often strong economic arguments in 
favour of increased trade. Synchronisation facilitates mutually beneficial trade and, 
when the conditions for this level of integration are provided, carefully designed 
arrangements that share benefits and risk among all parties can help safeguard 
benefits that must be weighed against any potential security concerns.  
Credit and volume risk will also be present in trade of this sort, as it is with bilateral 
trade between non-synchronous systems. Agreements are needed to enable system 
operators to cover imbalances caused by deviations from contracted cross-border 
supply. The cost of balancing energy needs to be recovered from the party causing 
the imbalance, and sufficient compensation paid to SOs.  
6.4.4 History of synchronisation within CAPS 
The electricity systems in Central Asia were operated synchronously during the 
Soviet era under the umbrella of the United Power System (UPS) of Central Asia. 
Developed in the 1960s, UPS was designed to be operated as a single system with 
coordinated energy transfers closely related to water releases from the major 
irrigation reservoirs in the region.  
                                                     
30 It is important to note however that in both of these cases the cascade was limited within a broader 
synchronised area (UCTE in the case of Italy) where there was sufficient transmission and generation 
capacity and action was taken to control the spread. 
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The UPS was centrally operated from the United Dispatch Centre (UDC) for the 
region based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
the UPS member countries remained interconnected but operated as separate 
systems with utilities forming on national lines. Trade is greatly reduced from the 
Soviet period.  
Figure 14 shows the high voltage transmission interconnections among the five 
states. The high voltage system is concentrated on the population and hydro-power 
centres through the South East of the region. The UDC at Tashkent is physically 
located at the centre of the network.  
Figure 14  High voltage interconnection in the Central Asian Republics 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank and ECA graphics 
The centralised control and coordination necessary to maintain synchronisation was 
provided within the framework of the Soviet political system, with the Central 
Dispatching Office in Moscow. The countries of the region have since formed the 
Power Council of Central Asia to coordinate efforts toward rebuilding cooperation 
within the electricity sector. The Council is represented by energy ministers from 
each country.  
The UDC is still operational but with a reduced role. The staff in the national 
dispatch and control centres continues to communicate with each other to maintain 
security of supply and support the remaining trade.  
In 1999 the leaders of four Central Asian countries (not including Turkmenistan) 
signed an agreement on the Parallel Operation of the Energy Systems of Central 
Asia.  
Tashkent UDC
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This history among the Central Asian power systems suggests there is a potential 
for re-synchronisation to facilitate trade. However, the power systems in the region 
are in need of investment to achieve standards of the metering, communications, 
staff capacity and system control sufficient for synchronous operation. The ADB, 
World Bank and other donors are providing ongoing assistance to Central Asian 
countries in such areas as transmission line rehabilitation and installing modern 
SCADA systems. 
6.5 Multilateral trade within a pool mechanism 
(Typology 4) 
6.5.1 Key characteristics 
Overview 
A regional trading system with a pool mechanism is the highest level of multi-
player and multi-country integration for competitive electricity trade. This trading 
arrangement can include market-based mechanisms for more efficient pricing and 
allocation of generation capacity and energy, ancillary services, and transmission 
capacity. The prices also provide signals for investment in new generation and 
transmission capacity and can be location specific.  
A multilateral regional pool based trading structure allows participants to buy and 
sell electricity domestically within their home countries (ie the country of physical 
offtake or injection) and in international markets via the regional trading 
arrangements.  
Pools are usually categorised as one of two types31: 
R Gross pool: Most energy is physically scheduled and dispatched 
centrally according to a merit order determined by a common stack of 
pooled bid and offer prices. All generators and suppliers face a common 
reference price and the system operator balances the system in real time 
using bids and offers from the stack. A secondary market in financial 
bilateral contracts usually develops alongside a gross pool, in order to 
allow participants to hedge their price risks. 
R Net pool (or balancing market): Most energy is traded through physical 
bilateral contracts and generators self-schedule to meet their contracted 
volumes. The system operator covers real-time deviations from 
                                                     
31 Many different names have been used to describe these main pool types. What we refer to as ‘gross’ 
and ‘net’ pools have, for example, also been called ‘mandatory’ and ‘voluntary’ pools. The net pool 
type is also very frequently referred to as a balancing market or as a bilateral contract market with 
balancing mechanism. The gross pool type may be one-sided, involving only generators in a generator 
pool and the pool acting as a single buyer for distributors and other consumers (eg as in the current 
arrangement in the Ukraine); or two-sided, involving both generators and consumers, sometimes also 
allowing demand-side bids. 
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contracted volumes using pooled bids and offers in a balancing 
mechanism (BM).  
In a multilateral trading structure participants are legally or contractually bound 
together through a set of commonly agreed and accepted market rules. This may be 
in the form of a multilateral contract among the parties and a central market 
organiser (the approach taken in New Zealand) or through requirements specified 
in the licensing conditions. 
A number of factors have a bearing on which pooling mechanism is appropriate in a 
given context, and on the various market design issues that flow from this such as 
the system for pricing32.  
However, the choice of market design must come after the broader questions of how 
to establish a market have been addressed. These questions relate to scope of the 
planned market and the barriers to market implementation. Each of these is 
addressed below. Box 11 briefly describes the initiatives toward implementing 
regional markets in North America. 
Box 11 Regional Transmission Organisations in North America 
In the United States efforts to create competitive electricity markets were being hindered 
by restrictions on open access to transmission systems. In response, the formation of 
Regional Transmission Organisations (RTOs) has been encouraged by Regulatory Order. 
RTOs act as System Operators to groups of interconnected networks, with trade 
coordinated also between RTOs.  
The required characteristics of an RTO include independence of other market participants 
and operational authority for the transmission system under its control. Their functions 
must include responsibility for planning transmission maintenance and expansion, acting 
as a provider of last resort of ancillary services, and calculating the available network 
capacity. RTOs are also given the tasks of setting transmission tariffs, monitoring the 
market, providing an information system and managing congestion. 
While the Order calling for the establishment of RTOs defines these minimum 
characteristics and functions, it is deliberately designed to be light handed, leaving the 
flexibility to decide the form that satisfies these to the RTO members. Although 
transmission owners are not forced to form RTOs, they are encouraged to do so. There are 
currently seven separate RTOs operating in the US and there are ongoing plans in the 
North western states to create an organisation based on a hybrid of the RTO and other 
approaches. The map in Figure 15 below shows existing and proposed RTOs and ISOs in 
the US (and interconnected Canadian systems). 
Figure 15 Current RTO development in North America 
                                                     
32 A common criticism of the gross pool market structure is that they enable market manipulation by 
having predictable marginal plants at each hour of the day. By contrast, cash out prices and 
positive/negative imbalances in the balancing market will be relatively volatile at any hour of the day. 
This is a deliberate feature of the BM design to encourage participants to contract ahead to the best of 
their ability in order to avoid this price volatility. This feature of the BM makes it more difficult for 
participants to manipulate the market price.  
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Box 11 Regional Transmission Organisations in North America 
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
 
Primary implementation issues: Market scope 
The primary questions of market scope that determine the required type and 
complexity of the market and the implementation or transition process include: 
R What is the degree of market opening (the percentage of demand that is 
allowed to freely contract for energy with its chosen supplier) and who 
are the participants in the market? 
R What is the degree of cross-border integration? 
R What are the characteristics of the product(s) being traded? 
Clearly, a competitive market requires competition among buyers and/or sellers. A 
degree of liberalisation and competition in generation and supply is likely to be a 
requirement for meaningful competition and market-based exchange at the regional 
level. Although it is possible for a pool-based market to be created at the regional 
level without first having established similar market structures in the constituent 
countries, this would be an onerous task for any region of the world. The experience 
in SE Europe suggests that the principle of reciprocal access is widely applied by 
countries – if country A’s generators are not allowed to sell freely to consumers in 
country B, then country B’s generators and not allowed to compete to sell to country 
A’s consumers.   
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The implementation of a regional net or gross pool market would most often 
proceed from the base provided by the individual country markets. It is assumed in 
the discussion below that such a market in ECO would proceed from competitive 
market reform in at least some of the participating countries (and indeed, such 
reform is underway in several ECO countries such as Pakistan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkey).  
It is useful to note that it is not necessary to have fully open and competitive 
markets (ie Type 4 markets) in place in all participating countries. This is illustrated 
by the SIEPAC regional market in Central America where the individual country 
markets are at varying stages of liberalisation (see section 7.3).  
Degree of market opening 
It has been common in many countries for the process of electricity market opening 
to proceed in stages. In this process the proportion of the total traded energy that is 
eligible to participate in the competitive market is increased systematically, usually 
beginning with the largest customers by volume and connection voltage. The 
customers in a partially open market who are not yet eligible remain captive to the 
incumbent supplier.  
In a partially open market it is necessary to consider how the eligible and captive 
parts of the market will interact. This has important implications for the market 
implementation and design, both nationally and regionally.  
The monopoly part of the market can be operated as a centrally dispatched pool 
which also provides balancing services to the competitive part of the market 
(Figure 16). If, at the time of partial market opening, no long term contracts existed 
between the generators and suppliers providing supply to the captive (non-
competitive) market, the price in this market segment would be fully exposed to the 
pool price largely determined by the bids from the competitive market. It therefore 
seems necessary that a purchasing agent (or agents) would be in place to carry out 
the contracting33 for the captive market and aim to submit balanced demand and 
supply positions to the SO. As a dominant and regulated purchasing entity, the 
purchasing agent could be restricted to trade less freely than participants in the 
competitive market, including taking account of policies towards preference for 
domestic producers and fuel sources, security of supply and other requirements 
arising from public service obligations. 
                                                     
33 The purchasing agent would more likely initially take over existing long term contract obligations 
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Figure 16  Partially open market 
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A purchasing agent carrying out the long term contracting for the captive market 
would be a regulated entity with the possibility of specific rules governing its 
behaviour as a market participant. A centralised purchasing agent would be a 
dominant player with a potentially restricting effect on competition; an alternative is 
that each distributor has a separate supply function carrying out the purchasing 
activity on behalf of its captive customers. At the time of market opening, the 
existing long term contracts would need to be allocated to these supply businesses. 
The situation of a hybrid market of this sort is being implemented in Turkey and 
has been recommended for the transition to a competitive market in Pakistan; it is 
also the market transition model recommended for the Ukraine electricity market. 
Many of the transition economies in Europe have been following a similar approach 
to staged market opening with a parallel market for the captive consumers and a net 
pool for the competitive market. Examples include Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Kosovo. 
Cross-border integration  
Under a pool (net or gross) market model varying degrees of cross-border 
integration are possible between the individual national markets. Provided that the 
choices are made rationally and that no artificial barriers are put in place the choices 
may not significantly affect the overall economic outcome.  
Starting from the assumption that national SOs will maintain the existing levels of 
system control over their own networks, meaning that they each need access to real-
time balancing energy, there are still many options for the degree of integration of 
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the markets. The main choices as to whether particular market elements are dealt 
with on a local country basis or on an overall regional basis relate to: 
R Number of settlement areas (each market participant settles their 
imbalance payments in only a single regional settlement area or separate 
settlement areas in each country) 
R Number of prices (single reference price (gross pool) or imbalance cash 
out price (net pool) for the whole region or separate reference and 
imbalance prices for all participating countries) 
R Number of bid-offer price stacks (generators place their bids on only 
one price stack – their country –simultaneously on several countries’ 
price stacks, or on one regional price stack) 
It may be appropriate to have separate settlement areas where there are separate 
currencies and the payment systems in the countries are independent.  
Provided a generator can offer its bid price increments and decrements directly into 
the other countries (ie multiple price stacks) there should be little long term 
difference between the effects of a single-price-environment and a multi-price-
environment.  
If a single pool or balancing market price is chosen for a region such as ECO, this 
would need to be converted into a local currency price (probably on a daily basis). 
This could be a dominant or stable currency from within the region or a common 
external currency (such as US dollar). In the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) 
both approaches are taken: trades are denominated in a stable and openly traded 
local currency (Botswana) and US dollars.  
Where there is a single price the key difference is that actions in one country will 
affect the price outcome in the other countries. With separate prices each country 
would be at least partly insulated from the price effects of changes in market 
conditions in other countries.  
There may be low, intermediate or full bid-offer stack integration: 
R At a low level of net pool integration there might be a separate 
balancing market in each country with bids and offers for each country 
restricted to participants in that country (ie each country balances and 
sets price within their own boundaries). This case does not apply to the 
gross pool.34 This is the main situation in the transition markets of the 
non-EU members of SE Europe 
R An intermediate situation where energy is dispatched or balanced 
separately in each country but participants (generators) are free to make 
bids and offers into the gross pool or balancing mechanism of any one of 
the countries. In this case, although there would still be separate 
                                                     
34 Fully separated mandatory gross pools imply no market integration whereas separated balancing 
markets still allow for an integrated physical bilateral contracts market. 
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bid/offer stacks and prices for each country, the efficiency of each pool 
mechanism would be expected to be improved over the low integration 
case as liquidity would be higher, and portfolio generation participants 
would have greater flexibility to hedge their imbalances by participating 
in export country BM. This is the situation among a number of the well-
interconnected markets of the EU countries 
R A fuller level of integration would see a single regional gross pool or 
balancing market with a region-wide price and bid and offer stack35. 
This would require a single regional market operator and coordinated 
SO action (see 6.5.2 below). Prices would be adjusted to account for 
transmission costs and losses (and possibly exchange rate conversion). 
This is the direction in which the Nordic markets, one of the longest 
established and best-known regional markets, have moved (see Box 12) 
                                                     
35 Prices would still vary by location due to the costs of transmission and congestion 
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Box 12  Nordic Power Exchange (Nord Pool) 
The Nordic Power Exchange (Nord Pool) facilitates international power trading among 
four Nordic countries. Nord Pool is a voluntary market and electricity is also traded 
outside of it in direct bilateral contracts. Around 40% of electricity traded in the Nordic 
region passes through the Nord Pool spot markets.  
Nord Pool and its subsidiary companies (carrying out functions such as spot market 
operation and market clearing) are owned by the Nordic Transmission System Operators. 
In addition to boards of directors governance includes a Market Council which advises on 
market issues.  
Nord Pool’s physical market is for day-ahead (Elspot market), up to hour-ahead (Elbas 
market) and balancing power. Prices are determined through a pooling mechanism that 
matches demand and supply to find a common reference price while taking account of 
available transmission capacity.  
Nord Pool acts as the counterparty to all trades, so that participants do not face a credit 
risk from the trading partner. Nord Pool also provides a trading platform and clearing 
house for financial hedging contracts. The prices on the physical spot market are used as 
the reference price in the financial contract markets.  
Nord Pool also manages constraints on the interconnectors between the countries and 
within the transmission systems. When a constraint occurs the market ‘splits’ and prices 
diverge on either side of the constraint according to the demand and supply conditions 
within each constrained area, with higher prices on the deficit side. Participants can 
physically deliver on financial contracts by trading on either side of the constraint 
through the Elbas intra-day market.  
Nord Pool uses a postage-stamp approach to charging for transmission system usage. 
This means that transmission system users within an unconstrained transmission area all 
pay common transmission tariffs. This system differs from the one used in the PJM pool 
where nodal prices are set according to conditions on each specific transmission line.  
Nord Pool’s activities are regulated by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate.  
Further information:: http://www.nordpool.no/ 
 
The choice of the level of integration may depend on: 
R The communication and coordination problems involved with running 
multiple separate bid stacks if generators are allowed to place bids on all 
stacks simultaneously 
R The complications for generators if they can only place bids on one of 
the stacks. 
R Whether the countries prefer to maintain separate system operators or 
merge the function 
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Characteristics of the product being traded 
Electricity can be ‘packaged’ for sale in a number of different ways depending on 
supply timings and duration. The length of the contract (short- or long-term) and 
the time to delivery has an impact on the type of market that will develop.  
As the length of contract duration shortens and the range of different contracts 
increases more sophisticated trading, balancing and settlement arrangements will 
be necessary.  
The shortest term of traded electricity is for balancing at real time, requiring a 
coordinated centralised pool mechanism. At the other extreme, long-term contracts 
can be traded directly between market participants or through intermediaries 
without needing formalised exchanges. Relatively simple auctions may be arranged 
to trade standardised contracts. From there, more sophisticated and liquid power 
exchanges can be developed.  
One of the most advanced markets trading multiple products is the PJM regional 
market in the USA (see Box 13). PJM combines the three former state-based utility 
areas and trades a range of energy, capacity and ancillary services products over a 
number of time frames. 
Box 13  World’s largest regional market: the PJM Interconnection 
The PJM Interconnection is the largest competitive regional electricity market and 
centrally dispatched grid in the world. It has over 400 participating members serving an 
area of the Eastern US with a population of 51 million and peak demand of nearly 145 
GW. As an RTO, PJM also facilitates regional generation and transmission expansion 
planning. 
PJM is owned by its members and governed by an independent Board. Part of the Board’s 
role is to ensure that no participant has market power, and a Market Monitoring Unit 
provides this regulatory function and recommends changes to the market if necessary. A 
second governance tier is provided by the Members Committee, on which all members 
have a representative who is able to vote on rule changes.  
Energy in PJM is traded in a combination of bilateral contracts and pool markets. PJM 
operates three pool markets: day-ahead, hour-ahead and real-time balancing. Trades 
determined in the day-ahead market are binding on the participants who settle them at 
that time. In the hour-ahead market new bids and offers are accepted to account for 
expected deviations from the day-ahead schedule. The real-time balancing market then 
ensures actual demand matches actual supply.  
PJM’s pool markets use locational marginal pricing, a complex methodology that 
calculates a price at each point of the network taking account of transmission losses and 
constraints. The cost of transmission constraints is priced into the pool prices in order to 
manage congestion. Risk management contracts called Financial Transmission Rights are 
available to participants to control the risk of price deviations due to congestion.  
PJM also operates capacity markets and  ancillary services markets.  
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Pre-conditions for market implementation 
As this is the most advanced form of trade being considered it is not surprising that 
it is the most demanding in the supporting conditions it requires. Where these 
conditions are not met it raises barriers to the process of market implementation and 
the level of implementation that can be achieved.  
The conditions needed to support the development of advanced trading 
mechanisms include: 
R Market liquidity – Market liquidity provides improved price signals 
and market efficiency. A certain level of trade is necessary for the market 
to be economically viable in the face of development and operation 
costs. Where liquidity is low a lower level of trading arrangement may 
be more appropriate.  
R Congestion management and availability of transmission capacity – 
clearly, cross-border trade cannot take place without sufficient 
interconnecting capacity. Efficient competitive markets will be aided by 
market mechanisms to allocate transmission capacity among trading 
participants. Market-based transmission allocation will also signal 
investment needs in new cross-border capacity and provide a funding 
source from operating cash flows. 
R Sufficient inter-SO compensation mechanisms – system operators and 
transmission owners in a regional market must be sufficiently 
compensated for energy flows within and through their systems. Where 
pricing for transit and loop flows is not cost reflective the incentives for 
efficient market behaviour and operation will be distorted. 
R Open access to the transmission systems and the role of SOs and TOs 
in the market – just as at the country level a fundamental requirement 
for competition at the regional level is open and non-discriminatory 
access to transmission systems. The transmission and system operator(s) 
should be indifferent to users and should grant system access on 
objective (preferably market-based) grounds. This means there should 
be separation between the SO and TO role and trading participants (ie 
generation and supply) in the market. Unbundling is usually considered 
a precondition to enable open access to the transmission network36.  
R Degree of market power within the national markets – competition 
will be stifled where national utilities or other dominant utilities retain 
market power through vertical integration or long-term supply contracts  
R Coordination of market rules in individual countries – differences in 
the individual market rules can inhibit trade between them. An example 
                                                     
36 Unbundling may be at the ownership, management or accounting level. Management and 
accounting separation with a retained common ownership is likely to require regulatory oversight to 
ensure against discrimination. This is generally a second-best solution to full ownership unbundling 
but may be a transitional step during the liberalisation process.  
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is different gate-closures between national markets where a long gate-
closure in one (eg longer than day-ahead) prohibits trade in a short-term 
(eg day-ahead) market37. 
R Non-cost reflective tariffs – if tariffs remain subsidised it will be 
difficult for price competition to develop. If countries wish to provide 
price support to selected customer groups it would be better at the 
aggregate economic level to do so with targeted mechanisms that do not 
distort prices. 
R Harmonisation of licensing regimes – differences among licensing 
rules, definitions and procedures will inhibit entry by cross-border 
traders to the regional market. 
Many of these are also supporting conditions for the development of competitive 
trade more generally.  
A key issue for the operation of regional markets is the development  of effective 
and non-discriminatory mechanisms to allocate  cross-border capacity. Congestion 
pricing provides a means for allocating scarce transmission capacity. In the early 
stages of development, congestion management on cross-border transmission 
capacity may be by relatively simple auctions. These may be for a range of periods, 
such as monthly or yearly, and for small divisions of capacity that can be flexibly 
combined into larger blocks. More sophisticated market mechanisms can be 
implemented as the level of trade and capacity develops. 
The principles for a market-based congestion management mechanism include: 
R Capacity availability should be measured in a transparent way and 
published 
R Access to cross-border and other transmission capacity must be non-
discriminatory for licensed participants 
R Curtailment should only be for emergencies and participants should be 
compensated 
R Capacity rights should be transferable, to allow a secondary market to 
develop  
R Surplus capacity should be offered into the market (subject to system 
security) 
R Capacity allowances should be subject to controls to protect against 
market power by dominant players 
                                                     
37 Gate-closure refers to the final time before dispatch when offers and bids can be accepted into the 
market.  
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R The use-it-or-lose-it principle should be applied so that capacity that is 
unused or not re-sold is returned to the market. This also protects 
against anti-competitive practices and avoids hoarding of capacity 
R Regional integration will be facilitated by common capacity allocation 
procedures at each border. 
Careful verification procedures are necessary to be sure capacity is exclusively 
allocated and to protect the property rights especially when traded in secondary 
markets. Where capacity has already been allocated in long-term contracts this will 
limit the development of competition and these should be phased out. 
6.5.2 Supporting framework 
The institutional framework to support multi-lateral cross-border trade will include: 
R System operator 
R Market operator 
R Regulatory authorities 
An organised power exchange may also develop for trading contracts.  
The trading arrangements will be embodied in a number of agreements, rules and 
systems, which typically include: 
R Market rules 
R Metering arrangements  
R Payments and settlements systems 
The market rules will also be designed to operate in a consistent manner with the 
local and/or regional grid codes, especially those parts of the codes which deal with 
meters, scheduling and dispatch, and communications. 
Institutions 
The System Operator or Operators are central institutions to the technical 
functioning of the market. SOs have a central position in the market with access to 
privileged information, and as such they often also act as independent Market 
Operator (MO). The combined entity is called the independent system and market 
operator (ISMO)38 
In a market covering multiple transmission systems the roles and relationships 
among the SOs will depend on the number of control and settlement areas: 
                                                     
38 Another common structure is to combine the SO with the transmission network owner, into a so-
called transmission system operator, TSO. 
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R If only one, need a single common market administrator (including 
settlements) and operator and set of governance rules to which all 
participants are party, to provide coordination among SOs  
R If more than one, then require rules/agreements among SOs to enable 
market transactions to take place and to allow balancing 
Where there are separate pools, settlement can be through inter-SO payments or 
through a centralised settlements administrator. The centralised case is a greater 
level of unification in the regional market. Trading between separate pools must be 
subject to constraint management and inter-pool trade will only be possible where 
sufficient interconnecting transmission capacity exists.  
Provided the market structures are properly designed the different choices could 
lead to similar economic outcomes. The choice may depend on: 
R Whether the countries prefer to maintain separate system operators or 
merge the function 
R The communication and coordination problems involved with running 
multiple separate bid stacks if generators are allowed to place bids on all 
stacks simultaneously 
R The complications for generators if they can only place bids on one of 
the stacks. 
Regulatory institutions at the country level or at a regional level will issue licenses 
(preferably harmonised across jurisdictions), ensure that the market rules are 
adhered to, and carry out market monitoring exercises of dominant players and 
safeguard against abuse of market power. The SIEPAC regional market provides an 
example of where a regional regulator and regional system and market operator 
have been created to oversee trading between integrated national markets. Within 
Europe, coordination is done formally through a set of EU Directives and less 
formally through a number of coordination bodies holding regular meetings of 
regulators, SOs and MOs. 
In a bilateral contracts markets contracts may be traded directly between buyer and 
seller, through an intermediary (a broker or trader) or through a power exchange. 
The liquidity in an exchange will provide more efficient price signals. A higher level 
of trading will be required to support a commercially operated power exchange. 
Power exchanges are sometimes developed on a non-commercial basis until 
sufficient liquidity has been built to support commercial operation.  
The proposed approach to the evolutionary development of the regional market for 
South East Europe is outlined in Box 14 below. 
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Box 14  Proposed development of South East Europe regional market 
The design concept for the Regional Electricity Market / Energy Community in South 
East Europe (REM / ECSEE, now simply referred to as the Energy Community, EC) 
started with a study for nine countries, called the Balkan Electricity Market study. The key 
market design proposals developed the concept of the evolution from coordinated 
bilateral contracts to integrated power exchanges.  
The evolution of market institutions should both anticipate but also follow the growth of 
trading volume and the shortening of trading interval. In the initial SE Europe design, the 
evolution was seen to follow three broad stages: 
R Stage 1: bilateral trade between integrated (state-owned) utilities. A 
Regional Market Coordinator (RMC) facilitates trade 
R Stage 2: trade between unbundled generators and distributors, some 
eligible consumers 
R Stage 3: short term exchanges through Regional Market Brokers 
(RMB) 
The first step was seen as creating an institutional structure including information 
exchanges and a RMC to facilitate the development of long term and medium term 
bilateral trades with a minimum of necessary changes to internal national market rules.  
The next step was proposed to be the increasing trading of short term electricity. The 
increased volume of trade and complexity of settlement requires further regional 
institutional structures. The first step would be the establishment of one or more Regional 
Market Brokers able to facilitate liquid short term trading. This could be an over-the-
counter (OTC) market, probably facilitated by an electronic bulletin board. Later, a fully 
automated exchange (cleared exchange) could be developed though this requires a much 
more complex market infrastructure for settlement (currency and credit risk) and contract 
enforcement/dispute resolution. 
 
Trading agreements and systems 
The market rules are often divided into sections containing: 
R Contractual or legal terms, binding participants to act in accordance 
with the rules. They may be enforced through contract law or 
administrative law 
R Commercial trading rules, including the rules for entry and exit, credit 
requirements, submitting bids and offers and price setting in the gross 
pool or BM 
R Technical rules, including security of supply and customer protection 
(with reference to the grid code) 
R Dispute resolution procedures 
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Verifiable metering systems, including at the border points, are essential to market 
operation. A payments and settlements system must be developed and is likely to 
be underpinned by credit posting requirements.  
6.5.3 Specific risk characteristics 
The risk characteristics of the multilateral regional market are in addition to the 
underlying country, technical and investment risks identified for other trading 
arrangements. The risks specific to the multilateral case include: 
Risks during transition and market integration  
During this period there is a lot of uncertainty in the regulatory and operational 
environment. New untested processes and systems introduce risks of error in 
coordinating the technical and commercial market operations.  
Technical risk during transition and integration can be reduced by careful planning, 
operating new systems in parallel for a testing period before going live with them, 
and ensuring there is redundancy and backup for market-dependent systems in 
case something goes wrong.  
Regulatory uncertainty can be managed with careful information sharing and 
stakeholder consultation. Weaknesses in the underlying regulatory capacity and 
commitment to the process must be addressed as a prerequisite to controlling 
regulatory risk. 
Market integration is also made difficult by differences in the institutional, 
commercial, legal, financial and technical environments in the participating 
countries. The experience of regional electricity market integration in Europe and 
the United States shows that even among developed markets with relatively similar 
conditions the process can be slow. Perhaps the only means of easing integration is 
through persistent commitment to the project and a willingness to take a long-term 
view.  
Risk of abuse of monopoly power: market price manipulation 
Any market with dominant players39 is potentially vulnerable to price manipulation 
irrespective of the type of market rules. However, the risks may be greater in gross 
pools than net pools, as the dominant generator is usually able to predict which 
plant will be setting the price in a gross pool and bid accordingly. 
Vertically integrated utilities may try to manipulate the price in either direction: 
R Raise prices, if they are long on generation and want to discourage new 
suppliers from entering the market 
                                                     
39 A dominant player is defined as one having monopoly power within a market, and the ability to 
influence prices. In electricity as well as other markets, monopoly power tends to be considered a 
potential problem when one player controls more than 25-30% of the market or an important segment 
of the market (eg peaking power or mid-merit power). 
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R Lower prices, if they are long on supply/distribution and want to 
discourage new generators from entering the market 
Their behaviour may switch in different time periods, creating high uncertainty in 
future prices which raises the risks for any new entrant. 
Strong regulators are required to firstly, monitor and detect abusive market 
behaviour; and secondly, to impose penalties which would usually require the 
dominant utility to divest itself of some of its assets to reduce its market power. 
However, the detection and remedy of market abuse is a lengthy process and in the 
meantime the smaller market players may be severely damaged or driven out of the 
market. 
Counterparty risk and defaulting market member 
This is the risk that the counterparty to a trade may default on payment or delivery. 
The cause of this risk may be independent of the market structure, such as poor 
collection rates or poorly capitalised or financially weak market participants. 
Complex markets usually require participants to post some form of credit guarantee 
with a central authority. This may be an actual cash deposit or, less onerous for 
smaller participants, a letter of credit with a bank, covering one or two months 
average bill. 
The failure of a market member through bankruptcy or administration can cause 
financial problems to all market members, not just their immediate counterparties to 
bilateral trades.  The UK market has seen the failure of a number of small suppliers 
but the administration of TXU Europe caused major disruption to trading and 
market prices for a short period. If a defaulting party does not settle its payments to 
the pool, all other parties may have to share in covering the losses. 
Operational risk 
In addition to risk during market development, there is technical risk during the 
operation of the market. Emergency backup procedures must be in place to protect 
against failure of market systems.  
Risk of market failure 
Following the intensive period of initial development, market rules usually undergo 
a continuous evolutionary process of update and improvement. New requirements 
and weaknesses in the arrangements are discovered through actual operational 
experience. In some cases unforeseen consequences of market design have been 
significant and have even resulted in fundamental redesign of the market. Examples 
include the England and Wales gross pool, which was redesigned as a net pool to 
overcome concerns about market manipulation, and the California market which 
failed as a result of design flaws.  
However, there is a growing body of international experience with pool-based 
markets including at the regional level. The lessons and experience from these 
markets should aid in avoiding many of the mistakes made elsewhere.  
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Risk of failing to get the initial conditions right 
As discussed in the section on supporting conditions above, if the required initial 
conditions are not met it will be difficult to overcome the barriers to successful 
market implementation. Where markets have failed it has not been the concept of 
traded electricity that has been at fault. Rather, it is the market design and the 
environment in which trade takes place whose weaknesses prevented the benefits of 
trade from being realised. California is a case in point.  
6.6 Conclusions on international trading types 
International (as well as national) electricity trading tends to evolve from simple 
bilateral trades to more complex forms of multi-party and multi-country trading. In 
the ECO region, and in particular within Central Asia and between it and its 
neighbours, trading arrangements in the short to medium term are likely to take the 
form of bilateral exchanges and long-term PPAs. 
This section has identified and described four main types of trading arrangements 
which characterise the principle stages in the evolution from bilateral cross-border 
trades to a more integrated regional market: 
1 Bilateral trade between neighbours: a) state-to-state utility transfers; b) 
dedicated trade from new facilities; c) trade with private sector 
involvement 
2 Bilateral trade via a transit country 
3 Trade among synchronised national power systems 
4 Multilateral trade within a regional pool mechanism  
Each type of trading arrangement has been described in terms of its key 
characteristics, the required supporting framework, and its specific risk 
characteristics. 
Multi-party trading can involve both multiple buyers and sellers, including 
independent suppliers and traders, and pooling arrangements. These generally 
evolve from national electricity markets to regional markets and require detailed 
rules for competitive cross-border trading and access to networks. The full evolution 
will typically take many years, during which time the various elements of the 
supporting institutional framework can be gradually developed both nationally and 
internationally.  
The last two trade types (synchronisation and multi-country regional pools) have 
taken many years to develop in the more advanced regions in Europe and America. 
These models can be studied (eg UCTE, SIEPAC, NordPool and the US markets, see 
also section 7) to asses the steps that would be necessary within ECO to meet the 
many preconditions for regional market integration, such as high liquidity of 
trading, efficient congestion management, access to networks, cross-border capacity 
allocation, transmission operator compensation mechanisms, cost-reflective tariffs 
and coordination of regulations and licensing across the member countries. 
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7 Case studies of international energy trade 
7.1 Summary of selected cases 
The TOR requires a review of international experience and alternative trading 
arrangements. Our approach to this task is to provide short studies of four selected 
cases. A number of examples of international trading arrangements in highly 
advanced markets have been given in various earlier sections of this report (eg 
NordPool, PJM market in the US), but in selecting the cases we have sought to find 
examples that are more similar to the conditions in ECO or that the ECO region 
might face in the medium term. Thus cases have been selected that involve the 
investment in both generation and dedicated transmission, that involve some of the 
ECO countries, that provide relevant examples of regional institutional 
arrangements, and that involve countries with national markets facing similar 
challenges to some of those in ECO. 
The international trading arrangements that we have chosen for our main case 
studies are: 
R NT2. The Nam Theun 2 hydro power, interconnection and trade project 
between Laos and Thailand, part of the GMS subregion initiative 
R SIEPAC. The SIEPAC electricity transmission, regional transmission and 
trade project among six countries of Central America 
R SAPP . The Southern Africa Power Pool arrangement to promote 
electricity trade among 12 countries in southern Africa 
R SCP . South Caucasus Pipeline  built to transport natural gas from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia 
The characteristics of the four cases are summarised in Table 9 and described more 
fully in the subsequent sections. 
 
Table 9  Case study summary 
 NT2 SIEPAC SAPP SCP 
Number of 
countries 
2 6 12* 3 
Post conflict 
countries 
    
New-build transit 
infrastructure 
    
Trade types 1c (Bilateral, new 
build, with 
2 (Transit trade, 
new build, 
1 (Bilateral, 
transit), 3 
2 (transit) 
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 NT2 SIEPAC SAPP SCP 
private sector) private sector), 4 
(regional market)
(synchronised) 
Foundation 
agreements 
Inter-
governmental 
MOU 
Framework 
agreement, IGA 
Inter-
governmental 
MOU 
IGAs,  
HGAs between 
governments and 
developer 
Supporting 
institutions 
None Independent 
regional 
regulator, 
regional system 
and market 
operator, 
regional 
transmission 
operator 
Regional 
cooperation 
body, SAPP 
committees, 
Coordination 
Centre 
None 
Dispute 
resolution 
Specific internal 
procedures, 
UNCITRAL 
Specific internal 
procedures, 
International 
Court 
Under regional 
trade structure, 
Specific rules 
being drafted 
Energy Charter 
Treaty (for IGA 
disputes), 
ICSID (for HGA 
disputes) 
Sovereign 
guarantee(s) 
  -  
Other risk 
coverage 
IFI and donor 
guarantees, 
Financial 
guarantee from 
seller to buyer  
- - - 
Private sector 
participation 
Developer, 
operator,  
financiers 
Transmission 
company, 
developers, 
traders 
Some private 
sector (IPP, 
transmission) 
Sellers, 
developers and 
operators (largely 
private sector 
project) 
Development 
period 
1992 feasibility 
study;  
2005 financing 
finalised and 
construction start 
1996 Framework 
Agreement;  
2000 regulator 
established; 
2002 market 
operation; 
2006 construction 
start 
Formed 1995. By 
2006, trade 
remained 
modest 
1996 PSA; 
2001 all 
agreements with 
governments, 
private sector; 
2003 construction 
start, 
2006 expected 
operation 
*The SAPP interconnected grid currently covers nine ‘Operating Member’ countries 
These detailed case studies are in addition to the other examples from international 
best practice that are used throughout this report to illustrate specific points in the 
study.  
Three of our main case studies include post-conflict countries, and all have private 
sector participation to varying degrees. The SCP project differs from the other three 
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in that it is a natural gas project. It is specifically a transmission project but includes 
Offtake and gas sales agreements. 
We consider each case study against a range of issues that are of direct relevance to 
developing trade in Central and South Asia. These are: 
R Evolution of the trade arrangement  
R Supporting legal and institutional framework 
R Dispute resolution mechanisms 
R Assessment of risks 
Finally, for each we consider the lessons for trade in the ECO region. Each of the 
case studies is discussed and expanded below. 
7.2 Nam Theun 2 project (Laos – Thailand)  
7.2.1 Introduction and background 
Laos PDR is a low income country in South East Asia that is estimated to have total 
hydro power development potential of 23,000 MW. The Nam Theun 2 project (NT2) 
involves the development of hydro electric potential in Laos for export via high 
voltage transmission interconnection to Thailand.  
The project involves the construction of a 1,070 MW hydroelectric storage project 
with the capacity to deliver an annual average of 5,636 GWh of electricity to 
Thailand via a double circuit 500 kV transmission line. A 115 kV line will also be 
built to supply a small portion of production to customers in Laos. The location of 
the project is shown in Figure 17. 
An important part of the technical design is the segregation of the turbines and 
switchyards: that part of the plant serving Laos (2 x 43 MW) is served by a separate 
penstock and a separate switchyard, necessary because the Laotian and Thai 
systems are not synchronised40.  
The project will divert water from the Nam Theun river (a tributary of the Mekong) 
at a site in central Laos (see map in Figure 17) and flood the Nakai Plateau to create 
the 450 km2 storage lake. The full construction phase began in June 2005 and the 
facility is planned to be in operation from late 2009. 
                                                     
40 Lack of grid synchronisation has complicated a number of potential cross-border hydro export 
projects in Asia. For example, the case of Nepal, whose power sector planners are very reluctant to 
synchronise with the Northern or Eastern Indian grids, which they claim would export their instability 
to Nepal. However, India has made great strides in improving grid discipline over the past few years, 
so this may become less of an issue in the future. 
C:\A1 Files\Projects\S.Asia Elect 237\Docs\FR\S Asia Final Report v4.doc   9/3/07 
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Figure 17  Location of Laos hydro projects 
 
Source: Lao National Committee for Energy 
Key characteristics of the project include: 
R The project is being developed specifically to transport output from a 
large new hydro-electric facility 
R It involves new-build generation and new-build transmission  
R Compared with the exporting country (Laos), the importing country 
(Thailand) is a more developed economy, has high electricity growth 
and limits (due to fuel availability and planning restrictions) to 
generating capacity that can be developed domestically, and is at a more 
advanced stage of electricity sector development and reform 
R The project is being carried out by a consortium of private and public 
sector companies and financiers with IFI backing 
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The project’s technical design is shown schematically in Figure 18.  
Figure 18  Nam Theun 2 project schematic 
 
Source: NTPC 
Other electricity trade projects in the region 
Projects to continue the development of Laos’ hydro power potential for export to 
Thailand are ongoing under a Memorandum of Understanding between the two 
governments. In September 2006, a 27-year concession to construct and operate the 
planned US$ 700 million 523 MW Nam Theun 1 plant was awarded to a public-
private consortium including EGCO of Thailand (40%), which is a partner in the 
Nam Thuen 2 Power Company (see section 7.2.4 below), the Government of Laos 
(20%) and a Malaysian engineering company (40%). As with NT2, the primary 
customer of NT1 will be EGAT under a PPA. Construction is planned to begin in 
2008. 
The Nam Theun 2 project is part of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) initiative 
to increase electricity interconnection and trade among the countries in the region. 
As in Central Asia, broader GMS trade is expected to develop in a step-by-step 
fashion beginning with bilateral arrangements and building toward a long-term 
goal of a regional market. In addition to the existing and expanding Laos-Thailand 
trade, bilateral arrangements are expected in the coming 4-5 years between Laos-
Vietnam and Cambodia-Vietnam. 
Nam Theun 2 in the context of Thai electricity demand and supply 
EGAT’s PPA under the NT2 project anticipates that by 2010 supply from NT2 will 
represent 3% of the Thai electricity system total annual energy requirement, and 3% 
of the peak capacity on the system. The country currently relies on thermal 
generation capacity for approximately 80% of its fuel mix (close to 50% is in CCGT 
plants). The northeast region, which can be served by imports from Laos, has been 
facing supply shortages.  
The 2004 Thailand Load Forecast Subcommittee forecasts of electricity demand were 
for 7.5% growth in 2004-8, 6.8% in 2009-13, and 6.4% in 2014-15 (Medium Economic 
Growth case)41. The World Bank’s economic analysis of the NT2 project used an 
earlier, more conservative, estimate of 6.17% per year for 2003-16. 
                                                     
41 Thailand Power Development Plan, 2004 
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Although there are potential hydro electric development sites within Thailand, 
objections to new large hydro projects on environmental and social grounds create 
barriers to their development. While the country has coal reserves and can import 
coal for electricity production there are also planning restrictions, primarily on 
environmental grounds, on new-build coal-fired generation. Finally, Thailand’s 
domestic natural gas reserves are limited, and although there are alternative natural 
gas supply options in the region there are associated security of supply issues, 
particularly given its already high dependence on this fuel.  
Electricity imports from neighbouring Laos enables the Thai electricity sector to 
avoid the planning restrictions on new domestic projects. Thailand is also in a 
strong position to negotiate a favourable price for purchases from Laos. 
7.2.2 NT2 project within the trade typologies framework 
The Nam Theun 2 (NT2) project falls within trade typology 1c: it is a large dedicated 
new-build project for trade between two neighbouring countries and involves the 
private sector.  
Laos and Thailand have had an electricity trade relationship since transfers were 
first made from Laos to Thailand in 1971. This trade has been of all three sub-
categories under trade typology 1, including small cross-border trade (Laotian 
customers near the border are currently supplied by low voltage connections with 
Thailand), and sales under PPAs from dedicated new-build plant involving both the 
state-owned utilities from each country and private sector partners (such as the NT2 
project).  
The broader GMS subregion electricity trade initiative is a more ambitious project 
involving all the riparian countries42 of the Mekong.  In addition to each of the sub-
categories under typology 1, the GMS initiative seeks to include international trade 
through transit countries (typology 2) and the longer-term vision is for more closely 
integrated trade of the sort covered in typologies 3 and 4. 
7.2.3 Project evolution 
The NT2 project has undergone a long period of evolution and development. The 
hydro electric potential of the site was identified in the 1970s, but serious 
consideration of its development did not begin until the early 1990s.  
Following a feasibility study carried out with World Bank funding in 1992, 
extensive economic and technical viability studies and environmental and social 
impact assessments were conducted over the course of more than a decade43. The 
project generated extensive public debate, which extended the development period. 
Finalisation of the financing agreements was reached in June 2005 following the 
receipt of World Bank project approval in March of that year, with construction 
                                                     
42 Cambodia, China, Laos PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam 
43 Some delay was caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 
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beginning soon after (although preliminary site preparation work had been ongoing 
since the middle of 2004).  
Confidence building projects  
In addition to NT2, Laos has implemented three other hydro projects to serve 
Thailand as an export market under PPAs. These are much smaller in scale, with the 
largest being the Theun-Hinboun IPP that was put into operation in 1998 (see 
Box 9). These projects served as test cases for development of hydro power in Laos 
and for the technical and economic arrangements for export to Thailand. 
Economic appraisal  
A World Bank benefit-cost analysis found that at capacity utilisation rates above 
30% NT2 was the least-cost investment option for Thailand44 (the plant is expected 
to operate with a capacity utilisation of around 60%). The analysis also found NT2 
to be least-cost for Laos.  
Concerns for environmental and social impacts 
The project involves the creation of a large storage reservoir as well as major civil 
works in relation to the dam and river diversion. Several international advocacy 
NGOs (such as the International River Network, Probe International) lodged strong 
objections to the project on environmental grounds. The international publicity 
given to these environmental concerns greatly influenced some of the problems in 
firming up the consortium (for example, EDF announced its intention to withdraw 
from the project in July 2003, only to rejoin again in October 2003).  
One of the key steps to resolving these concerns was to constitute an international 
Panel of Environmental and Social Experts. The Panel’s reports played a significant 
role in establishing the necessary environmental safeguards to the satisfaction of the 
World Bank’s Board. This was a precondition to the World Bank providing the 
financial guarantees that were essential to the project’s viability.  
7.2.4 Key players in project implementation 
The key participants in the project implementation (the project design, construction 
and operation) are: 
R NTPC – the project company specially created to execute the project 
R Government of Laos (GoL) 
R EGAT - the key customer for the output of the project 
R Head Contractor – EdF, which is contracted by NTPC to oversee the 
design and construction of the project 
                                                     
44 Project Economic Analysis, March 14 2005 
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The IFIs have also had an important role in the project design and facilitating 
financing, and will provide further technical support assistance related to the 
project. 
Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) 
The Nam Theun 2 Power Company is a joint venture between four partners:  
R Electricité de France International (EdFI): 35% 
R Lao Holding State Enterprise (LHSE): 25% 
R Electricity Generating Public Company (EGCO): 25% 
R Italian-Thai Development Public Company Ltd (ITD): 15% 
The NTPC is incorporated in Laos under Laotian law as a foreign investment 
company. 
The partners in NTPC are a mix of public and private companies. Lao Holding State 
Enterprise (LHSE) is a publicly owned investment vehicle created by the 
Government of Laos in 2005 to represent its investment in the project. Electricité de 
France (EdF), the parent company of EdFI, remains majority owned by the 
Government of France. The remaining two partners are publicly traded companies 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand45.  
IFI role in project support 
In addition to financial guarantees and grants, the World Bank is providing 
technical assistance to the GoL in relation to: 
R revenue and expenditure management  
R environmental and social impact management  
Laos is one of the least developed countries in East Asia and there was concern that 
it would not have the required institutional capacity to manage the revenues from 
the project transparently and accountably. The revenue and expenditure 
management component is designed to build capacity within GoL to better enable it 
to direct the revenues from the project through its public spending programme and 
to account for those revenues.  
Importantly, this assistance recognises the need to begin building capacity before 
the revenue stream begins.  
                                                     
45 Electricity Generating Public Company (EGCO) was created in 1992 from the partial privatisation of 
EGAT (although EGAT, and thereby the Thai government, continues to be the largest single 
shareholder with a 25% share). Its core business is supplying electricity to EGAT.  
The Italian-Thai Development Public Company Ltd (ITD) is a Thailand based construction and civil 
engineering firm.  
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The World Bank is supporting the GoL in the creation of a Poverty Reduction Fund 
that will be used to channel revenue from the project to priority programmes. 
A significant amount of attention has been focussed on managing the 
environmental impacts and on resettling villages in the affected area. The IFIs are 
supporting the development and monitoring of various programmes in relation to 
the project impacts. A condition for World Bank support to the project was that the 
Government of Laos prepare an environmental and social management policy.  
As well as these programmes directly related to the project, the IFI and bilateral 
development agencies are using their support to the project to leverage broader 
development and poverty reduction and governmental capacity building 
programmes in Laos.  
7.2.5 Legal supporting structure and institutional framework 
The key legal and contractual agreements supporting the project are: 
R MOU between the governments of Laos and Thailand 
R Concession Agreement between the Government of Laos and the project 
company 
R PPAs between the project company and both of the offtakers 
R Risk guarantees from international institutions 
R Financing agreements between the project company and the financiers 
R Head construction contract issued by the project company 
In addition there is a Sponsors’ Agreement among the partners in NTPC and the 
GoL, and the Shareholders’ Agreement among the four owners of NTPC. There are 
also agreements between the GoL and the IFIs and bilateral institutions.  
The contractual and institutional structure supporting the project is summarised in 
Figure 19 below.  
 
 
 
South Asia: Policy Paper for Regional Energy Trade, Final Report, March 2007  
Economic Consulting Associates, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Case studies of international energy 
trade  
129 
Figure 19 NT2 Institutional and contractual structure 
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Source: World Bank 
Each of the key agreements is summarised in turn below.  
Thai – Laos Governmental agreement 
In 1996 the Thai and Laos government signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) for the development of up to 3,000 MW of hydro power resources in Laos 
for export to Thailand. This replaced and extended an earlier MOU that had 
formalised the electricity trade relationship between the two countries. NT2 is the 
single most significant project to be pursued under this agreement.  
Concession Agreement 
The project is structured on a Build, Own, Operate, Transfer (BOOT) basis according 
to a Concession Agreement between a special purpose vehicle created for the 
project, the Nam Theun 2 Power Company Ltd (NTPC), and the Government of 
Laos (GoL). The Agreement grants a 25-year concession to NTDC after which the 
project assets, which include the dam and power generation facilities and 
transmission lines to the EGAT delivery point, are to be transferred to GoL. The 
concession period begins with sales under the PPA with EGAT. 
The Concession Agreement between the GoL and NTPC is governed by Laos Law46. 
While the Concession Agreement is between GoL and NTPC, it makes explicit 
reference to the other project agreements, in particular the EGAT PPA, and 
references EGAT’s rights as a stakeholder in the concession agreement.  
                                                     
46 English Law is to be used in the case of any particular issue where Laos Law is found to be silent on 
the issue in question or wholly inadequate. 
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Power Purchase Agreements 
The two offtakers from the project are the state-owned utilities in each country: the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and Electricité du Laos (EdL). 
In 2003, EGAT and EdL each entered into a PPA between themselves and NTPC. 
The EGAT PPP, accounting for 95% of NT2’s design capacity (995 MW), is the core 
demand driving agreement for the project. The remaining 5% (75 MW) is for 
delivery to EdL under a separate PPA47. As such, the discussion below provides a 
brief overview of the terms of the EGAT PPA.  
The contracted energy and associated tariffs in the EGAT PPA are categorised 
according to three types:  
R Primary Energy (PE), of 4,406 GWh/year on average. The tariff and 
payment are set half in Thai Baht and half in US Dollars 
R Secondary Energy 1 (SE1), of 948 GWh/year on average. The tariff is set 
half in Thai Baht and half in US Dollars while payment is all in Baht 
R Secondary Energy 2 (SE2), of 282 GWh/year on average. Both tariff and 
payment is in Baht. 
The first two of these relate to two time of day periods and are subject to take–or-
pay (TOP) conditions with annual tariff escalation. The third, which accounts for 5% 
of the contracted volume, is reserve or excess energy that has a fixed tariff and is not 
TOP. 
The per kWh tariffs are formed of US Dollar and Thai Baht components. Using the 
starting exchange rate of 40 Baht to the US$, the currency split in the tariffs is 51% 
US$ and 49% Baht. This closely matches to the currency split in the project’s debt 
financing (see section 7.2.6 for details of the financing structure).  
The tariff for PE and SE1 escalate at a rate of 1.4% per year until the end of the 
concession in 2034. The SE2 tariff is constant in all years of the concession. The 
tariffs under the EGAT PPA are summarised in Table 10.  
                                                     
47 The powerhouse contains 4 x 250 MW turbines to supply the EGAT component, and 2 x 43 MW 
turbines to supply EdL. 
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Table 10  Tariffs in the Nam Theun 2 EGAT PPA 
 2009 (tariff year 1) Escalation 2034 (tariff year 26) 
 USc/kWh Baht/kWh USc/kWh Baht/kWh
PE 2.118 0.805 1.4% 2.948 1.120
SE1 0.975 0.370 1.4% 1.358 0.516
SE2 0.000 0.570 - 0.000 0.570
Source: ADB loan document and NTPC. The concession period is 25 years. The 2009 tariff year contains only 
one month, while 2034 contains 11 months. 
Energy sold under the EdL PPA is all PE escalated at the same annual rate as for 
EGAT of 1.4%. The EdL tariff begins at 1.765 USc/kWh and 0.698 baht/kWh in 2009 
and reaches 2.457 USc/kWh and 0.961 baht/kWh in 2034. 
Most (95%) of the average annual total available energy contracted to EGAT is on a 
take–or-pay basis. While EGAT is contractually required to pay NTPC for the full 
amount of TOP energy that NTPC declares available in any month it is not required 
to dispatch the full declared amount. If it dispatches less, EGAT is able to receive an 
equivalent amount of energy at a later date to make up the dispatch shortfall48. 
EGAT may also dispatch more when there is sufficient water available.  
The PPA specifies the delivery point at the centre of the Mekong river at a location 
on the border between the two countries. EGAT is required to build a 166 km 
double circuit 500 kV transmission line from Roi Et in Thailand to the border to 
meet the transmission line being built by NTPC.  
The PPA states that the power station will be operated automatically by remote 
dispatch controlled by EGAT, subject to certain operating restrictions such as 
NTPC’s water management obligations. NTPC uses its energy declarations to carry 
out its water management responsibilities. 
The EGAT PPA is governed by English Law. Dispute resolution under the PPA is 
discussed in section 7.2.8. 
Head construction contract 
The Head Construction Contract is between NTPC and the lead construction 
contractor, EdF. It is a turnkey contract for engineering, procurement, construction 
(EPC) and management of the project. EdF will in turn subcontract many of the 
contract roles. Through the Head Construction Contract NTPC passes many of the 
development and construction phase project risks to EdF.  
                                                     
48 The shortfall amount that EGAT may claim is subject to limits to protect NTPC from being forced to 
spill valuable water in order to retain the water related to the dispatch shortfall.  
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Water rights and watershed management 
The Concession Agreement grants NTPC water rights to the rivers associated with 
the project for the period of the concession. Accordingly, NTPC is made the 
responsible party for managing the water catchment and release.  
NTPC’s water rights include commitments from GoL not to make changes that 
would affect NTPC’s operation of the hydro scheme and its ability to generate 
electricity from it. NTPC is required to make minimum water releases to support 
other riparian uses and to accommodate water use for irrigation in the project 
design. The Agreement also allows for future changes in the water release regime to 
enable other parties to generate electricity.  
The watershed is to be monitored by the Watershed Management and Protection 
Authority (WMPA) within GoL. WMPA will be supported by technical advice from 
NTPC. 
7.2.6 Project financing and financial risk coverage 
The total project base investment is US$ 1.25 billion with a further US$ 200 million 
contingency funding. Finance is 28% equity and 72% international loans from a 
mixture of the private and public sector investors, IFIs, bilateral agencies, 
commercial banks and export credit agencies.  
Crucially for the viability of the large private sector participation in the project, the 
World Bank Group and Asian Development Bank are providing debt guarantees of 
around US$ 185 million to cover commercial lenders’ political and financial risk.  
The project’s financing structure is summarised in Table 11.  
Table 11  Summary of NT2 financing structure 
 Equity Debt Total
NTPC shareholders 350  
US Dollar debt 450 
Thai baht debt 450 
Total base financing 350 900 1,250
Contingency 100 100 200
Total financing 450 1,000 1,450
Source: ADB/WB project update, March 2006 
Equity financing 
Equity financing in the project is US$ 350 million. The partners in NTPC each make 
an equity contribution to the project in proportion to their shareholding.  Public 
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sector investors directly account for 60% of NTPC equity through the inclusion of 
the Laos government owned LHSE and the French Government owed EdF, and 
slightly more indirectly through ownership of the private sector partners (ie EGCO). 
The LHSE equity component is US$ 87.5 million. The GoL’s equity contribution 
through LHSE is being funded by grants and loans from several of the IFIs and 
Agence Française de Développement (AfD). 
Debt financing 
The project’s US$ 900 million of base senior debt financing is denominated equally 
between US Dollars and Thai Baht. The US Dollar financing participants include:  
R A syndicate of nine international commercial banks 
R IFIs: Asian Development Bank (US$ 50 million private sector loan to 
NTPC, and US$ 20 million public sector loan to the GoL to assist its 
equity contribution  to NTPC), the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
(US$ 55 million loan to NTPC) and the Nordic Investment Bank49 
R Two French bilateral agencies (AfD and PROPARCO), and the Export-
Import Bank of Thailand  
The Baht denominated component is financed by a further syndicate of seven Thai 
commercial banks (some of which are owned by the Thai State).  
Risk guarantees 
The large private sector commercial lending component of the project is enabled in 
part by the protection of political risk guarantees and insurance from the IFIs, 
bilateral institutions and by the export credit agencies50. The main IFI contributions 
to political risk coverage are: 
R The World Bank Group is providing partial risk guarantees (US$ 42 
million) and MIGA guarantees (US$ 91 million)  
R The Asian Development Bank is providing a political risk guarantee to 
NTPC (US$ 50 million) 
The MIGA guarantee is provided to cover all of the political risks within MIGA’s 
ambit51. The guarantee applies mostly (US$ 86 million) to the US Dollar commercial 
debt, with a small component to cover EdFI against currency transfer restriction in 
Laos.  
The GoL provides a counter-guarantee to the ADB partial risk guarantee. 
                                                     
49 The World Bank is also providing a grant to cover social and environmental impact management. 
50 The participating export credit agencies are those of France, Sweden and Norway. 
51 These are risk of currency convertibility and transfer restriction, expropriation, war and civil 
disturbance and breach of contract.  
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Additionally, the EGAT PPA requires NTPC to provide several forms of financial 
security guaranteeing its obligations to EGAT. These are in the form of bank 
guarantees, cash deposits and a mortgage over NTPC’s physical assets. The security 
guarantees were due at the time NTPC was able to drawdown its debt financing.  
7.2.7 Risk assessment and mitigation 
Political risk 
Political risk coverage is provided to the financiers and suppliers as well as to EGAT 
by the financial risk coverage facilities and export credits mentioned above.  
In the EGAT PPA each party agrees to waive sovereign immunity. The Force 
Majeure clauses in the EGAT PPA include cases of both Laos and Thai political 
Force Majeure, which refer to certain acts of either government. In the event of a 
Force Majeure the length of the PPA is extended for a one day for every day of the 
Force Majeure, and if it continues for specified long periods the contract can be 
terminated by either party.  
Financial management risk 
The NTPC is required, under its concession agreement, to keep accounting records 
denominated in US Dollars, to follow International Accounting Standards and to 
have its records audited by international auditors.  
Requirements on GoL for prudent financial management are a condition of the 
World Bank backing for the project.  
Legal and regulatory risk 
The Concession Agreement provides the NTPC compensation if changes in local 
law have a material effect (outside of specified financial thresholds) on the project’s 
operation and return to the company. There is a complementary protection for the 
GoL against changes that results in increases in the company’s revenues, in which 
case the company must pay compensation to GoL. 
The GoL agrees in the Concession Agreement to waive any immunity it may 
otherwise have with respect to any legal or arbitral proceeding, award or 
enforcement, not to take any actions to impede or restrain the agreed dispute 
resolution process, and that Laos courts will recognise and enforce awards made in 
accordance with the agreed dispute resolution process. It also reaffirms its 
obligations and commitments under the New York Convention52.  
The EGAT PPA includes protection for both companies against changes in the laws 
in either country (except in relation to taxes) that affect either party’s financial 
position. The company in the country whose law has changed is required to 
compensate the other company.  
                                                     
52 Laos PDR ratified the Convention in 1998.  
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The PPA also accounts for the possibility of electricity market reform in Thailand 
during the first 13 years of the PPA. EGAT has the option of incorporating the 
NTPC purchases into a power pool or other mechanism subject to certain 
conditions.  
Exchange rate and interest rate risk 
As noted in section 7.2.5, the PPAs underpinning the project specify tariffs in both 
US Dollar and Thai Baht with a split that matches the currency proportions in the 
debt financing. This provides a natural hedge to NTPC against exposure to 
fluctuations in the currencies of the debt during the lifetime of the PPA.  
Interest rate risk on the floating rate US Dollar denominated debt would be hedged 
through an interest rate swap whereby the debt would effectively be converted to a 
fixed rate.  
Foreign exchange convertibility  
The Concession Agreement includes clauses to entitle the NTPC to use bank 
accounts in the project currencies in Laos and a number of other countries. It also 
requires the GoL to direct the Bank of Laos to enable foreign exchange transactions.  
Design, construction and completion risk 
The Concession Agreement places requirements on the NTPC to meet good design, 
engineering and construction standards. It also divides the project implementation 
into four distinct phases and assigns the risk that they will not be completed within 
a specified timeframe to NTPC. The Agreement specifies maximum periods within 
which each phase must be completed and penalties to NTPC for failing to meet this 
timeframe.  
NTPC has in turn passed the risk of construction delay and cost overrun onto EdF 
through the Head Construction Contract with is structured on a turnkey basis (ie 
fixed price and completion date). 
The EGAT PPA further places requirements on EGAT and NTPC to complete their 
facilities under the project within specified periods. A period is also specified for 
EGAT to obtain the necessary access rights for its transmission component.  
The project financing arrangements include incentives for NTPC to protect against 
overruns in development costs, which are effectively capped. The project is 
budgeted to incur development costs of US$ 74.2 million. These costs are to be paid 
by the shareholders of NTPC who are then entitled to reclaim them. According to 
the agreement with the lenders, the development costs will be returned to the NTPC 
shareholders as base equity following an independent financial audit. The result is 
that the NTPC shareholders cover the development costs through their equity 
contributions but they will not receive compensation if those costs exceed the 
budgeted level. 
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Operation and maintenance and performance risk 
The EGAT PPA makes NTPC responsible for maintaining and operating the NT2 
facilities in Laos while EGAT is given responsibility for ensuring that the 
transmission system in Thailand is able to receive the electricity output from the 
project. The operating and maintenance costs are paid by each party except where 
they are responsible for costs incurred by the other party. 
If NTPC defaults on specific performance obligations under its EGAT PPA, EGAT is 
entitled to take over the operation and maintenance functions that are in default in 
order to remedy the situation.  
Dispatch risk 
EGAT’s TOP liability to NTPC is calculated on the basis of the declared available 
energy, rather than the energy actually dispatched. In this sense NTPC is not at risk 
from outages in the Thai transmission system since an inability to deliver the energy 
does not affect the payment it receives.  
Hydrological risk 
Since NTPC is assigned responsibility for managing the water catchment and 
releases it bears the risk that variation in hydrological conditions will affect the 
energy availability. A simulation of the average annual outcome of the terms in the 
EGAT PPA was carried out using actual hydrological data for the period 1950-2002. 
The simulation showed that the storage reservoir and operational flexibility of the 
project allowed hydrological risk to be smoothed between years to provide reduced 
risk of fluctuations in average available energy.  
The simulation was also used to model the impact of hydrological fluctuations on 
payments under the PPA. This showed that the Primary Energy, which makes up 
the bulk (nearly 80%) of contracted energy under the PPA, is relatively stable over 
time. The Secondary Energy component of the PPA was expected to be more 
variable as it followed the hydrological cycle.  
Environmental and social impacts 
The construction activities, river diversions, and the creation of the storage lake will 
have significant impacts on the environment and communities in the area and the 
project has attracted interest and scrutiny from academics, NGOs and individuals 
around the world. The international public institutions in particular have shown 
high profile concern for these issues. A number of safeguards requirements have 
been incorporated into the agreements between the IFIs and GOL and in the 
Concession Agreement.  
Under the Concession Agreement the NTPC is responsible for managing the 
environmental and social impacts of the project in accordance with standards 
agreed with GoL. The environmental and social plans developed to monitor, plan 
for and mitigate these impacts include: 
R Environmental Assessment and Management Plan 
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R Resettlement Action Plan 
R Social and Environmental Management Framework and Operational 
Plan 
The Concession Agreement includes provision for unanticipated (at the time of 
signing) project impacts, which the company is required to cover up to a specified 
limit. The Concession Agreement also provides for a panel of experts to provide 
independent review of the project impact mitigation measures.  
Other risks 
There is a risk in Laos of injury or damage due to unexploded ordinances (UXO) 
that are left from periods of conflict. The Concession Agreement makes NTPC 
responsible for finding and removing or destroying UXOs in the project area.  
7.2.8 Dispute resolution 
The arrangements for dispute resolution between GoL and NTPC are set out in the 
Concession Agreement. This provides three avenues: 
R The Consultation and Dispute Committee 
R An Expert 
R Arbitration in Singapore according to the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules 
For disputes between EGAT and NTPC, the PPA also stipulates three avenues for 
resolution:  
R In the first instance, a standing committee of two representatives from 
each party will consider billing and payment disputes, while an attempt 
should be made to resolve other disputes through direct negotiation 
R If the matter remains unresolved, it is referred to a panel of three 
experts, whose decision is final and binding 
R If, however, the referral of the dispute to experts is not required or is not 
agreed to by the parties, or if the experts fail to determine the dispute 
within the required time period, the dispute will be referred to 
arbitration in Singapore under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules 
7.2.9 Lessons for ECO 
The NT2 project illustrates that it is possible to bring to market a large complex 
international electricity project including new-build hydro generation and 
transmission that: 
R is located in a low income and institutionally poorly developed country  
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R uses international financing and project development, management and 
operation expertise and includes the private sector.  
Two components of this project were key to making it commercially viable with 
private sector financing: 
R the creditworthiness of the main buyer (EGAT), which reduces the 
payment risk to the project and thereby the financing risk 
R the reduction of political risk through the involvement of international 
development institutions and their provision of risk guarantees 
As with the other case studies considered here, this project suggests that for large 
scale investments in developing countries a sovereign guarantee from a 
participating government is a necessary risk reduction measure. Like the others it is 
also underpinned in the first instance by an inter-governmental agreement between 
the two state parties to the trade. In this case the agreement is a memorandum of 
understanding. 
The project development and structuring also includes other aspects that contribute 
to risk reduction. Among these is the coordination of the currencies in the tariff 
structure with the currency mix in the debt financing. This contributes to the 
financial risk reduction by mitigating exchange rate risk. The construction contracts 
assign the implementation risks to the contractor and limit cost overrun through the 
use of a turnkey structure.  
The project development process itself should contribute to risk reduction. The 
project spent more than a decade passing through several study and design 
iterations including considerable scrutiny and opportunity for response from 
interested parties not associated with the project sponsors and partners. Among the 
outcomes of this process was a focus within the project design on environmental 
and social impact monitoring and mitigation. The degree of transparency and public 
scrutiny also required that the sponsors provide good justification in economic 
terms (although there remain some criticisms of the analysis).  
The long lead-time also indicates that a project of this scale and complexity is likely 
to require several years before construction can begin. 
Another important aspect of the project design is the capacity building support 
provided by the World Bank to the Government of Laos for the management of the 
project revenues. This support was intended to ensure that the revenues from the 
project would be used to benefit the people of Laos through poverty reducing 
programmes and reflected a concern about the potential for corruption and waste. 
Importantly, this support recognises the need to begin building institutional 
capacity at the earliest possible opportunity and with as much lead-time as possible 
before the project begins operation.  
It is hard to see how the project could have been implemented without the MIGA 
guarantees, and, in turn, without the World Bank (and ADB) having been satisfied 
that adequate environmental safeguards were in place. While many of these 
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concerns are unique to hydro projects, the role of the IFIs in resolving 
environmental controversies is critical. 
7.3 Central America transmission and regional market 
(SIEPAC) 
7.3.1 Overview of SIEPAC 
The SIEPAC53 project among six countries in Central America54 is a useful example 
of: 
R An regional international trading system that has been developed in a 
way that allows for differences in the stage of development of the 
underlying markets in the member countries 
R Cooperation among a number of countries to build a new transmission 
line to allow the benefits of trade to be captured,  
SIEPAC illustrates the importance of an underlying framework agreement to 
facilitate the development of a regional market.  
SIEPAC seeks to enable regional electricity supply projects to take advantage of 
economies of scale and maximise the use of hydro resources in the region. Regional 
projects will serve customers within the through firm contracts backed up by firm 
transmission rights to capacity on the regional transmission network.  
SIEPAC is at a stage of market development in advance of anything in the ECO 
region. The initiative began over ten years ago and was formalised in a framework 
agreement (known as the ‘Marco Treaty’) among the country governments in 1996. 
Construction of the new transmission line linking all six countries began ten years 
after this foundation event, in 2006. This illustrates the complexity of the key steps 
required to create a system of this sort:  
R reaching agreement among the participating governments  
R developing the market design, securing financing, and  
R establishing the necessary institutional and regulatory structure (further 
details of the structure are given in annex A1.1).  
                                                     
53 Sistema de Interconexión Eléctrica para los Países de América Central 
54 The member countries are Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama. 
In addition, Colombia has expressed interest in interconnecting its system with SIEPAC and Mexico, 
Belize and the Dominican Republic have participated as observers.  
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7.3.2 Background 
The SIEPAC project in Central America is part of a regional initiative to create an 
electricity market and promote private sector involvement in transmission 
infrastructure and generation capacity. At its core are two projects: 
R The development of a regional electricity market (MER) based on a 
standard set of trading rules at the regional level. The MER initiative 
includes the creation of a regional regulator and a regional transmission 
operator 
R the development and completion of a 1,830 km international 
transmission system, including new-build lines, to provide sufficient 
interconnection among the six countries in the region to enable 
increased trade.  
Construction of the transmission line, which began in Panama in July 2006 and runs 
north to Guatemala, is expected to be completed in the second half of 2008. The line 
will operate at 230 kV, with transfer capacity of 300 MW. It will complete and 
reinforce the integration of the transmission systems of the six countries. 
Existing market and supply situation in the region 
Peak electricity demand in the region is relatively low. In 2003, the highest peak 
demand was 1290 MW in Costa Rica. Since the individual markets (and the 
participants within each) are small, it is difficult to both develop competition and 
take advantage of economies of scale within individual countries. By enabling 
generation projects to be developed to serve a regional market, the SIEPAC project 
aims to overcome these restrictions.  
The region’s electricity generation fuel mix is dominated by hydro electricity, 
although the relative importance of hydro has been falling in favour of thermal 
generation since the early 1990s. There remain large quantities of undeveloped 
hydroelectric potential. The SIEPAC transmission line will contribute to more 
optimal usage of the region’s hydro power.  
Until April 2002, the region was divided into two interconnected areas, with 
Guatemala and El Salvador connected to each other but electrically isolated from the 
other four countries. The connection of El Salvador to Honduras in 2002 linked all 
countries. However, the tie-line interconnections between neighbouring countries 
are insufficient to support the planned regional market. The SIEPAC line is intended 
to strengthen the interconnections and increase transfer capacity in both directions. 
The route of the line is shown in Figure 20. 
 
 
 
South Asia: Policy Paper for Regional Energy Trade, Final Report, March 2007  
Economic Consulting Associates, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Case studies of international energy 
trade  
141 
Figure 20  Route of SIEPAC transmission line 
 
Source: Energy Information Agency (EIA) 
The six countries have reached varying levels of market reform and development. 
This ranges from moves to implement retail competition in El Salvador and a 
regulated wholesale pool in Guatemala, to centrally planned single buyer markets 
in Costa Rica and Honduras. 
As in the ECO region, Central America includes a number of countries in a post-
conflict environment. The region is recovering from several protracted conflicts 
during the final decades of last century: 
R Guatemala: internal conflict, which began in 1960, ceased with the 
signing of the Peace Accords in 1996 
R El Salvador: civil war began in 1979 and was officially ended in 1992 
R Nicaragua: internal conflict from 1982 to 1988 
Cross-border conflicts in the region include a short war between El Salvador and 
Honduras (1969). 
SIEPAC project financing 
The transmission line has a project cost of US$ 320M, to be financed by equity and 
concessionary and ordinary loans in a 25%/75% split. The debt component consists 
of loans from the Inter-American Development Bank’s Special Fund for Operations 
(US$ 50M; 16%), ordinary capital of the IADB (US$ 120M; 37%) and loans from the 
Spanish Quincentennial Fund (US$ 70; 22%).  
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The equity component consists of 10.8% of the total project cost contributed by the 
participating countries and 14.2% from Endesa (the Spanish utility), the main 
private sector partner in the project.  
The loans to the national utilities are guaranteed by sovereign guarantees of the 
respective governments.  
The regional electricity market (MER) design and implementation is supported by 
technical assistance of US$ 16.4m, financed mostly (90%) by the IADB, of which 
US$ 5m was a grant with the rest funded through loans, and the remainder from the 
six countries.  
Critically, donor funding for the transmission line was made contingent on the 
parties reaching agreement on the market and regulatory structures.  
Private sector participation 
A transmission line company, Empresa Propietaria de la Red (EPR), was formed in 
1998 to own the transmission line. It is a joint venture between the governments of 
the six countries (through their state-owned utilities) and two private sector 
companies, Endesa of Spain and Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. (ISA) of Colombia. The 
public-private partnership grants Endesa, which has a 12.5% ownership, 
responsibility for managing the company. EPR has its head office in Costa Rica and 
branches in each country.   
Construction and supervision of the line was contracted to Canadian company 
Dessau-Soprin.  
7.3.3 Supporting legal and institutional framework 
The Marco Treaty of the Electrical Market of Central America, which forms the 
Framework Agreement for the SIEPAC project, was signed on 29 December 1996, 
ratified in 1998 and entered into effect from January 1999. According to the Marco 
Treaty, the six countries agree to the formation of a Regional Electricity Market 
(MER), including a regional system and market operator (EOR) and a regional 
regulatory agency (CRIE). The Treaty also makes provision for dispute resolution, 
primarily through CRIE  
CRIE began functioning in 2000, EOR was established in 2001, and MER began 
operating under a transition market code in 2002. The development of the market 
and transmission codes and the organisation of CRIE and EOR have been ongoing 
since 2002.  
The Marco Treaty also grants a concession to EPR to develop the SIEPAC line on a 
build, own and operate (BOO) basis.  
Institutional structure 
The SIEPAC project necessitated the creation at the regional level of the capacity to 
design and implement the regional market and the transmission line. Prior to the 
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Marco Treaty there were no regional organisations able to carry out these functions. 
The Treaty facilitated the creation of a number of organisations, including both 
temporary design and implementing organisations and permanent regulating and 
operating institutions.  
Three permanent organisations were created as legal entities under the Marco 
Treaty: 
R The Regional Commission on Electrical Interconnection (CRIE), which 
acts as regional regulator and resolves disputes in the regional market 
R The regional system operator and MER administrator (EOR) 
R The transmission line company (EPR) 
The Marco Treaty establishes CRIE as an entity with its own juridical identity and 
powers under public international law. Therefore, CRIE is subject to and governed 
by international law and is not a national entity. CRIE is headed by a six-person 
board of commissioners, one representing each member country. 
EOR has a 12-person Board of Directors; two per country. 
The role of CRIE is to regulate the MER. Its responsibilities include approving 
regulations for the market and coordinating these with the country level regulators, 
setting tariffs for use of the transmission system, progressing the market through 
increasing stages of competition and to guard against the exercise of a dominant 
position, imposing penalties for non-compliance with market rules, and settling 
disputes among participants. CRIE also approves extensions to the regional 
transmission network. CRIE is based in Guatemala. CRIE’s legal status and dispute 
resolution powers are discussed in more detail in section 7.3.4 below.  
EOR’s role includes proposing rules for MER and transmission system use for 
approval by CRIE, ensure quality and security of supply in the electricity system, to 
carry out the market operation function in an efficient manner, and to settle market 
transactions among participants. EOR is also responsible for providing information 
on market conditions as well as developing and publishing generation and 
transmission expansion studies and centrally planning extension of the regional 
transmission grid (RTR). EOR is based in El Salvador.  
The administrative costs of CRIE and EOR are met through contributions from the 
governments, fees paid by market participants and penalties imposed for non-
compliance with the rules.  
A number of temporary organisations were formed for the design and 
implementation phase of the MER project. It is intended that these will be reduced 
over time as the project moves into its operation phase and the permanent 
organisations take up their roles.  
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Regional Electricity Market (MER) 
The general design of the MER designates it as a seventh market, sitting on top of 
the country level markets. It consists of a firm and non-firm contracts market and a 
day ahead and real time spot market for short-term trades with prices set at 
specified physical trading points (nodes) in the regional transmission grid (RTR). 
Access and use of the RTR is auctioned in the form of financial and physical 
transmission rights by EOR. The RTR is made up of the new SIEPAC line, the tie-in 
lines and designated parts of the national grids.  
The general design of the MER allows for day-ahead spot market and real-time 
balancing. Transmission use of system charges will incorporate a variable charge for 
losses and congestion, a charge based on volumes transmitted across the lines, and a 
top-up charge to meet the regulated revenue requirement of the transmission 
companies.  
Each country retains its domestic market and regulations with the necessary 
changes to ensure compliance with MER and that it is able to interact with the 
regional market. Firm contracts for international trade must be approved by 
regulators in both the buyer and seller countries to ensure there is a corresponding 
firm transmission right. The terms (eg duration and capacity) are freely decided by 
the buyers and sellers.  
In addition to the new SIEPAC line, third parties are allowed to develop and 
construct new transmission lines. The owners of these lines will then be granted the 
associated transmission rights.  
Evolution of the MER 
The general design of the MER, based on principles in the Marco Treaty, underwent 
a two year development period before receiving approval by the six governments in 
2000.  
The Transitional Regulations of MER were finalised by CRIE and signed by the 
governments in 2002. More detailed market design followed, with the development 
of transmission codes, market rules and further organisation of CRIE and EOR. The 
transitional regulations were replaced in December 2005 with the approval by CRIE 
of updated regulations. The regulations govern the actions and responsibilities of 
the system operators in the SIEPAC member countries in regard to dispatch, tariffs 
and transmission services, and clarify the role of CRIE in relation to MER. The 
Transitional Regulations established border (nodal) prices  
7.3.4 Dispute resolution in MER 
The Marco Treaty provides for two levels of disputes and binding resolution: 
R Binding resolution by CRIE - In relation to disputes between agents 
operating in the market 
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R Resolution by the Central-American Court of International Justice - In 
relation to disputes between States party to the Treaty, in relation to 
interpretation of the Treaty, or the obligations imposed directly on the 
States under the treaty55.   
In either case, parties must first try to settle disputes through conciliation. Under the 
Rules of the MER, States may also choose to submit the dispute to CRIE for 
resolution on a binding basis, or such other forum as the parties agree to.  
Role of CRIE in dispute resolution  
The provisions for resolution of disputes are set out in more detail in the MER 
regulations56. These provisions provide for a three step process of negotiation, 
conciliation and binding arbitration. CRIE is responsible for both the conciliation 
and arbitration processes. This process is subject to the rules and regulations 
established within the SEIPAC structure, and is not governed by a domestic law. 
The general provisions apply to all disputes arising in the MER under the Regional 
Regulation57, where the dispute is between the following parties: 
R between national system operators, between national regulators  
R between agents in the market 
R between the EOR and an agent in the market or  
R between the EOR and a national system operator.  
The Rules of MER set out the procedure for arbitrations, and do not incorporate 
external rules or procedures. A three person tribunal, appointed from The Board of 
the Commissioners, acts as the arbitration tribunal of nationals that are not of the 
nationality of either party to the dispute.  
The procedures do provide for only one, limited form of appeal of a decision, by 
appealing to CRIE on the basis that it acted outside its legal powers or the decision 
contravenes overriding norms and principles.  
7.3.5 Risk assessment and mitigation 
All six countries have successfully attracted major international energy investors to 
their electricity sectors. However, the economies of the SIEPAC members are in 
transition and some bear the scars of recent conflict. In the case of the large 
investments needed for the SIEPAC line and to provide a creditworthy basis for the 
new market to reduce finance and payment risk, the donors/IFIs required sovereign 
guarantees from each of the participating governments.  
                                                     
55 including, for example, obligations to ensure freedom of transit and in relation to tariffs 
56 Reglamento del Mercado Electrico Regional 
57 unless the Rules provides other specific dispute resolution procedures 
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Planning risk and the risk that project financing would be stranded due to market 
and regulatory mechanisms not having been sufficiently developed in time for 
physical completion were mitigated through pressure being applied by IFIs 
providing financing. Construction of the physical transmission infrastructure could 
not begin until after the finalisation of the supporting institutional structures and 
agreements. 
As discussed above, the project includes a strong legal basis for clear dispute 
resolution procedures and establishes a supra-national institution to arbitrate and 
provide binding resolutions on disputes.  
7.3.6 Lessons for trade in ECO 
SIEPAC is a more advanced trading arrangement than anything existing currently 
within ECO. Development of the legal and institutional structure that will underpin 
SIEPAC took ten years after the signing of the inter-governmental treaty. The 
concept of international electricity trade had been in development for some time 
before this.  
Central America has a history of cooperation and initiatives aimed at developing 
closer regional economic and political integration and SIEPAC was built on a 
favourable history of inter-governmental cooperation. Even allowing for the 
added complexity, the time taken to reach the initiative’s current developmental 
stage is indicative of the challenge of implementing regional trade agreements.  
One of the interesting aspects of SIEPAC was the strict terms on which donor and 
IFI financing was released. The involvement and of pressure by external financing 
agencies probably contributed to delay in the transmission project, but it helped 
ensure that disagreements at the highest level had been worked through and that a 
supporting structure that could support viable trade had been settled before serious 
investment was sunk.  
At its foundation this project rests on legally enforceable agreements between 
governments, as provided in the Treaty. The central regulatory institution, CRIE, is 
granted high legal status in international law including autonomy from national 
courts. This provides a unified legal structure for the multi-country market that 
should contribute to its independence. It also creates a potentially powerful 
institution at the regional level that indicates a serious commitment on the part of 
the national governments that have ceded authority to it.  
As with many of the other international trade examples we have reviewed the 
financing for the project is underpinned by sovereign guarantees. These are 
important for limiting the financial risk of projects such as this that contain various 
other political and investment risks and for encouraging private sector participation.  
The project seeks to take advantage of private sector expertise with the inclusion of 
a major international investor-owned utility that also has a stake in the region. It is a 
mark of confidence in the project that a private sector partner could be found. 
Increased private sector trade in the regional market is a stated objective. 
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SIEPAC illustrates that it is possible to create a relatively advanced regional 
electricity trading arrangement between countries that are at differing stages of 
internal market development. This is an encouraging example for ECO, which 
contains an even broader span of market complexities than the SIEPAC region. It 
also shows that post-conflict environments are not necessarily a barrier to trade, 
although each should be considered on the basis of its own situation and capacities. 
7.4 Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) 
7.4.1 Introduction and background 
Regional cooperation in the electricity sector has the potential to deliver substantial 
development benefits to the countries of Southern Africa. The interconnection of 
national electricity systems has a long history, but until recently most developments 
were bilateral in character. Systematic electricity sector cooperation across several 
countries was facilitated by the formation of the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) 
in 1995. Operating under the rubric of the broader regional integration institution, 
the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), SAPP is presently a ‘loose 
pool’, but seeks eventually to provide a fully competitive electricity market for the 
region.  
At present, SAPP has 12 member countries, with 97% of energy being carried over 
the interconnected grid, which covers 9 countries. The utilities of the interconnected 
countries are ‘operating members’ of SAPP. There are plans for the remaining three 
non-operating members to become connected to the shared grid, with the 
interconnector projects for Tanzania and Malawi currently being implemented and 
a transmission company, WESTCOR, being formed in 2004 to integrate transmission 
systems from DRC through Angola to Namibia, Botswana and South Africa.  
The SAPP member countries and the interconnected grid are shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21  SAPP interconnected grid 
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The members of SAPP and their basic operating data are summarised in Table 12. 
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Table 12 Summary of SAPP members in 2005 
Country Utility Membership 
Status 
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW)
Max 
Demand 
(MW) 
Energy 
Sent Out 
(GWh)
South Africa Eskom operating 42,011 33,461  21,985 
Zimbabwe ZESA operating 1,975 2,066  9,391 
Zambia ZESCO operating           1,732          1,330           8,884 
DRC SNEL operating           2,442 1,012           6,904 
Mozambique HCB IPP           2,075            4,515 
Namibia NamPower operating              393             491           1,660 
Swaziland SEB operating                51             172           1,001 
Botswana BPC operating              132             434              977 
Lesotho LEC operating                72               90              446 
Mozambique EDM operating              233             285              147 
Tanzania TANESCO non-op              839             531           3,674 
Angola ENE non-op              745             397           2,649 
Malawi Escom non-op              285             242           1,177 
Total interconnected             51,116  39,341        255,910 
Total SAPP             52,985         40,511        263,410 
Interconnected % 
SAPP     96% 97% 97%
S Africa % 
interconnected     82% 85% 87%
Source: SAPP Coordination Centre. Mozambique demand figure excludes MOZAL.  
See Box 8 on the Cahora Bassa project for further details of the HCB IPP 
As can be seen from Table 12, the interconnected system is dominated by South 
Africa, which has approximately 85% of the installed capacity, maximum demand 
and energy consumption. The hydro-power potential of the Congo and Zambezi 
rivers is considerable, and offers the potential for South Africa to avoid building 
further coal-fired or nuclear stations. 
7.4.2 Evolution of SAPP 
The driving political and economic force behind the evolution of SAPP has been 
South Africa’s desire to meet future increases in demand by importing low cost 
hydro-power from its northern neighbours.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, southern African countries, excluding South Africa, 
cooperated in energy matters via the Energy Coordination Unit of the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference, the forerunner of SADC. In the 
electricity sector, this included various small interconnector projects.  
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Political will for the development of trade was enhanced by a severe drought in 
1992 that had a marked effect on the production of hydro-electricity in the region. 
The evident economic and political costs of shortages of electricity provided an 
opportunity for utility planners to impress on political leaders the need for action on 
electricity capacity expansion plans and the benefits of regional trade as a means to 
cover for temporary under- and over-capacity. Zimbabwe was particularly in need 
of expanding electricity imports, and to facilitate this, new 400 kV transmission lines 
were constructed from Cahora Bassa (500 MW) and from the Mathimba Power 
Station in South Africa, via Botswana (300 MW). The commissioning of the 
Mathimba line meant the interconnection of two large systems into a single 
synchronous system covering the bulk of Southern Africa58. The South African 
system, due to its size, dominates SAPP and essentially imposes its operational 
characteristics on the other systems. 
Even before it was politically acceptable to deal with South Africa, the state-owned 
South African utility Eskom was actively trying to foster interest in hydroelectricity 
projects in neighbouring countries. This paved the way for SAPP to be formed 
within a year of South Africa’s first democratic elections, which took place in 1994. 
SAPP itself was created in August 1995 at the SADC summit held in South Africa.  
7.4.3 Supporting structure and institutional framework  
At the 1995 SADC summit, the member governments signed an Inter-Governmental 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the formation of a power pool in the 
region. Three other key documents which were agreed and signed subsequently are:  
R the Inter-Utility Memorandum of Understanding, which established 
SAPP’s basic management and operating principles 
R the Agreement between Operating Members, which established the 
specific rules of operation and pricing, and  
R the Operating Guidelines, which provide standards and operating 
procedures.  
The founding MOU has recently been updated and a Revised SAPP Inter-
Governmental Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Ministers of 
Energy in February 2006. The other three main legal documents are also in the 
process of revision. The need to revise the founding agreements is prompted by 
three factors59: 
R the restructuring of the umbrella regional integration body, SADC 
                                                     
58 There had been significant synchronisation problems in 1990 when a low capacity link had been 
installed between Botswana and Zimbabwe. The higher capacity Mathimba link locked in the 
synchronism. 
59 SAPP Annual Report 2006, pg 5. 
 
 
 
South Asia: Policy Paper for Regional Energy Trade, Final Report, March 2007  
Economic Consulting Associates, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Case studies of international energy 
trade  
151 
R electricity sector reform in several SADC Member Countries including 
the creation of Electricity Regulators60 
R the expansion of SAPP membership  
R the need to expand SAPP participation beyond the national power 
utilities, to include commercial parties such as Independent Power 
Producers 
The redrafting exercise is to include the formulation of an agreement on dispute 
resolution that is specific to the electricity sector. SAPP had been able to do without 
such an agreement because reference was made to the Dispute Resolution 
provisions in the 1992 SADC Treaty61. In this regard it is notable that the existence 
of a regional body with a broad cooperative or integrative mandate may well make 
it easier to initiate and sustain cooperation in a particular sector, such as electricity.  
From the initiation of SAPP in 1995, the institutional structure has had three tiers:  
R the Executive Committee 
R the Management Committee  
R three technical sub-committees (Planning, Operating and Environmental 
Sub-committees).  
Chairing of each of the committees has rotated between representatives of the 
national utilities.  
While maintaining the rotating chair principle, in 2000 a permanent SAPP Co-
ordination Centre was established in Harare. The principle initial objective of the 
Coordination Centre was to establish the Short-Term Electricity Market (STEM) (see 
below). The success of STEM has helped to make the Coordination Centre a credible 
and respected organisation. This is evident from the fact that the Coordination 
Centre is consulted on up-coming negotiations by new players (for example 
providing capacity building to Malawi prior to the national utility Escom 
negotiating its first power purchase agreement with HCB). The Coordination Centre 
has also been turned to for assistance in the resolution of disputes (for example, the 
dispute over reactive power between MOTRACO and Eskom). 
7.4.4 Electricity trade in SAPP 
To date, SAPP has made creditable strides in establishing mechanisms to encourage 
short-term trade, although these are still far from optimal, and the amounts 
involved are a small proportion of total energy consumption, as shown in Table 13. 
There have also been benefits in the area of auxiliary services, for example the 
                                                     
60 Electricity regulators have been established in recent years in Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. A regional institution, the Regional Electricity Regulators Association of 
Southern Africa, was formed in 2006. 
61 Article 16-4 
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decision to share spinning reserve resulted in a reduction on a national basis of 
reserve requirements from 20% to 15% of peak demand, resulting in considerable 
savings.  
Table 13  SAPP electricity trade in 2005 
Country Utility Bilateral contracts 
(MW) 
Energy traded 2005 
(GWh)
South Africa Eskom           1,706          10,417 
Mozambique HCB           1,620            4,515 
DRC SNEL              260            1,470 
Zambia ZESCO                80               280 
STEM 5 utilities                178 
Trade             3,666          16,860 
Total on inter-con 
system           39,341         255,910 
Trade % total   9% 7%
STEM % total trade     1%
Maximum STEM trade 842 GWh in 2002 at an average price of around 0.4 USc/kWh. Price rose to 1.2 
USc/kWh in 2005 
Where SAPP has completely failed to make progress is in the implementation of a 
co-ordinated investment strategy. No new capacity expansion project of any 
significant size was implemented anywhere in SADC in the first 10 years of SAPP’s 
existence. The failure to plan ahead for the long project lead times which are 
inevitable in the electricity sector is analysed further in section 7.4.7 below. 
Short Term Energy Market (STEM) 
The Short Term Energy Market (STEM, see also annex A1.2.3), operated by the 
Coordination Centre, is a market for hourly day-ahead and longer-term contracts. 
STEM also organises secondary trading of contracts that have been cleared through 
the market. The operation of STEM is governed by a framework laid out in its Book 
of Rules. Total energy traded in STEM peaked at 842 GWh in 200262. 
The three controlling SAPP system operators monitor and report on whether the 
STEM contracts have in fact been adhered to by the contracting parties. Non-
compliance results in fines which are subtracted from the notional bank balances 
held by the participating utilities in a shared bank account in Botswana maintained 
by SAPP. 
                                                     
62 This dropped to 178 GWh in 2005, partly due to generation being removed from the market to enable 
rehabilitation 
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Real time trade that optimises short-term supply-demand balancing and wheeling 
opportunities would allow for a significant increase in the level of trade. Two major 
studies are being undertaken at the present which will consider how real time 
trading could be introduced (part of the SAPP Pool Plan Review) and how to 
improve on transmission pricing to encourage expansion of trade. It has been 
agreed that wheeling charges, which are presently calculated using a MW-km 
approach, should in future be based on a nodal pricing methodology. The 
transmission study will also make recommendations on the development of 
auxiliary services markets. 
7.4.5 Electricity trade typologies within SAPP 
In respect of the four typologies described in section 4, trade within SAPP at present 
fits into all three sub-categories of Typology 1 (bilateral trade amongst neighbours), 
with much of the trade also fitting into Typology 2 (bilateral trade via transit 
countries) and Typology 3 (trade within a synchronised system). Examples of SAPP 
trading arrangements that fit the different typologies are given in Table 14. 
Table 14  Trade typologies within SAPP  
Typology SAPP Examples 
1 Bilateral Trade amongst 
neighbours 
  
1a Transfers between state utilities Eskom to LEC, EDM, NamPower, BPC, SEB 
1b New facilities MOTRACO (wheeling Eskom & HCB power to 
MOZAL) 
1c Private involvement HCB-Eskom, HCB-ZESA 
2 Bilateral trade via a transit 
country 
Eskom-ZESA, SNEL-Eskom, ZESCO-Eskom etc 
3 Inter-SO trade in synchronised 
system 
SAPP contains three SO control areas  
4 Power pool Long-term objective (expanding Eskom's internal 
pool) 
Note: For utility acronyms, see Table 12 
The bedrock of SAPP trade is Typology 1, mostly 1a, and there have also been new 
(transmission) facilities (notably MOTRACO, see appendix A1.1.2) that fall within 
the 1b framework. HCB’s role in the Cahora Bassa project fits typology 1c.  
A large portion of trade is wheeled through transit countries, in accordance with 
Typology 2. All of the transit countries are SAPP members, and this means that even 
for the short-term trades being arranged under STEM, there is pre-agreement on 
allowing the transit country’s transmission network to be used and on the level and 
sharing of wheeling charges. 
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In respect of Typology 3, there are three synchronised control areas in SAPP, 
managed by ZESCO (Zambia), ZESA (Zimbabwe) and Eskom (South Africa). The 
Operating Guidelines describe how the three SOs are to manage the synchronized 
system and deal with problems (such as isolating certain sections and re-
synchronising).  
SAPP’s long-term vision is to become a ‘tight’ pool, with a fully integrated, 
competitive electricity market and centralised control (Typology 4). While SAPP as a 
whole is a long way from this at the present time, the establishment of an internal 
pool in South Africa is being viewed with interest as a possible nucleus of a future 
SAPP-wide pool. 
7.4.6 Barriers to project development in the region 
A major barrier to the development of the significant hydro resources in the 
northern areas of the SAPP region has been political instability. A number of 
important potential projects are located in countries which have either been at war 
or have had, and often still have, weak administrations, poor security arrangements 
and very high risk profiles from the viewpoint of any outside investor (including 
other SAPP utilities). This applies in particular to the development of the Inga site 
on the Congo River in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which with 40,000 MW of 
hydro-power potential is a prime focus for future electricity supplies for the region. 
While projects in the countries with large hydro-power resources may be least cost 
in the absence of these factors, the increase in the cost of capital brought about by 
local instability can be sufficient to turn project economics away from regional trade 
in favour of self-sufficiency. Current studies suggest that a higher cost of capital for 
hydro projects in countries such as DRC leads to the elimination of the cost 
advantage of the hydro projects. With most of the new demand being in South 
Africa, the least cost solution appears to involve increased thermal power 
investments there63. 
Another factor that dilutes the benefits of regional cooperation is continued public 
sector subsidisation of new investment, particularly in South Africa. South Africa is 
continuing to invest in its electricity sector through Eskom, a quasi-public 
enterprise, while other countries look to foreign private investors to provide capital 
for major investment projects. This can result in a distorted cost of capital in favour 
of domestic projects in the south rather than potential export-oriented hydro plants 
in the north. In this case, where South African government policy favours Eskom 
investment domestically, private sector involvement would actually result in a 
lower degree of regional integration than would otherwise be the case.. 
To maintain the momentum of regional cooperation in electricity, a practical 
response is for utilities and emerging electricity companies in SADC countries to 
participate in developing projects in other SAPP countries, including taking an 
equity stake in the project and raising finance on the basis of home country risk 
premiums and capital costs. However, ‘offshore’ projects of this kind are yet to 
happen to any significant extent. The utility best able to pursue this route is Eskom, 
                                                     
63 This analysis fails to take formally into account environmental costs and broader economic benefits 
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which is clearly keen to develop projects elsewhere in the region. The potential 
dominance of Eskom is not always welcome in other countries in the region, 
however, and local utilities will tend to want to take a large stake themselves.  
The key parameter that emerges is the weighted average cost of capital between 
Eskom, private sector and national utility investors.  
One of the barriers to increased trade through STEM has been capacity constraints 
on the tie-lines interconnecting the three control areas. This issue is directly related 
to the ability of the interconnected systems to coordinate investment planning and 
attract financing. It also relates to the capacity allocation methodology, under which 
bilateral contracts are given precedence over market trades.  
7.4.7 Risk assessment and mitigation 
The principal risks which have impinged on the achievement of the potential for 
electricity coordination in southern Africa have been associated with economic and 
political instability (taking its most egregious form in civil war in Angola, DRC and 
Mozambique) and the lack of real political commitment to regional integration. This 
is evident despite the rhetorical commitments to the achievement of a single 
economic community which are made by political leaders at summits of the regional 
body, SADC.  
Physical security risk to infrastructure 
The prime example here is the sabotage of the DC transmission line from Cahora 
Bassa to Pretoria during the Mozambique civil war. The line was put out of service 
in 1981 and made totally inoperable in a sophisticated single attack in 1985 that 
destroyed 514 pylons. The line remained out of service for 17 years with power 
flows only being restored in 1998 (see Box 8).  
The threat of interruption of supply due to destruction of transmission lines arises 
not just from political instability but also from poverty. For example, power exports 
from SNEL in the DRC have been interrupted during 2006 due to the removal of 
copper cable and cross-struts from the transmission towers in a remote part of the 
country. The motivation in this case appear to be purely economic: sale of the 
copper at high world prices and use of the cross-struts to make ploughs for 
subsistence agriculture.  
It is difficult to mitigate poverty motives within the context of electricity sector 
development alone. However, it is important to make sure the local community 
benefits form increased access to (and lower cost) electricity.  
Planning risk 
The fact that no significant capacity expansion has occurred since the formation of 
SAPP, and that the regional balance has now turned from a surplus to a deficit, is 
testimony to the poorly developed planning procedures in member countries, 
compounded by cautious and incomplete electricity sector reforms. At a deeper 
level, these problems arise from the persistence of preferences for state control of the 
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electricity industry and for self sufficiency in generation capacity, but an 
unwillingness to take the steps necessary to match these orientations, not least 
because of the prohibitive costs. 
Political instability and weak governance within member countries are another 
major set of risks inhibiting effective planning of supply expansion (as well as 
financing, construction and operation).  
Financial risks 
Political instability in the region contributes to financial risk. Combined with 
economic mismanagement it also raises the risk of exchange rate variability. This 
has been a major issue in bilateral contracts, the most salient example again being 
from Cahora Bassa.  
In the STEM, the exchange rate risks are carried over short periods. The STEM 
operates in two currencies – Rand and US dollars – with settlements being made on 
a monthly basis. The bank accounts were set up in the SADC country with the 
strongest balance of payments and reserves position, and the most open foreign 
currency arrangements – Botswana.  
Security of supply risk 
The risk of interruptions of supply arising in another country is used to justify 
expensive investments on home soil. However, experience in the country currently 
the largest beneficiary of growing interdependence in SAPP, Zimbabwe, is that the 
risk of supply interruptions can be much higher from domestic sources than from 
imported electricity.  
7.4.8 Other risks affecting the region 
The above major risks have been linked to specific historical circumstances in 
southern Africa. SAPP has also had experience in confronting less dramatic risks, 
which would affect any nascent power pool, but which can nonetheless be 
important in retarding the deepening of electricity cooperation. 
Technical risks on large interconnected networks 
There is always a risk of instability on a large inter-connected system resulting in a 
major system failure that might have been obviated on a smaller system. In 2005, 
there were 20 faults on the SAPP network, 16 of which were considered serious and 
one of which led to a total blackout in the affected region. The obvious approach to 
mitigating risks of this sort is the ongoing development of technical operating 
arrangements and capacity, through a process such as that taken in UCTE in 
Europe.  
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Risk of failing to agree on contract details 
In the few regional construction projects which have been implemented, project 
delays have arisen less from risks associated with construction per se, but with 
agreeing the details on contractual arrangements to use the new infrastructure. It 
may be that the infrastructure has to be in place before contentious issues can really 
be confronted, but ideally, to mitigate the risk of project delays, the negotiations to 
agree the contractual details should take place well in advance of the completion of 
construction. In the case of SIEPAC this risk was avoided by the IFIs effectively 
applying pressure to finalise contractual details, after which the IFI financing could 
be released.  
However, it is notable that the problem of agreeing the details was much more 
severe before the establishment of SAPP, for example in the Botswana-Zimbabwe 
interconnector project that was completed in 1990. 
Risk of simple arrangements suppressing economic opportunities 
The simplistic wheeling charge adopted by SAPP is based on formulae that have in 
effect precluded some favourable trading arrangements which would have 
delivered significant benefits. Different approaches to wheeling charges were the 
subject of a technical study in 1999. Sophisticated approaches were rejected by SAPP 
in favour initially of a fixed fee for wheeling (shared equally by transit utilities) and 
subsequently by the MW-km method. This can disadvantage projects located long 
distances from demand which could otherwise use alternative approaches such as 
offset arrangements.  
The simplistic wheeling charge formulae were beneficial in allowing SAPP trading 
arrangements to get going, but such initial pragmatism can result in significant costs 
being incurred subsequently. Arrangements which run counter to the underlying 
economics play into the hands of those seeking for political or other reasons to 
promote autarchy over cheaper, more reliable regional strategies for electricity 
supply.  
7.4.9 Conclusions on SAPP 
The notable but very modest achievements of the Southern African Power Pool need 
to be assessed in relation to the context of southern Africa’s regional ambitions. On 
the one hand, it is acknowledged that regional cooperation and regional integration 
are not short-term processes. They require time for confidence to be gradually built 
and the next regional steps to be taken. On the other hand, in southern Africa the 
electricity sector offered by far the biggest immediate benefits of competing regional 
cooperation sectors64. Purposeful action in the electricity sector would have 
contributed most to building the momentum for broader regional cooperation.  
What was hoped for when the regional economic power, South Africa, became a 
legitimate member of the region and SAPP was formed, was a rapid movement 
                                                     
64 Conclusion from study for African Development Bank (1992) Economic Integration in Southern Africa, 
Oxford. 
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towards an integrated, regionally least-cost electricity investment strategy. The 
reality instead has been the development of a short-term market for electricity, 
providing limited trade gains for the participants. What is perhaps more important 
about STEM is that it has maintained a sense of purpose about cooperation in 
electricity and has given considerable stature to the Coordination Centre. 
SAPP provides an example of how a regional cooperation organisation (in this case 
SADC) can provide the framework within which regional electricity trade can 
develop. At the highest level SADC offered a forum in which there was established 
interaction among political decision makers from across the region. SAPP is also an 
example of where multilateral trade is underpinned by an inter-governmental 
agreement. 
The ongoing tendency toward policies of energy self-sufficiency continues to hinder 
the development of trade and investment in the needed transmission infrastructure. 
As a result a region with large energy resources now finds itself facing localised 
electricity deficits.  
The significant challenges for SAPP still lie ahead. As the regional electricity surplus 
has now been taken up, the pressure to accelerate long contemplated generation and 
transmission projects is growing. With the exception of Zimbabwe, this fortunately 
comes at a time when there is an unprecedented level of political and economic 
stability in the SAPP countries.  
However, there are still important risks in the SAPP environment. The real political 
commitment to regional solutions to electricity supplies remains in doubt. High 
levels of country risk and factors such as inexperienced regulatory structures will 
raise the costs of project financing and put pressure on the accuracy of demand 
forecasts and cost recovery strategies. At the operational level, past experience has 
shown that sophisticated approaches to issues such as wheeling are not easily 
accepted by all members, so there is also the risk that the results of the major studies 
presently underway to iron out technical details will not be accepted and 
implemented in ways most conducive to regional objectives. 
7.4.10 Lessons for ECO 
Although SAPP has successfully implemented some short-term trade mechanisms 
and has proven the benefits of trade, it is an example of an international trade 
initiative that has not lived up to initial expectations and has taken a long time to 
develop. In this sense it provides useful lessons for ECO on pitfalls to avoid as it 
develops its own trade. There are also some positive characteristics that might 
provide useful suggestions for ECO. 
Positive lessons from SAPP include: 
R SAPP was founded on inter-governmental agreements (consistent with 
other examples of international trade), as well as other multi-party 
coordinating agreements 
R Early development of trade among SAPP countries was for small 
interconnections under the institutional wing of the regional association. 
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ECO, or other regional body, could provide this role for the ECO 
countries 
R The creation of a respected coordinating entity (the SAPP Coordination 
Centre) can serve to strengthen technical cooperation, act as a driver for 
integration, and provide a neutral forum for resolving disputes 
R The multi-country nature of SAPP potentially provides the necessary 
institutional support to multi-system transit for contractual and short-
term market trades (however, there are currently weaknesses as 
discussed below) 
R Financial and exchange rate risk can be reduced by specifying a 
common currency for trading, using short settlement periods and 
locating financial transactions in the participating country with the 
strongest banking sector and macroeconomic environment 
R As in many ECO countries, electricity sector reform is ongoing in the 
SAPP countries. As the underlying environment in the national 
electricity sectors has changed, so SAPP has begun to adapt 
R In the early stages, a dedicated dispute resolution procedure is not 
necessarily required if procedures are available within a regional 
agreement  
R This final bullet point above suggests that early trading arrangements in 
ECO could take advantage of existing dispute resolution procedures in 
agreements such as the ECO Trade Agreement and the Energy Charter 
Treaty. Dedicated procedures could then be developed incrementally as 
trade grows and becomes more sophisticated. 
Several key lessons for ECO from the less successful aspects of the SAPP experience 
are: 
R Political instability and direct physical security risks have limited trade 
and investment and resulted in severe supply interruptions 
R Lack of political commitment has slowed the process of integration 
R More than ten years after the IGA signing (1995), trade within SAPP is a 
relatively small proportion of the potential. This partly illustrates the 
long-term view required of the time frame for these projects 
R The failure to further develop trade is due in part to a continued focus 
on self-sufficiency policies in some governments despite clear evidence 
of the benefits of trade. This is of direct relevance in ECO where self-
sufficiency policies have restricted trade for the past 15 years 
R Protectionist positions have also restricted cross-border investment in 
new facilities 
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R SAPP has had no coordinated investment strategy and this has created 
uncertainty and restricted much needed new investment in transmission 
capacity  
R Weaknesses in transmission pricing have also restricted trade by 
discouraging wheeling over large distances from supply sources to 
demand centres 
These lessons stress the importance of establishing a collaborative institutional 
structure but also show that this requires real political commitment toward trade. 
The development of SAPP has suffered from the failure to convince the political 
leaders of the magnitude of the benefits from regional cooperation in electricity. 
The lessons also highlight the serious difficulties in successfully establishing and 
sustaining trade projects (be they large or modest) in politically weak and unstable 
environments where there are significant security risks. In the case of SAPP at least, 
trade has not been able to happen before political stability. 
7.5 South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) project 
7.5.1 Project overview and background 
The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) project is, as indicated by the name, a gas 
pipeline not an electricity transmission project! It is designed to export gas from the 
Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea to Turkey and eventually 
SE Europe. The inclusion of a gas pipeline in a study of electricity trade is 
considered worthwhile as it is of interest to the ECO region for a number of reasons: 
R It is an example of a major energy export project involving two ECO 
country members as principals 
R The project involves the construction of major new transport 
infrastructure and was developed and funded mainly by private sector 
partners (with some IFI support)  
R The pipeline crosses three countries, including Georgia as a transit 
country; the region has experienced serious conflicts in recent times 
R The project involves state-owned companies (SOCAR, BOTAS) as sellers 
and buyers of the gas (both ECO member country utilities) but private 
sector companies are the pipeline developers and operators 
R There is separation of the energy trading and transit activities 
R Most of the set of contractual documents are in the public domain, so 
they can be referred to as a successful example of risk allocation: 
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R The project became operational at the end of 2006 and the success 
of the contractual and institutional framework will be tested in 
practice in the near future 
R Gas export projects are also of growing interest to the ECO region, 
especially the gas-rich CAR countries 
For these reasons it was considered that interesting lessons for ECO could be 
learned from SCP for electricity trade projects. 
Using our typology, this project involves bilateral trade via a third party transit 
country (typology 2). Apart from the obvious difference that it is gas trade rather 
than electricity, it differs from simpler trades of this type in two main ways: 
R The seller is not a single state-owned entity but a joint venture of public 
and private enterprises 
R The transport infrastructure, the SCP pipeline, has been built and 
financed by private companies 
The 690 km pipeline route is shown in Figure 22; the gas is landed at the Sangachal 
terminal near Baku in Azerbaijan, transits through Azerbaijan and Georgia via 
Tbilisi65, and crosses into Turkey to join the main transmission system at Erzurum, 
hence the alternate acronym for the pipeline of BTE. 
Figure 22  Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline route 
 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Turkey 
The main components of the project are66: 
R Gas production from the Shah Deniz fields in the Caspian Sea will be 
exported to Turkey 
                                                     
65 This route avoids the shorter but more risky and politically problematic route through Armenia 
66 Further details can be found on: www.bp.com/caspian 
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R The gas sellers (partners in the gas production sharing agreement 
– PSA) are a consortium of the Shah Deniz developers including: 
SOCAR, the Azerbaijan state owned company 
BP 
Statoil 
Lukoil 
Elf (now Total) 
Turkish Petroleum Overseas Company (TPAO) 
R The gas buyer is BOTAS, the Turkish state-owned gas import, 
wholesale and transmission enterprise 
R The gas pipeline (route BTE) is being constructed by a consortium (the 
SCP partners) including some of the Shah Deniz partners, notably BP, 
SOCAR, Statoil and Total. The pipeline operator will be Statoil. 
Construction of the pipeline is roughly on schedule, and Turkey started receiving 
initial Shah Deniz gas at the end of 2006. 
The initial contracted volume of gas will rise in three annual steps from 2 bcm in the 
first year to 3.5, 5 and 6.6 bcm pa, with a maximum of a little under 8 bcm pa. The 
pipeline is thought to be able to support a maximum flow with additional 
compression investment of about 20 bcm. The proven gas reserves in Shah Deniz 
are over 660 bcm supporting production of say 20 bcm for over 30 years. 
Turkey is a major importer of gas, now importing a total of over 27 bcm in 2005, of 
which the majority (about 16 bcm) came from Russia and the rest from Iran, Nigeria 
and Algeria. BOTAS was thus an established and creditworthy partner to sign the 
major offtake contract necessary to provide funding for the project. However, 
Turkey at the time was over-supplied with gas and over-contracted for the future. It 
did not really need any more gas, so the Azeri gas contract was agreed on 
favourable terms, including a price discount to Russian gas, a cap on price rises67, 
and flexibility in the other terms such as allowing the gas to be re-exported to third 
parties (something which is not allowed in the Russian Gazprom contracts). Other 
reasons this contract went ahead include: 
R Turkey was also willing to assist Azerbaijan, with whom it has long-
established strong relationships, to start its gas export industry 
development 
R Turkey was keen to diversify its sources of supply and reduce 
dependence on Russian gas 
                                                     
67 Most gas sales contract prices are indexed to oil prices , and are thus now very high, but sometimes a 
cap is put on how high they can rise. 
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R There was strong pressure from Europe and particularly the US to 
establish an export corridor for Caspian oil and gas (also to diversify 
risks away from Russia) 
R Georgia was also keen to reduce its energy dependence on Russia and 
strengthen its security position by ‘hosting’ a project of strategic 
international importance. 
Development of the project 
The project will have taken over 10 years to develop from the initial key contracts to 
first deliveries68. The major steps in the development of the SCP project were: 
1996 Shah Deniz PSA signed, exploration commences 
2001 All agreements between governments and SCP private 
partners signed 
2003 Shah Deniz stage 1 gas development project sanctioned 
2003 Pipeline construction begins 
2006  Completion of pipeline expected end 2006  
Exploration for Shah Deniz stage 2 begins 
2007 -  Commercial deliveries of gas to Turkey and Georgia 
 
Azerbaijan was not able to develop its gas resources on its own, through lack of 
financing and insufficient domestic demand to justify major costs in Caspian 
exploration. The prospect of sales to Turkey’s growing gas market was a key factor 
in initiating the funding of Shah Deniz. 
It should be noted that gas projects are frequently very profitable, as the market 
price of gas is usually well above the marginal supply cost. For this reason, gas 
development and trade projects have a lot of momentum behind them as the 
sponsors have large incentives to capture the economic rent. In this respect, they 
may differ from electricity trade projects where the economic benefits may be much 
thinner. 
Turkey was able to finance the transmission pipeline development and 
reinforcement inside its own border, as well as providing the major financial 
guarantees through its gas purchase contract. However, Georgia could not finance 
or guarantee the transit pipeline through its territory and the upstream partners in 
                                                     
68 In this respect it is similar to the SIEPAC and SAPP projects which also took of the order of 10 years 
to develop. 
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the PSA therefore formed a consortium (with slightly different participation) to 
finance, construct and operate the pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey’s border. 
The project therefore had, from the start, a very strong element of public-private 
partnership in both the upstream gas development and the midstream gas 
transportation and transit. 
Georgia is a highly strategic energy corridor and transit route. Caspian energy can 
reach Europe going round the Black Sea via the northern loop (see Figure 23), but 
that has to transit through Russia which significantly reduces the diversity benefit. 
The Southern loop goes through Georgia to Turkey. Georgia is also on a North-
South corridor for Russia to transport energy to Armenia. On the one hand, Russia 
has been trying to gain control of the energy assets in Georgia, in order to control 
the transit along both corridors; on the other hand, the US government has been 
very keen to assist Georgia to remain independent of Russia and to facilitate the 
development of the E-W energy corridor69. This political backing has provided 
significant comfort to the private investors in SCP and pressure on the governments 
to reach agreement. 
Figure 23  Caspian energy export routes to Europe 
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It should be noted that US pressure (with European support) was also instrumental 
in initiating and progressing the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline (Azerbaijan-Georgia) and 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey). These fore-
runners to the SCP project established many of the principles of the project’s 
construction and operating framework of agreements including the political risk 
mitigation measures. 
                                                     
69 The peaceful 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, and its general inclination to be aligned with Europe 
as well as Asia, are further factors which lead to strategic US support to maintain and strengthen 
Georgia’s independence. 
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7.5.2 Supporting framework 
Contracts based on public-private partnerships and risk-sharing are well-known in 
the upstream oil and gas industry. In this case, a fairly typical contract, the 
production sharing agreement (PSA), governs the investment by the development 
consortium (all privately funded) and the sharing of gas production between the 
investors and the government of Azerbaijan. 
At the political level, the project was facilitated by strong relationships and 
historical ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan, friendly relations between Georgia 
and the other two countries, an orientation by Georgia (and Turkey) to exercise their 
independence and to sit on the cross-roads between Asia and Europe, and strong 
political support from the US and Europe. Beyond this, there were no major 
international or bilateral agreements or institutions between the countries, although 
all are signatories of the Energy Charter Treaty and this was incorporated into the 
IGA dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Contracts and agreements supporting the trade 
The framework of agreements that were put in place follow a clear and reasonably 
well-established pattern in the industry. The main agreements, with their principal 
functions, are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15  Framework of agreements for SCP 
 Agreement and parties Function 
1 Production Sharing 
Agreement (PSA) 
between the Government 
of Azerbaijan 
(represented by the state 
oil company) and the 7 
Shah Deniz consortium 
partners 
Covering the terms for the exploration, development and 
production of Shah Deniz stage 1, including sole rights in 
the concession area for up to 38 years, exploration, 
development and production minimum investment 
obligations, cost recovery, production sharing percentages, 
liabilities and disputes. 
BP and Statoil shared a majority 51% interest and the other 
5 parties shared  49% 
2 Host Government 
Agreements (HGA) 
between a) SCP and 
Georgia and b) SCP and 
Azerbaijan 
The HGA between Georgia and the SCP partners provides 
a framework for the government of Georgia to grant rights 
and special conditions for the construction and operation of 
the pipeline and the transiting of gas. It is similar to a 
concession agreement, providing exclusive rights, 
protection to property, special terms for tax, import, export, 
access to foreign currency and repatriation of profits. It 
establishes a framework for dispute resolution and 
guarantees the security of the pipeline. 
The Azerbaijan HGA is similar in scope and content, 
though with less need for guarantees of performance as 
there is leverage on Azerbaijan as the major financial 
beneficiary of the export trade. 
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 Agreement and parties Function 
3 Inter-Governmental 
Agreements (IGA) 
between a) Azerbaijan 
and Turkey and b) 
Azerbaijan and Georgia 
The IGAs provide in effect a form of cross-guarantees 
between the governments to safeguard the provisions of 
the HGAs and to avoid unforeseen complications due to 
the operations across multiple countries, such as the need 
for one operating company to function in all countries, 
avoidance of double taxation, and mechanisms for 
cooperation and coordination. 
Azerbaijan has different issues with each country, leading 
to two separate IGAs. For Turkey, the IGA provides a high 
level guarantee to the GSPA and also mentions the Trans-
Caspian Pipeline project. For Georgia, the IGA provides a 
high level guarantee to implement the more complex 
GSPAs for Georgia’s transit royalty and purchased gas. The 
IGA also provides guarantees by Georgia to implement and 
not to hinder the transit of gas to Turkey.  
4 Pipeline construction and 
operation agreements 
between SCP and 
contractors 
An EPC contract for the construction of the pipeline, on 
commercial terms 
An O&M contract for the operation of the pipeline (Statoil 
as the operator) 
5 Transportation agreement 
between SCP as pipeline 
owners/operators and 
the Shah Deniz partners 
(as gas shippers) 
Each of the SCP Shah Deniz participants is an owner of a 
share of the gas and enters into an agreement with the SCP 
pipeline owners and the operator (Statoil) to transport the 
gas and to pay transportation charges. The transportation 
agreement also deals with all liabilities in respect of failures 
in transportation relating to quantity or quality of gas 
delivered. 
6 Gas Purchase and Sale 
Agreements (GSPA) 
between the SCP/Shah 
Deniz gas shippers  and 
a) Georgia, b) Turkey 
Georgia receives 5% of the transit gas as royalty payment 
and can also buy an additional similar amount at very 
favourable price terms. The GPSA deals with quantities, 
payment, minimum take obligations and other commercial 
matters. 
Turkey is the main offtaker and has entered into a standard 
long term take-or-pay contract with a price cap and price 
discount to Russian gas. The terms of this contract are 
confidential. 
Agreements 1, 2 and 3 are in the public domain. They are available in English on BP’s website, see: 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006654&contentId=7013494, and for an example of an HGA 
see: http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/SHA/Eng/HGA/Host Government Agreement Azerbaijan (English).pdf. 
7.5.3 Risk assessment and mitigation 
The agreements listed in section 7.5.2 above were generally negotiated 
simultaneously over a period of about 2 years and attempts were made to 
coordinate back to back provisions in key terms such as liability, Force Majeure and 
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dispute resolution. The main areas of risk are briefly identified and the principles 
applied to their mitigation are summarised below. 
Political risk 
The absence of complete and consistent legal and regulatory frameworks for gas in 
general and large transportation and transit projects in particular, as well as the 
absence of any existing relevant institutional framework, meant that an overarching 
framework needed to be put in place to cover political risk specifically for the 
project. This was done through the IGAs (direct agreements between the pairs of 
governments) and the HGAs (agreements between the governments and the SCP 
parties). 
The HGAs attempt to provide assurances that would protect the financial viability 
of the project, and insulate the project from changes in internal national rules such 
as tax rates, excise duties, foreign exchange controls, employment legislation and 
expropriation of assets. A broad guarantee was provided to restore the economic 
equilibrium of the project (economic stabilisation) if there were changes in the 
country’s laws or regulations. 
It should be recalled that the US government had applied political pressure to 
complete the set of transactions and continues to take an active interest in 
supporting the implementation of the project. A similarity exists with the external 
political pressure applied by the EU that has been instrumental in bringing the 
countries of Central and South East Europe into the Energy Community (for 
electricity and gas) that aims to create a single energy market between all the 
countries of Europe. 
Planning and construction risk 
The pipeline passes through some difficult mountainous terrain, and in Georgia the 
winter conditions also added to the construction difficulties and risks of delays and 
cost over-runs. 
The project schedule was carefully planned and coordinated with the work for the 
BTC oil pipeline. A very important feature was the sharing of the pipeline corridor 
with BTC, as can be seen in Figure 24. This reduced the cost and risk of delays. 
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Figure 24  BTE Pipeline 
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Key: black pipeline – Baku-Supsa; blue pipeline – BTC; pink pipeline – SCP.  
Source: CB&I John Brown Limited. 
Another benefit of constructing SCP in the same corridor as the BTC pipeline is the 
ability to minimize the environmental and social impact, using the same integrated 
project team. 
As the pipeline in the Azerbaijan and Georgia sections is owned by the international 
SCP partners, the construction was planned and managed by international firms. 
Security risk 
The area has seen recent conflicts and is quite prone to terrorist attacks70. The 
benefits of running oil and gas pipelines through the same corridor are offset by the 
additional risks of explosion in one damaging the other. Adequate separation is 
required between the two pipelines. 
Security was a major issue during the contract negotiations. The SCP parties wanted 
to bring in their own security forces to patrol and protect the lines, but Georgia 
would not permit foreign armed personnel on their territory. However, the 
Georgian government (and the Azerbaijan government) would be hard stretched to 
cover the financial liability of a major accident to the pipelines if their security forces 
failed to provide adequate protection71. 
The HGAs provide wide-ranging assumption of liability by the governments and 
guarantees of providing secure protection by their own security forces. The success 
of this approach has yet to be tested, since operation has not yet started. 
                                                     
70 Both electricity lines and gas pipelines have been blown up on Georgia’s border with 
Russia/Chechnya during early 2006 
71 The oil industry has examples of security being provided by armed personnel under the control of 
the energy producer. This is the case in Nigeria (where the oil companies effectively operate within 
protected enclaves) and in Angola where the production facilities in Cabinda province are ‘ring-
fenced’.  
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Operating risk 
Operation will be carried out by one of the SCP parties (Statoil). Terms in the HGAs 
provide for coordinated operation across the countries. Applying international 
operating standards and procedures will minimise the risks of accident and poor 
operating performance. 
Transit risk 
Georgia is receiving 5% of the transit gas as transit fee, and can purchase another 
similar amount on preferential price terms. Nevertheless, a very substantial value of 
gas needs to pass through Georgia and in the last two winters Georgia has been 
short of gas from Russia affecting the operation of power plants and heating. The 
IGAs and HGAs deal with guarantees by the Georgia government to allow 
unhindered transit. The continuing interest and influence of the US government is 
probably another significant factor that will help to avoid interruptions to transit or 
reduction to gas throughput that have occasionally happened on other transit routes 
(eg through Ukraine). 
Energy supply risk / geological risk 
The geological risk is borne by the gas sellers, ie those SCP parties sharing in the 
PSA and consequently parties to the GSPA with Turkey. The Turkey contract is a 
supply contract (ie for defined volumes of gas) therefore the geological risk lies 
entirely with the sellers. 
There is ample gas (proven reserves of approximately 660 bcm, with ultimately 
recoverable reserves likely to be a lot higher (eg x 2) to make the geological risk 
small at these sales volumes. 
The supply risk due to accident or poor performance of the upstream facilities is 
also a risk born by the upstream operators, under the standard terms of a GSPA. 
Offtaker / credit risk 
Until recently Turkey had an overhang of gas contracted volumes as growth in gas 
demand had not matched their high expectations. This excess supply has now 
largely disappeared through demand growth and renegotiation of some contracts. 
The main risk in Turkey is that the gas retail price has been lagging behind increases 
in the import price of gas. However, as the offtaker is the state-owned BOTAS, 
which has a good payment record, the offtaker risk is not now as high as it might 
have appeared at the time SCP needed to sign the GSPA with BOTAS. 
The GSPA allows re-export of gas (not allowed in the Gazprom contracts) which is 
another measure to mitigate the non-payment risk if it would be caused by an 
excess supply of gas in Turkey72. 
                                                     
72 New pipelines are currently being constructed to increase the connection of Turkey to SE Europe 
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The credit risk on the payment of transportation charges for the pipeline is minimal 
as the parties on both sides of the transportation agreement are largely the same. 
Disputes and arbitration 
In the HGAs disputes should be resolved following the ICSID Convention. The SCP 
parties are required to take a joint position in a dispute. Arbitration will be 
according to the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Arbitration will be carried out in Geneva, 
Switzerland, or another country which is a signatory to the New York Convention 
on enforcement of arbitral awards. Arbitration would be in English. The state 
entities are required to waive state immunity to arbitration proceedings and awards. 
Fast track dispute resolution is provided by the parties being able to agree to resolve 
by the use of an independent Expert. 
Procedures would be governed by English law. 
The IGAs provide for a number of voluntary dispute resolution steps between states 
but finally disputes should be resolved by an ad hoc tribunal/arbitration panel 
following the provisions of Article 27 of the Energy Charter Treaty 1994, to which all 
the countries are signatories. 
7.5.4 Lessons for ECO 
The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) project is a gas pipeline but is nevertheless 
relevant to this study as it faced a number of similar challenges to the TAP project 
and other large electricity trade opportunities in ECO. It is a major energy export 
project involving two ECO country members as principals and it involves the 
construction of major new transport infrastructure. SCP was developed and funded 
mainly by private sector partners but it is important to note that the project’s 
commercial and financial risks were underpinned by the creditworthiness of Turkey 
as the main offtaker, and the private sector parties as operators. 
Although this study concerns electricity trade, gas export projects are also of major 
and growing interest to the ECO region, especially the gas-rich CAR countries. 
The project became operational at the end of 2006 with only minor delays from the 
original schedule, thus demonstrating that construction risks can be managed even 
in the face of security concerns and difficult terrain. The pipeline crosses three 
countries, including Georgia as a transit country; the region has experienced serious 
conflicts in recent times. The success of the contractual and institutional framework 
will be tested in practice in the near future as operational experience is accumulated. 
R Among the interesting features of this case study for ECO are the 
following main points: The ability to construct a complex project across 
three countries without any over-arching institutional structure or 
political agreements/treaties, was achieved by adopting a set of inter-
locking agreements with common back-to-back provisions between the 
private parties and the host governments. However, the political 
backing for the project was strongly underpinned by the cooperative 
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relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and by external stakeholder 
support for (and pressure on) Georgia, particularly from the US. It is 
doubtful that the transactions could have been concluded in the same 
time, or with the level of private participation, without such strong 
external backing. External political stakeholder pressure is also seen to 
be instrumental in Europe in promoting integration of the energy 
markets of non-EU countries within the Energy Community 
R The high level of private participation in the financing and operation of 
the project, especially the transportation system, illustrates that it is 
possible to structure a project to attract private investors even before 
there is a comprehensive institutional structure for trade. The main 
emphasis was on a set of internationally enforceable agreements 
between the three governments (IGAs) and between each government 
and the project developers (HGAs) 
R The use of international arbitration and dispute resolution provisions 
was a key part of the agreements and a critical element for the private 
parties. It is noteworthy that the inter-government agreements made use 
of the Energy Charter dispute resolution procedures  
R The security risks to the pipeline, especially in the transit country 
(Georgia) were a major concern during contract negotiations. The 
sabotage risk meant that there was a very large contingent liability. The 
allocation of this risk and the related costs and procedures for security 
measures had to be carefully negotiated between the parties. The 
contingent liability is very large because of the high value of the 
transported gas. On the other hand, this value also creates a very strong 
economic pressure for the project. In this respect, gas projects differ from 
electricity projects due to the higher potential economic benefits of trade 
R Similar to the other 3 cases (NT2, SIEPAC and SAPP), it took around 10 
years to complete the arrangements for the project from the initial 
signing of the upstream gas exploration and development contracts in 
1996 through the signing of the final pipeline agreements in 2001 to first 
deliveries of gas at the end of 2006.  
Although a gas project, this case is worth careful examination as the first large 
multi-country energy project involving 2 ECO countries and significant private 
investment. The main agreements (IGAs, HGAs and PSA) are publicly available and 
the detailed allocation of the project risks can therefore be examined in a project 
which has achieved a successful completion of construction and initial operation. 
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8 TAP electricity trade project assessment 
The proposed Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) project is the most ambitious 
electricity trade project currently being developed within ECO.  It would transport 
electricity generated in Tajikistan, via Afghanistan, to meet the energy deficiency in 
Pakistan. If successfully developed, it would be a milestone project for further trade 
and investment within ECO. In this section we assess the proposed TAP electricity 
trade project from the perspective of the type of trading arrangement that is likely to 
be appropriate, the specific risks and options for mitigating them, and the options 
for finance.  
8.1 Overview of the proposed TAP project 
The Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) electricity transmission project would 
enable the export of electricity from Tajikistan and potentially other Central Asian 
states such as the Kyrgyz Republic to the growing market of Pakistan (and 
potentially India)73.  
The project would involve transit through Afghanistan via a new-build high voltage 
transmission line over challenging terrain. Estimates of the required length of the 
line vary from around 650 km to 1,000 km, depending on the routing option. 
Afghanistan could also receive some supplies as part of the project, either directly or 
from other import routes from Central Asia. 
Detailed technical and economic appraisals of the potential routes have yet to be 
carried out74. Preliminary assessments suggest a possible path via Kabul (option 1) 
and another more northerly route that would minimise transit over Afghan territory 
(option 2) but pass through more difficult terrain (and therefore be more costly). 
This would see the new line connect to transmission assets at the Rogun 
hydropower project in Tajikistan and deliver near Peshawar in Pakistan. These two 
suggested routes are shown in Figure 25. Following its completion the Sangtuda 
hydro power plant in Tajikistan could be connected to the TAP line directly or 
through the Tajik network. In addition, the ADB is financing a new 220 kV line from 
Sangtuda to Afghanistan75. 
The project would be for bilateral trade through a transit country and so it fits into 
the second of the trade typologies described in section 6.3. If it was implemented it 
                                                     
73 For the avoidance of confusion, the name TAP is used in this section to refer to the proposed 
electricity transmission line from Tajikistan to Pakistan. Where the proposed gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Pakistan, also known as TAP (see section 2.1.6), is mentioned it is referred to by its 
full name. Note that the acronym TAP is also used for the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline project to take gas 
from the Balkans to Italy. 
74 In October, the ADB announced funding for a study into the technical and economic feasibility of 
electricity trade between Central and South Asia. We understand that the World Bank is planning to 
fund a separate study into the commercial aspects of a trade project. 
75 To Pul-e-Khumri via Kunduz. Advance action on procurement for construction of this line was 
approved in October 2006 
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would most likely involve dedicated assets for generation, transit and trade, 
although some of the generation facilities would not be new-build. The level of 
private participation that could be attracted would depend crucially on the ability to 
reduce the project risks, which currently are significant. 
Figure 25  Proposed TAP transmission route 
SANGTUDA 
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Source: NTDC, presentation to Central Asia/South Asia electricity trade conference, Islamabad, May 2006, ; 
with ECA graphic 
Potential benefits of TAP 
As discussed in section 2.1.2, electricity trade between Central and South Asia is 
supported by several positive characteristics: 
R Surplus installed and partially completed capacity combined with large 
potential energy resources in Central Asia  
R Growing energy shortages in South Asia and large projected future 
demand increases 
R Seasonal complementarity in the occurrence of peaks between the two 
regions 
Trade offers potentially wide-ranging benefits within the region. Integrating 
Afghanistan economically and politically would help to stabilise the region and 
open up new opportunities for mutual advancement. More direct and immediate 
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benefits to Afghanistan include the transit fees and/or electricity offtakes76, as well 
as new markets for power from the Central Asian states and additional and 
potentially lower cost power sources for South Asian customers. Revenues created 
by the project would be important income sources for Afghanistan and the Central 
Asian states. If used carefully and responsibly these could assist development and 
poverty reduction in these countries.  
Another associated benefit could be improved cooperation and closer ties among 
the states. If revenues from trade outside the region were realised, it could provide 
new impetus among the Central Asian states to move further from their energy self-
sufficiency policies and to find lasting solutions to the issues of water sharing in the 
region.  
The TAP electricity project is not the only energy project seeking to transport energy 
resources through Afghanistan to Pakistan. The proposed gas pipeline project to 
transport gas from Turkmenistan has also been under discussion for a number of 
years, although no formal agreements are yet in place (see Box 15). 
Box 15  Trans-Afghan-Pakistan gas pipeline project 
Trans-Afghan-Pakistan natural gas pipeline project 
The governments of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, with assistance from the 
Asian Development Bank, are developing the concept of a pipeline from Turkmenistan to 
Pakistan and India that would transit Afghanistan. India’s Cabinet approved participation 
in the project in May 2006. The pipeline would provide an alternative market outlet for 
Turkmen natural gas and meet increasing energy needs in the destination countries. It 
would transport as much as 30 billion cubic meters annually over a distance of 1,700 km. 
The estimated project cost is US$ 3.5 billion.  
The three governments formed a Steering Committee to coordinate the development of 
the project and signed a Gas Pipeline Framework Agreement in 2002. A feasibility study 
was financed by the ADB. There is also the potential for development of gas storage sites 
in Pakistan to provide coverage in the event of disruption to supply.  
Although a number of international energy companies have indicated a potential interest 
in the project a consortium has not yet been formed and there are no financing 
arrangements, gas supply or transit agreements in place. Crucially, Afghanistan is yet to 
provide physical security guarantees along the proposed route. Another issue is the need 
to complete independent audits of the Turkmen gas reserves.  
 
International support to project development 
The development of the TAP project is being supported by a number of interested 
parties: 
R The governments and state-owned utilities of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and the Kyrgyz Republic 
                                                     
76 the project could be structured so that Afghanistan receives payment for transmission in kind in the 
form of much needed electricity imports 
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R A group of donors and IFIs including the World Bank, the ADB, the 
IsDB and USAID 
R Private parties, including international utility companies RAO (Russia) 
and AES (US) 
The Kyrgyz Republic has joined the core TAP countries as a full participant in the 
project. Many of the circumstances and potential contributions to trade that exist for 
Tajikistan are relevant also of the Kyrgyz Republic. Like Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic has large export potential from hydro power, partially completed hydro 
capacity, low domestic demand and seasonal complementarity with South Asia. The 
existing interconnections among the Central Asian countries mean that energy 
exports from the Kyrgyz Republic could be made relatively easily through a TAP 
gateway in Tajikistan. 
The interested parties have had an ongoing dialogue on the project for several years. 
Most recently, the four participating governments, international institutions and the 
interested private investors met to discuss regional trade in Dushanbe in September 
2006. This followed an electricity trade conference in Islamabad in May. The project 
also features on the agenda of broader international development cooperation 
initiatives for Afghanistan, such as the regional Afghan reconstruction conference 
held in New Delhi in November.  
These meetings have included participation from high level governmental 
representatives, such as Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of Energy, advisors 
to the governments, and senior management from the utilities. This suggests that 
one of the first steps in project development - gaining high level political interest 
among the four countries – has been achieved. 
Progress to date 
Some important initial institutional steps were taken at the Dushanbe conference:  
R The four governments signed an MOU on project development  
R An inter-ministerial working group was created to carry the project 
forward 
R IFIs announced funding for studies into the technical and economic 
feasibility of the project 
These are consistent with the early steps taken on large international trade projects 
elsewhere.  
Additionally, RAO UESR, which is participating in the completion of the Sangtuda I 
hydropower project in Tajikistan, has indicated that it is interested in selling output 
from the plant to Pakistan.  
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8.2 Risks to trade: overcoming the barriers 
8.2.1 Identification of risks 
In principle the net benefits to TAP trade are likely to be positive and the project 
holds the potential to bring a much needed development platform to the countries 
of Central and South Asia. However, as things stand currently such a project would 
face significant risks and barriers, related to both developing and securing transit 
and arranging and operating multi-country trade.  
A key consideration for the project’s development will be how to structure it and 
create a supporting framework to mitigate the risks sufficiently to attract the project 
finance. Although there are various risks present throughout the region, in this case 
they are particularly focused on the transit through Afghanistan. Two main risks 
dominate: 
R Political risk - The fledgling government in Kabul lacks institutional 
capacity, suffers from corruption, and has a limited security remit over 
much of the country. The legal environment is poorly developed and 
there is no experience with a large investment project of this sort. 
R Security risk - Low level but determined warfare is a continuing 
problem in Afghanistan (and potentially the border region in Pakistan) 
and major infrastructure assets would be a visible target for anyone 
violently opposed to the government.  
The vulnerability of a transmission line to attack and damage is illustrated by the 
experience with Cahora Bassa (Box 8). There are also political and security risks in 
the Central Asian states as well as Pakistan, but these are likely to be less severe 
than in Afghanistan. 
Most of the other project risks identified in section 3 are also likely to be present to 
varying degrees in the TAP project. These include: 
R Planning risk – this is likely to be made worse by the weakness of 
Afghanistan’s institutions including the domestic utility. Coordination 
of planning across the countries, high level political and external 
stakeholder support, and transparent project approval procedures will 
help to manage these risks 
R Construction risk – the terrain is particularly challenging, raising the 
potential for cost overruns, and construction (depending on when it 
takes place) could be vulnerable to security risks. However, it should be 
noted that the SCP gas pipeline construction has been completed with 
minimal delay 
R Financial (including payment) risk – the project would require a 
creditworthy buyer and guarantees to suppliers and financiers that 
payment would be made 
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R Legal and regulatory risk – Afghanistan is in the process of rebuilding 
its institutions and establishing rule of law. The other countries are also, 
to varying degrees, in the process of establishing regulatory and market 
environments in their electricity sectors and opening to foreign 
investment. Nevertheless, it is likely that a major transmission line 
project would require to be carried out under a concession agreement 
(eg host government agreement) 
Several of the second level risks facing the project (eg planning, construction, 
timing) are directly influenced by the two main risks, while others are common to 
projects of this sort in new and developing markets.  
Afghanistan suffers ongoing human resource and institutional capacity problems 
that present a barrier its ability to participate fully in projects of this scale and 
complexity. This problem is present at all levels of government and administration, 
in the national electricity utility, and in the private sector. It also affects the security 
forces (both army and police).  
The absence of capable political and legal institutions, ongoing violent insurrection 
against foreign forces and the Kabul government (currently concentrated in the 
south and east), the weakness of indigenous law-enforcement and military 
capability in the face of this violence and questions as to whether the government 
can develop the rule of law and credibly impose it throughout the country illustrate 
that Afghanistan remains a nascent nation state.  
Security situation in Afghanistan 
A detailed assessment of the current security situation in Afghanistan, or of 
prospects for the future, are beyond the scope of this report and of the resources 
available to it. However, for investors or participants in an infrastructure project in 
the region security assessments will be essential and critical.  
The security situation is complex and evolving quickly. It involves both domestic 
and international dimensions, and there are conflicting views as to the exact nature 
and roles of various parties to the conflict.  
At the time of carrying out this study, an insurgency was growing in strength and 
violence in the eastern and southern parts of the country. The north, where a 
transmission line to Pakistan is likely to transit, was considered relatively calm by 
international observers and reconstruction efforts were able to progress there with 
less interference.  
8.2.2 Options for managing the risks  
The risks related to TAP can be divided into those directly related to the security 
and political situation in Afghanistan and those that are common to international 
trade projects more generally. Approaching the risks in this way provides a 
framework for considering mitigation options. 
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The challenge is to control the risks enough to make a trade project viable without 
exhausting the economic benefit that it may offer. A number of features of the 
approach to risk management are apparent among risk mitigation options: 
R The project is viable under a long-term perspective 
R Even taking a long-term perspective, it is likely that the project will 
require international governmental or developmental institution 
sponsorship to mitigate financial risk  
R Afghanistan requires institutional support, which can be provided by 
the IFIs and donors 
R Support for the project in Afghanistan will be increased by ensuring 
inclusiveness and shared benefits locally 
These are discussed further below.  
Security and political risk - long-term perspective required 
The reality of the current situation with regard to security and political risk is: 
R The private sector may be willing to participate in the project through 
various different types of arrangement, but significant private equity 
investment is unlikely under current conditions  
R Buyers of electricity are likely to be reluctant to take the supply risk 
associated with transmission through Afghanistan at present77 
R Sellers may be unwilling to commit to contracts to supply under the 
current risk of interruption  
However, given time the security situation may improve enough to support the 
project. In each of the case studies presented in section 7 it was at least 10 years from 
the signing of the founding inter-governmental agreements before the projects had 
advanced enough to allow construction to begin or before a modest level of trade 
was achieved. The founding MOU for TAP was signed in September 2006. If the 
experience of timeframes of other major international trade project developments 
were to be repeated for TAP, it might take several years before construction or 
operation of a TAP line would begin. However, given the special circumstances in 
Afghanistan there could equally be an international initiative which could shorten 
the usual timeframe.  
In the first instance security risks can be managed through the use of physical 
protection measures, and to a lesser extent careful physical design. However, due to 
the vulnerability of a transmission line providing physical security will be costly. 
These costs, in addition to the cost of outages, may outweigh some of the benefits 
                                                     
77 This observation is made despite Pakistan having signed the October 2006 TAP project MOU.  
Whether Pakisatn will take delivery of the power at the generation level or at its border remains to be 
agreed. 
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from the project – assuming finance and buyers can be mobilised under these 
conditions.  
More lasting protection will be provided by resolving the underlying political 
motivations for attacks and by building greater capacity within Afghanistan to 
provide security. Reducing the risks and controlling the causes sufficiently to enable 
an electricity trade project must be approached as part of the broader development 
of the country. This is beyond the scope and control of a trade development project 
alone. It will take time, perseverance, and effort from all sides and requires a long-
term perspective.  
If the underlying issues are addressed then the risk of sporadic violence will fade 
(although it may not disappear altogether). We must also not forget that Pakistan 
and potentially Central Asia are also open to unrest. But, the cost of providing 
physical security to the line and of interruptions should reduce with time.  
Financial risk - Sovereign and IFI guarantees 
Most of the international trade projects reviewed for this study included sovereign 
guarantees against the financial risks. This is likely to be the case for TAP, with 
guarantees required from Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the case of Pakistan, this 
would have to be considered within the context of the well-developed policy for 
private power and the desire to move away from sovereign guarantees for power 
projects. In the case of Afghanistan, until such time as a sovereign guarantee has 
substantial worth, it would need to be underpinned by international political risk 
guarantee instruments. 
Financial and political risk insurance is therefore also likely to be required, 
particularly to attract international and private sector investors. The IFI risk 
insurers, such as MIGA, can play an important role. Indeed, in the case of Nam 
Theun 2 their involvement was considered by many to be vital.  
The involvement of IFIs can also provide a strong diplomatic tool to reduce political 
risk and associated financial risks.  
Institutional development 
Afghanistan requires capacity building throughout its institutions, including the 
Ministry of Energy and Water and the national state-owned utility, Da Afghanistan 
Brishna Moassesa (DABM). This presents risks related to the ability of Afghan 
participants to manage and plan a project of this scale.  
The legal and regulatory institutions also need to be strengthened. The weakness of 
the rule of law and legal institutions present stark legal and regulatory risks to 
developing projects in Afghanistan.  
It is feasible that a project of this sort, at its simplest involving permission to build 
and operate a transmission line, could be carried out under a concession with little 
further involvement required from Afghan institutions.  
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However, this would miss an opportunity to leverage from the project to capitalise 
on the risk mitigation element which is in-built in shared ownership and to build 
capacity locally within Afghanistan . There is an opportunity for experience to be 
gained among Afghan participants as well as for knowledge transfer from 
international experts to local staff. It is preferable therefore that local institutions, 
including DABM, be involved as project partners.  
The IFIs and donors are clearly placed to provide assistance for capacity building. 
As was the case with Nam Theun 2, capacity building should begin as soon as 
possible. Capacity building to support the project could be implemented as part of 
broader assistance to the sector and governance in Afghanistan. Other countries, 
particularly those in Central Asia, would also benefit from ongoing capacity 
building.  
The more advanced utilities, such as from Pakistan or international participants, 
could also provide useful support to capacity building and knowledge transfer.  
Ensuring inclusiveness and shared benefits 
The insurgency currently building in the south of Afghanistan, which requires some 
support among the general population in order to be sustained, appears to be 
gathering wind from a sense of disillusionment with the achievements and 
capability of central government, and of corruption of government at all levels. 
Afghanistan remains among the poorest countries on earth, with development 
indicators in all categories among the lowest in the world, including access to 
electricity.  
This highlights the importance to a long-term development strategy of ensuring that 
the local population is given a sense of inclusion and participation in initiatives that 
affect them or that are visible to them, that they are able to see benefits from 
changes and initiatives, and that promises made to local people are realistic and 
include a realistic timeframe.  In this regard, it is important that the transit fees are 
used for development purposes.  
It is important then that the benefits of the project are properly communicated to 
stakeholders within the broader community. People need to be appropriately 
compensated for way leaves, and they need to be consulted, their opinions 
acknowledged and respected, and they must be kept informed. Providing electricity 
along the route would be one approach that is likely to have long-term benefits. 
The most obvious evidence of the benefits of a project as visible as a large 
transmission line will be improved access to electricity. This is especially true given 
the very low level of electricity access in Afghanistan currently. An associated 
electrification programme, both rural and urban, could increase local-level 
stakeholder support.  
The project might supply increased imports of electricity to Afghanistan directly 
from the line (for example, if the line was to pass near a relatively large demand 
centre such as Kabul). Alternatively or in addition, since taking supply from a high 
voltage line to meet the low demand in many parts of Afghanistan may not be 
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economically feasible, the project could be associated with imports via the lower 
voltage lines from Central Asia that are currently being rehabilitated.   
The Nam Theun 2 project in Laos provides an example of broader development 
initiatives being incorporated into a package related to a large electricity trade 
project. There the IFIs played an important part in ensuring broader developmental 
objectives were pursued and they could provide the same role in Afghanistan.  
Mitigating other risks 
SIEPAC provides an example of how IFI’s can use the leverage of their financing to 
improve and speed up project preparation and planning. Ideally this will pave the 
way for smoother implementation during the construction and operation phases.  
8.2.3 Conclusions on TAP 
If Tajikistan and Pakistan shared a direct border there would still be significant risks 
in an electricity trade project. The involvement of Afghanistan as a required transit 
country adds a further level of major risks. The ordinarily accepted requirements in 
the investment environment to support private (or even public) participation on the 
scale involved in a large high voltage transmission project are simply absent from 
Afghanistan without external support or further institutional development and 
security improvement. Such progress is likely to be a challenge in Afghanistan and 
will require considerable assistance from stakeholders outside of the country who 
must be willing to bear the associated risk.  
The underlying causes of risk in Afghanistan will most probably remain for some 
time and addressing them exceeds the scope of a trade development project alone. 
However, the time that would be needed to bring the project to construction stage 
provides an opportunity to conduct further analysis while the broader nation 
building and developmental programme continues and, it is hoped, the security 
situation improves.  
Once the security situation improves, many of the other project risks would be 
similar to those faced by international electricity trade projects elsewhere. The 
success of those projects shows that these risks can be overcome. Financial risk 
mitigation instruments will almost certainly be required for the financing. In 
addition, risk management efforts should focus on institutional development with 
involvement of external stakeholders, and ensuring inclusiveness and sharing of 
benefits within a long term development strategy that ensures that transit fess are 
used for development purposes and that the approach increases local population 
support.  Providing electricity along the route would assist in this objective. 
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9 Roadmap for development of electricity trade in ECO 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this section is to draw on the analyses earlier in the report and indicate 
the types of trade that could develop in the ECO region in the short to medium term 
together with the steps required to facilitate trade in electricity. The summary of 
these elements, the trade opportunities and steps to bring them to fruition, together 
with a prioritisation of the timeframe for implementation, is what is meant here by a 
‘roadmap’ covering actions that could be taken both be the countries and external 
stakeholders such as IFIs. The section covers: 
R Identification of a number of specific trade projects that are under 
consideration or might be developed, in each ECO country 
R Conclusions drawn for ECO from the lessons from international 
experience, especially the specific case studies covered in this report 
R Discussion of the likely evolution of trade, taking account of the general 
and specific risks, institutional arrangements and financing options 
R Recommendations on immediate actions which the ECO states and the 
IFIs plus bilateral donors could take to provide a better enabling 
environment to stimulate electricity trade. 
R A roadmap for development of trade in ECO that includes a preliminary 
listing of priority projects  
An underlying theme is that the significant economic benefits associated with 
regional trade in electricity are not sufficient in the short term to ensure that the 
trade projects will go ahead. There is need for a supporting framework of 
institutions, legal agreements and guarantees to be in place. These necessarily have 
to be built up on the basis of experience in a series of projects that encourages the 
progressive widening and deepening of regional cooperation in electricity. 
9.2 Trading opportunities 
Regional electricity trade could significantly contribute to improved energy supply 
and economic growth in ECO countries. The potential is likely to be realised 
through progressive exploitation of the options, from Types 1 and 2 in our typology 
(bilateral trade between neighbours and via a transit country), through dedicated 
export projects and trade between synchronised systems (Type 3), to eventually 
attain a regional pool (Type 4).  
In the ECO region, development will initially be in respect of strengthening intra-
regional trade within the Central Asian Republics, where an inter-connected grid 
already exists but much needs to be done to ensure adequate supplies of energy and 
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security of supply throughout the region. The main strategies are loss reduction, 
rehabilitation programmes and some key new generation and transmission 
investments – (Bishkek II in Kyrgyz Republic, Talimardjan I in Uzbekistan and the 
North-South transmission project in Kazakhstan). By strengthening existing links 
with Iran, and through Iran to Azerbaijan and Turkey, the benefits of larger 
integrated systems can be accessed (risk sharing, reduced reserve requirements, 
short-term trade opportunities and larger markets for private investors). 
The main focus of this study, however, is on the major projects which can be 
developed to export to the large, rapidly growing electricity markets in Turkey, Iran 
and Pakistan.  In this regard there are broadly two clusters of countries, each 
composed of predominantly exporting, transit or importing countries, with a further 
categorisation among exporting countries by fuel type: 
R East cluster consists of the following countries: 
R Pakistan (importing country with large, rapidly growing market) 
R Afghanistan (importing and transit country – existing 
interconnections with Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
the last two being strengthened, plus new 500 kV lines envisaged 
in TAP project)  
R Turkmenistan (transit and exporting country, presently oriented to 
Iran, so also part of the West cluster, but in due course could 
export via Afghanistan to Pakistan) 
R Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (exporting countries – fossil fuel 
based generation)  
R Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan (exporting countries – 
hydropower based generation). 
R West cluster consists of the following countries:  
R Turkey (importing country)   
R Iran is an importer of electricity (eg from Turkmenistan), but as a 
country with immense petroleum and natural gas resources (eg 
gas reserves of 940 tcf), it is also a major exporter of energy, and 
exports will grow significantly over time. For west cluster ECO 
countries, Iran is also transit route to Turkey. With a multiplicity 
of roles, Iran may usefully be classified as a market integrating 
country. 
R Turkmenistan (existing transit country, with orientation to 
increase exports to Iran) 
R Afghanistan (potential major transit country when 500 kV Herat 
line has been built) 
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R Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (exporting countries – fossil fuel 
based generation). 
The main trade opportunities are summarised in Table 16and Table 1778. 
Turkmenistan belongs to both clusters, but presently is close to Iran and has isolated 
itself from the rest of the region.  Kazakhstan, which has been put in the East cluster, 
also straddles both clusters.  Kazakhstan is best placed of the ECO countries to 
export to major markets outside the ECO region (Russia and China), but could also 
participate in ECO trade projects such as TAP. Amongst the Central Asian 
Republics, Kazakhstan has gone furthest with electricity sector reforms and once the 
North-South interconnector is in place, linking and reinforcing the two existing sub-
national grids, it will have a very strong electricity sector. 
The tables include a colour-coded presentation of the likely time-frames of different 
options for the evolution of trade within the ECO region. This shows that the 
immediate opportunities are in the west cluster, where existing mainly seasonal 
exports from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Iran and Turkey could be expanded.  
A third transmission line between Turkmenistan and Iran is planned and 
Azerbaijan is set to benefit from the proposed energy corridor being established 
between Iran and Russia, traversing Azerbaijan.  
                                                     
78 Similar tables could be constructed for exports of other energy resources from the region. Gas 
exports in the Western cluster, for example, would show the current dominance of Azebaijan with 
large gas resources (reserves of 1370 bcm, 660 bcm of which are in the Shah Deniz field alone), but 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan each with reserves of (probably well) over 100 tcf are also seeking new 
export markets. The primary gas market for Azerbaijan is Turkey, while Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan export via Russian pipelines. Future markets in Europe, Pakistan and further afield in Asia 
(China, Korea, Japan) are being explored. 
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Table 16  Summary of prospects for trade in the West Cluster of ECO 
Azerbaijan Turkmenistan
Oppor-
tunities
M
ar
ke
t i
nt
eg
ra
tin
g
Trade 
nexus
Iran Transmission lines in 
place, some trade occurs, 
will expand when Iran-
Russia energy corridor is 
built
Two transmission lines in 
place, third being planned, 
electricity already being 
exported to Iran.  Could be 
increased.
Im
po
rt
in
g West 
cluster
Turkey Exports could be increased Small exports could be 
increased provided elec 
tariff reflects gas price 
lower than import parity
Trade options with good prospects, short to medium term projects
West cluster
Opportunities from new 
Iran-Russia transmission 
lines
Exporting countries                           
(fossil fuels)
Opportunities from 
alignment with Iran
 
Table 17  Summary of Prospects for Trade in the East Cluster of ECO 
Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyz Rep Tajikistan
Project Talimardjan I & II Bishkek II Sangtuda, Rogan I & II
Capacity 3,200 MW 400 MW 4,270 MW
Econ cost 2.63 c/kWh 2.67 c/kWh 3.07 c/kWh
Im
p/
tr
an
si
t Afghanistan Small imports 
already exist; 
wheeling for new 
export projects
Small imports already 
exist; wheeling for new 
export projects
Small imports already 
exist; wheeling for new 
export projects
Im
po
rt
in
g
Pakistan Potential (transited 
through 
Afghanistan) but 
would have to 
overcome political 
constraints to trade
Potentially if can link into 
TAP project and compete 
with CA hydro
Uzbekistan well placed to 
export to Pakistan
Kyrgyz participant in TAP 
on basis of existing 
seasonal surpluses and 
Bishkek. Kambarata 
Project II (240 MW @ 3.95 
c/kWh) could also be 
competitive.
TAP project to export 
substantial energy to 
Pakistan (Rogan Phases I 
& II, but must overcome 
water sharing issues)
M
ar
ke
t i
nt
eg
ra
tin
g
Trade 
nexus
Iran Two transmission 
lines in place, third 
being planned, 
electricity already 
being exported to 
Iran.  Could be 
increased.
Some potential but 
expensive (Ekibastuz 
1,000 MW at 5.05 c/kWh, 
project already going 
ahead though)
Seasonal exports to meet 
summer peak in Iran (1st 
Talimardjan project 800 
MW at 1.75 c/kWh)
Potential if Kambarata 
projects are developed
Seasonal exports to meet 
summer peak in Iran 
(Sangtuda I project 670 
MW at 1.97 c/kWh, Iran 
has proposed to develop 
Sangtuda II as a joint 
venture). Would need to 
transit Afghanistan or 
Turkmenistan.
Countries with greatest export potential
Trade options with good prospects, short to medium term projects
Trade options with good prospects, medium term projects
Trade possibilities with medium to long-term potential
Exporting countries                           
(fossil fuels)
Exporting countries                           
(hydro potential)
(opportunities to export 
outside of ECO region to 
Russia and China)
East 
cluster
Opportunities from 
alignment with Iran
East cluster
(most economic 
options)
 
Notes: The tables exclude intra-CAR trade to meet regional demand in Central Asia (as envisaged in World Bank 
(2004)). They also do not elaborate opportunities for all ECO for creating larger integrated systems (risk sharing, 
reduced reserve requirements, short-term trade opportunities and larger markets for private investors). The tables 
focus on major exports to Pakistan, Iran, Turkey (and also Russia and China) which are to come predominantly from 
new capacity. 
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The medium to long term potential lies in developing the significant opportunities 
to produce low-cost energy which exist principally in the East cluster in Uzbekistan 
(Talimardjan I & II) and Tajikistan (Sangtuda and Rogan I & II) and to a lesser extent 
in the Kyrgyz Republic (Bishkek II and Kambarara II)79.  These projects have to be 
classified as medium to long term both because their size (long lead times) and 
because of the need for new transmission lines to be built through Afghanistan 
(security concerns).   
In the shorter term, these countries have the opportunity to export to the West 
cluster, initially to meet the summer shortfall in Iran, but later (if additional 
transmission capacity is installed) to contribute more generally to supply in Iran and 
Turkey. Iran has shown its commitment to imports by proposing to develop the 
Sangtuda II project jointly with Tajikistan. 
9.3 Lessons from International Experience 
The study has presented an analysis of four relevant cases of regional energy trade 
chosen to reflect similar challenges to those in the ECO region, in particular 
requiring investment in new infrastructure: 
R NT2. The Nam Theun 2 hydro power, interconnection and trade project 
between Laos and Thailand, part of the GMS subregion initiative 
R SIEPAC. The SIEPAC electricity transmission, regional market and 
trade project among six countries of Central America 
R SAPP. The Southern Africa Power Pool arrangement to promote 
electricity trade among 12 countries in southern Africa 
R SCP. South Caucasus Pipeline built to transport natural gas from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia 
Each case presents a different but overlapping set of lessons fro ECO. Among the 
most relevant are (with the cases that best illustrate the point in brackets): 
R It is possible to bring to market a large complex international energy 
project including new-build hydro generation and transmission (NT2, 
SIEPAC, SCP) 
R the creditworthiness of the main buyer is a prime consideration to 
reduce the payment risk to the project and thereby the financing risk 
(NT2, SCP, SIEPAC – existing national markets) 
                                                     
79 ‘Lesser extent’ because of the project sizes. The projects in Kyrgyz Republic may well be developed 
sooner than those in Tajikistan and thus have a more immediate role in trade (eg water sharing 
problems are probably less in the case of the Kambarata scheme than the Rogan project, so more likely 
that Kambarata will be developed first). 
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R the reduction of political risk through the involvement of international 
development institutions and their provision of risk guarantees is an 
important element in the financing package (NT2, SIEPAC, SCP) 
R a sovereign guarantee from a participating government is a necessary 
risk reduction measure (NT2, SAPP) 
R The projects typically take at least a decade passing from the initial 
founding agreements to implementation and operation (all) 
R The support provided by the external stakeholders such as the IFIs (eg 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank) crucial to maintaining the 
momentum of project development (SAPP, SCP), including assisting in 
the resolution of critical issues such as environmental controversies (for 
hydro projects, transmission) and security.  
R Strong political commitment is necessary to advance large projects and 
this is assisted by a favourable history of inter-governmental 
cooperation (SIEPAC, SAPP, SCP). It can be enhanced by creating 
powerful institutions at the regional level (SIEPAC, SAPP) 
R The foundation of project implementation rests on legally enforceable 
agreements between governments. This may be by multi-country treaty 
(SIEPAC) or by bilateral inter-governmental agreements (SCP), or multi-
lateral government agreements (SAPP) 
R Private sector participation can be an important component of the 
project, both for funding and operational expertise (SCP, SIEPAC). This 
also improves the confidence of commercial lenders to the project 
R It is possible to create a relatively advanced regional electricity trading 
arrangement between countries that are at differing stages of internal 
market development (SIEPAC). 
R It also shows that the experience of at least two of the cases show that 
post-conflict environments are not necessarily a barrier to trade 
(SIEPAC, SCP) 
R Progressive development of the scale of trading can start from small 
interconnections under the institutional wing of a regional association 
(SAPP).  
R The creation of a respected coordinating entity can serve to strengthen 
technical cooperation, act as a driver for integration, and provide a 
neutral forum for resolving disputes (SIEPAC, SAPP) 
R This final bullet point above suggests that early trading arrangements in 
ECO could take advantage of existing dispute resolution procedures in 
agreements such as the ECO Trade Agreement and the Energy Charter 
Treaty. Dedicated procedures could then be developed incrementally as 
trade grows and becomes more sophisticated. 
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Several of the less successful aspects of the SAPP experience provide negative 
lessons of aspects to avoid in ECO: 
R Political instability and direct physical security risks have limited trade 
and investment and resulted in severe supply interruptions 
R Lack of political commitment has slowed the process of integration 
R More than ten years after the IGA signing (1995), trade within SAPP is a 
relatively small proportion of the potential. This partly illustrates the 
long-term view required of the time frame for these projects 
R The failure to further develop trade is due in part to a continued focus 
on self-sufficiency policies in some governments despite clear evidence 
of the benefits of trade. Protectionist positions have also restricted cross-
border investment in new facilities 
R The lack of a coordinated investment strategy has created uncertainty 
and restricted much needed new investment in transmission capacity  
R Weaknesses in transmission pricing have also restricted trade by 
discouraging wheeling over large distances from supply sources to 
demand centres 
These lessons stress the importance of establishing a collaborative institutional 
structure but also show that this requires real political commitment toward trade. 
9.4 Evolution of trading arrangements 
The evolution of the trading arrangements depends only partially on the economic 
potential. The underlying economics has to contend with a number of specific risks 
and the successful implementation of projects also depends on the strength of the 
supporting institutional arrangements and on securing project financing. Each of 
these is discussed in turn in the following sub-sections.  The final sub-section makes 
recommendations on putting greater momentum into the evolution of electricity 
exports from ECO countries. 
9.4.1 Risks to trade in ECO and possible mitigation 
As already highlighted in this report, new trading arrangements in the ECO region 
will need to address a number of risks and constraints to trade. The main categories 
of risk are: 
R Political risk is perhaps the most significant barrier to large-scale 
development of international trade in ECO. Major efforts in the 
development of international cooperation and supporting institutional 
structures will be necessary to facilitate expansion of electricity trade 
both within, and as exports from, the ECO region. This can be facilitated 
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by support from external stakeholders such as the IFIs and the US or 
Western Europe governments.   
R A closely related issue is the security risks, which are of obvious 
importance in relation to the vulnerability of long distance transmission 
investments.  
R Commercial risks, which include planning, design, construction, 
volume, supply and payment risks, are also significant in the context of 
complex, multi-country projects.  
R A high level of perceived financial risk is a major barrier reducing the 
likelihood of attracting private equity investors into electricity trade 
projects in ECO80.  In addition to specialised insurance and guarantee 
instruments, factors which would make the private sector more likely to 
invest would include private participants having a broad stake (eg have 
upstream generation investments prior to participating in a transmission 
project), seeing potentially significant returns (if uncertainties are 
resolved in their favour), having options on future expansion projects 
(though this would always be difficult as well as problematic to be made 
binding) and having the comfort of strong IFI/donor support.  
As emphasized earlier in the report, many of the risks can be simultaneously 
addressed by careful structuring of the projects.  An option for mitigating financial 
risk due to security of supply concerns is to structure projects on the basis of joint 
venture or cross-shareholding arrangements. The design goal for these structures is 
to link the cost of supply interruption in the importing country to the party best able 
to control the source of supply risk in the exporting country. An example is where 
the exporting utility takes a financial stake in the electricity sector of the receiving 
country. This approach can also apply to deal with the converse case of volume risk, 
with the receiving utility taking a financial stake in the exporting country. 
9.4.2 Institutional arrangements 
The main areas where institutional support for trade can be strengthened and 
extended to promote trade and mitigate some of the risks are: 
R Putting in place enforceable inter-governmental agreements for specific 
trade arrangements 
R Building on existing institutional and multi-country agreements in ECO 
R Expanding participation in the Energy Charter Treaty and other external 
frameworks to support trade deals 
R Building regional institutions to further cooperation on technical, 
environmental and regulatory issues.  
                                                     
80 Other forms of private involvement in electricity trade projects that minimise financial risks can 
more readily be implemented. 
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International electricity projects outside of developed markets almost always 
require inter-governmental agreements to provide a legal underpinning and 
indicate commitment at the highest level to trade and to managing risk. In 
formulating such agreements, there is scope to build on the bilateral agreements 
which exist for energy trade and the more general ECO agreements that are already 
in place, the primary ones being: 
R ECO Charter and the Treaty of Izmir  
R Economic Cooperation Strategy for the ECO region 
R the Framework Agreement on ECO Trade Cooperation 
R the ECO Trade Agreement (ECOTA) 
Some specific areas which warrant attention in the above agreements to provide a 
stronger framework for electricity trade are discussed in Box 16 in section 9.5.4. 
below. 
Multilateral agreements that assist the development of electricity trade can be 
generalised into two types: 
R Regional trade and investment agreements providing a framework to 
promote cross-border energy trade. For example, investment protection 
provisions and rights of free access to transit. 
R Specific agreements for the operation of electricity trading within a 
market – for example, with policies, regulations and rules similar to 
SAPP and SIEPAC.  
As highlighted earlier in the report, the most important multi-lateral energy 
agreement to which ECO member states have already subscribed is the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) – see Box 5 with further details in annex A2:.  
To further regional trade in electricity, one of the immediate aims of ECO states 
should be to build institutions which foster regional cooperation on technical, 
environmental and regulatory issues.  This cannot easily be done in the abstract: 
what is needed is to develop a pipeline of projects of mutual interests around which 
the institutions can grow in a manner that is commensurate with the growing levels 
of cooperation.  An obvious starting point for this is in respect of studies: 
R Study on Electricity Interconnections among ECO Countries (on-going) 
R Technical study to identify priority opportunities 
These studies would provide the tangible cooperation projects to sustain the 
cooperation and regional institution-building process.  Some initial suggestions of 
the sort of projects which could be considered at this stage are presented in section 
9.4.4, with a more comprehensive list  the Roadmap (Table 18, section 9.7). 
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9.4.3 Financing  
The general options and issues for financing electricity trade were reviewed in 
section 5. Here we briefly highlight the financeability of the electricity trade projects 
with the highest potential within ECO, and indicate the approach that might be 
taken towards their financing. 
The potential new supply options from within the Central Asia region were 
outlined in section 2. Among these, the following generation projects would appear 
to be those most promising for development within the near to medium term: 
R The Sangtuda hydro plant in Tajikistan is being completed by RAO of 
Russia  
R The Ekibastuz coal fired plant in Kazakhstan is owned by AES of the US 
which plans to build new units and rehabilitate the existing plant 
R There is a MOU with Iran to complete works on the Sangtuda II plant, 
primarily for export to Iran 
R The Talimadan gas fired plant in Uzbekistan is under construction and 
completion is expected soon 
R A gas-fired plant could be built on a site already prepared at Bishkek in 
the Kyrgyz Republic, although we are not aware of any developer or 
financing commitment to the project  
The Sangtuda plants would be primarily for export, while the three thermal plants 
would serve some domestic demand but could also provide a significant proportion 
of their output to the export market. Bishkek would be built to meet the current 
peak demand deficit in the Kyrgyz Republic but could also export its surplus 
outside of this period.  
Both RAO and AES have shown an interest in exporting electricity from their 
generation projects to Pakistan81. Funding for Sangtuda II may come in part from an 
Iranian source such as the state-owned utility, following the MOU to export to Iran. 
In each case, additional financing would be required to build transmission capacity 
to bring the output to market. The new transmission options for export from Central 
Asia are essentially to connect the region westwards to Iran, southeast to South Asia 
and possibly eastwards to China. 
Financing is available to the Sangtuda I and Ekibastuz plants from the quasi-private 
sector82. This commitment suggests that these companies are comfortable with the 
risk profile of the projects and are confident that financially viable markets will be 
found for their plants’ output. This in turn suggests that they may also be willing to 
take a financing role in new transmission infrastructure. RAO in particular may 
                                                     
81 The new north-south transmission line in Kazakhstan also opens the opportunity for Sangtuda to 
export to Russia. 
82 RAO, which remains majority owned by the Russian State, might be considered a quasi-private 
investor. 
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have a higher tolerance for political risk and strategic motives for investing in the 
region.  
Financing for a South Asian interconnection would be dependent on mitigating the 
risks discussed in section 3. This would require guarantees from the governments 
involved and international financial institutions and bilateral agencies. The 
commitment of RAO to the region and its interest in finding a sufficient market to 
take its supply suggests that it could be a partner in the financing of such a line. If 
the guarantees were sufficient, a portion of the remaining debt or equity financing 
could be financed by private international financial institutions. A syndicated debt 
structure such as the one used by groups of international financiers for the Nam 
Theun 2 project may be an option.  
Financing for a transmission line to strengthen connections to Iran would be 
dependent on mitigating similar risks83. This option does not currently have the 
attention of the international donor and concessionary lending community. In the 
absence of private sector or external government support, Turkmenistan and Iran 
are financing new transmission from their own public funds. 
9.4.4 Building momentum in ECO’s electricity trade evolution 
It is clear that trade in ECO has to evolve step-by-step from the existing rather 
modest bilateral arrangements, extending transmission systems and drawing in 
other sources of supply, thus encouraging the strengthening of the interconnected 
grid. Initially, risks will be covered primarily by guarantees from the participating 
governments, but wherever possible the more advanced risk mitigation mechanisms 
enumerated in this report should be incorporated into project design and 
implementation.  Once there is experience to build upon from mitigating risks in the 
smaller, bilateral projects, the larger, dedicated export projects (notably the TAP 
project) will in due course come to fruition. 
It has been recommended in section 9.4.2 that a study be commissioned to draw up 
a comprehensive, sequenced set of projects for progressive implementation.  The 
basic constituents for this list are as follows: 
R Intra-regional trade: Small trade expansion projects amongst the Central 
Asia countries based on seasonal complementarities and distribution of 
fuel sources.  This might be based on long-term power purchase 
agreements with government guarantees, but graduating into larger 
projects with joint investments involving private or quasi-private 
entities and attracting external guarantees and support (eg from IFIs).  
Part of this will involve developing mechanisms for equitable sharing of 
the benefits of water usage, an important prerequisite for further 
development of hydropower potential. 
R Coordination centre: Rebuild the role of the United Dispatch Centre in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan.  Initially this could be a coordination centre, 
                                                     
83 A line to Iran could transit Afghanistan, or cross Turkmenistan with associated security issues for 
upstream suppliers 
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similar to the SAPP Coordination Centre, with technical control of the 
synchronised system coming later. 
R Afghanistan: build on existing cross-border trading arrangements with a 
view to strengthening the electricity sector (capacity-building in Afghan 
government and utilities, demonstration of operable projects to  increase 
confidence that Afghanistan can be a reliable transit country etc) 
R West cluster: fostering the relationships being developed between 
Turkmenistan and Iran and Azerbaijan and Iran/Turkey 
R East cluster:  build on the four country TAP project agreement, building 
the role and capacity of the associated working groups. 
9.5 ECO countries – steps towards an enabling framework 
While many of the trade options will inevitably take a long time to come to fruition, 
there is much that ECO governments can do immediately to create an enabling 
environment and be prepared for the type of complex project structures which are 
likely to emerge in due course. The measures suggested below are oriented to pre-
empting concerns about risk and move the agenda of risk mitigation forward in 
parallel with the development of the projects themselves. The steps which ECO 
countries might take in this regard can conveniently be divided into four categories: 
R Improve the investment environment 
R Ensure the electricity sector operates on a commercial, business-oriented 
basis 
R Prepare to negotiate complex projects 
R Participate in strengthening regional institutions 
9.5.1 Investment environment 
As highlighted throughout this report, it would be beneficial to attract investors into 
the electricity sectors of the member countries. The companies interested in 
investing may be private firms but would also be state-owned enterprises wanting 
to have a stake in a project in another country in order to mitigate part of the 
associated risks. The investment environment conditions that are necessary would 
be the same and indeed also apply to stimulating domestic and foreign investment 
in all sectors of the economy. The main elements requiring action to a greater or 
lesser extent by different ECO governments are: 
R Establish a clear, comprehensive legal framework for commercial 
investments 
R Enhance legal guarantees on private property, for example through 
introducing or strengthening provisions in the Constitution 
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R Have an independent central bank and a disciplined national budgetary 
system so as to establish a stable macro-economic environment 
R Permit full currency convertibility or else, stable, predictable 
mechanisms for handling foreign currency 
R Entrench the independence and raise the stature of the judiciary 
R Provide the resources needed for rapid processing of legal disputes 
through the courts and for the enforcement of court or arbitration 
judgments 
R Complement the above with legislation giving a framework for private 
arbitration, including allowing arbitration in other countries with highly 
respected dispute resolution procedures 
R Adopt international dispute settlement procedures, such as ICSID 
arbitration and use these mechanisms to provide precedents 
R Provide adequate resources and incentive structures for the police and 
the military to operate in an efficient, apolitical manner 
R Streamline procedures for domestic and foreign investors to establish 
new businesses or execute major projects 
R In particular, in public private partnership projects in any sector, 
establish fast-track planning and approval procedures.  
9.5.2 Electricity sector 
Improved commercial performance of the domestic power sector in each country is 
an important prerequisite for increased regional trade in electricity. Electricity sector 
entities need to be financially solvent and creditworthy trading partners. The 
electricity sectors should also work towards becoming competitive (which may take 
different forms in different countries84), so that exporters for example would have a 
choice of buyers in destination countries. The evolution of internal trade within the 
countries would provide market signals for exporters. Within the exporting 
countries, there is need to establish stable supply to domestic markets to obviate the 
risk of energy exports being diverted to domestic consumption.  
Many of the countries have already undertaken extensive electricity sector reforms, 
but there is still room in most cases for further progress in the following areas: 
R cost reflective tariffs 
R reduced losses (technical and non-technical) 
                                                     
84 These include different approaches to unbundling and allowing large customers to freely purchase 
their own energy, which can create multiple potential buyers in the sector 
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R reduction or elimination of generalised supply-side subsidies (with 
targeted subsidies for low income consumers) 
R non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid 
R professional regulatory body in place 
It is important that the regulator be as autonomous as possible so as to avoid 
political pressures derailing the intentions of the reforms.  Energy or multi-sector 
regulatory agencies already exist in most ECO countries85. When considering trade 
projects requiring large investment, it is important that there be predictable, stable 
regulation that is even-handed in dealing with domestic and foreign markets in 
both exporting and importing countries. 
9.5.3 Capacity to negotiate complex projects 
An ECO government may seek to enhance the skills base in their country to 
effectively negotiate complex project structures that are likely to emerge as regional 
trade in electricity develops. Major projects would justify the engagement of 
professional transaction advisers, but the government nonetheless requires the skills 
to appreciate what is involved and interact effectively with its advisers. Many of 
these skills would also be applicable in other sectors, providing benefits elsewhere 
in the economy. The requirements cover a range of disciplines including: 
R international and commercial law 
R financing and financial risk management 
R public-private partnership arrangements 
R regulation of delivery of infrastructural services 
R electricity grid expansion and inter-connection/synchronisation of 
existing grids 
R conjunctive operation of generation facilities in large systems with a mix 
of hydro and thermal generation.  
9.5.4 Regional institutions 
As clearly shown in the case studies, the existence of strong regional institutions 
provides a framework for increased trade and the integration of energy and other 
sectors across national boundaries. There are a number of institutions and 
agreements in the ECO region which could be strengthened as apart of a strategic 
move towards future deepening of regional trade and investment in specific sectors. 
This is discussed further in Box 16. 
                                                     
85 Independent energy regulators exist in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan (multi-sector regulator), Pakistan 
(separate electricity and gas regulators) and Turkey. As far as we are aware, independent regulators do 
not yet exist in the other countries. 
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Box 16 Strengthening of ECO agreements to facilitate electricity trade  
 
The Economic Cooperation Organisation was established under the Treaty of Izmir (ECO 
Treaty). The Treaty contains general obligations and principles, and makes provisions for 
Specialised Agencies and Regional Institutions. In this context, the treaty provides the 
framework for the possible establishment of a regional institution in relation to electricity 
trading. 
The ECO Trade Agreement seeks to support the development of trade among the ECO 
member countries. Specifically, its objectives are to: 
foster, support, and boost regional trade based on common principles, and to reinforce 
economic cooperation among ECO Member States through the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers, reduction of tariffs, and exchange of concessions 
It is unlikely that the existing trade agreements could be the sole or primary mechanisms 
for promoting cross-border trade in electricity, since they are general and not specific to 
the particular trade risks. However, it may be possible to amend them to include 
provisions that endorse power trade and transit as a regional policy and extend tax 
exemption and trade restrictions to energy (in a similar way, for example, to NAFTA). 
The crucial function of inter-governmental agreements is to provide a legal basis for the 
implementation of projects. Grounded in this are the procedures, rights and obligations 
for dispute resolution. At present, however, the ECO Treaty does not contain any explicit 
provisions concerning dispute resolution, and there are also no clear legal obligations 
under the Treaty. However, a number of trade-related agreements have been reached 
under ECO, which do allow for dispute resolution that could potentially form a template 
for the development of agreements on electricity trade: 
 The ECO Trade Agreement provides for settlement of disputes between Contracting 
States by the Cooperation Council established under the Agreement, comprising 
representatives of all member states and acting by a two thirds majority.  
 The ECO Transit Transport Framework Agreement includes provision for the 
establishment of a Transit Transport Co-ordination Council (TTCC) to settle disputes 
between state parties. Any dispute not settled through consultation or the TTCC may 
be referred to ad hoc arbitration, to be conducted in accordance with the UNCITRAL 
Rules of Arbitration.  
 
In the electricity sector itself, ECO countries could usefully create regional bodies to 
fulfil a number of different functions: 
R Electricity Forum: An ECO-wide electricity sector forum to share 
experiences.  This might, for example, hold periodic conferences 
involving energy ministries, power utilities, regulators, academics etc. 
R Technical Cooperation Advisory Body: A regional technical body to 
discuss and share experience in solving engineering problems (for 
example issues associated with grid interconnections) 
R Energy-Environment Cooperation Advisory Body: Similar body to deal 
with environmental issues related to regional energy supply and usage 
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R Integrated Water Resource Management Advisory Body: this could be 
part of the energy-environment body, or a separate entity.  Given the 
importance of hydro-power, regional cooperation in water, that takes 
into account environmental flow requirements and all other uses (the 
IWRM approach) is important.  Legal frameworks, such as interstate 
water sharing agreements, may well be required for this86.  
R Energy Regulation Cooperation Advisory Body: Similar body to pool 
experiences and harmonise approaches to energy regulation in the ECO 
region. 
As mentioned in section 9.4.2, the most expedient approach is for these institutions 
to develop in response to the demands arising from executing projects of mutual 
interest.  This concept is developed further in section 9.  ECO can play a facilitating 
role by providing a supportive political framework and more tangible 
encouragement through providing forums for discussion of electricity sector issues. 
9.6 IFIs and bilateral donors  - steps towards a trade-
facilitating environment   
Within the agenda of increasing regional trade in electricity, the most obvious role 
of the IFIs and bilateral donors is in respect of:  
R finance   
R risk mitigation. 
These roles imply providing resources for the identification, appraisal and financing 
of projects, with particular emphasis on elements where donor financing and/or 
guarantees87 can be structured to mitigate specific risks.  
Donors can also, however, usefully assist the ECO countries in many of the areas 
identified above for improving the enabling environment. Specific examples would 
be: 
R assist in establishing a firm legal framework, strengthen the judiciary 
and dispute resolution procedures 
R support the establishment of a PPP framework and supporting 
institutions 
R promote electricity sector reforms, including the establishment of a 
professional, autonomous regulatory agency88 
                                                     
86 The parallel development of hydropower development and water resource management under the 
Nile Basin Initiative (in Africa) provides a relevant example from another region covering 10 countries. 
87 For example, in the form of risk mitigation products for private investors 
88 Where such a regulator does not already exist 
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R provide resources and opportunities for capacity-building in the public 
and private sectors 
R financing studies to identify trade and investment opportunities across 
countries 
R facilitate intergovernmental agreements and the establishment or 
strengthening of regional institutions.  
It is important that IFIs and donors coordinate their efforts among themselves so as 
to make the best use of resources in the region, and avoid the countries incurring 
opportunity costs in dealing with overlaps in donor efforts and the time-consuming 
processes that are often involved. 
9.7 Conclusions on development of ECO electricity trade 
This section has summarised the role that each country can play in the development 
of electricity trade both within the region and exports from the region. These 
opportunities were captured in Table 16 and Table 17 which highlighted the sub-
regional nature of the West and East clusters, as well as the different roles that each 
country might have as importer, exporter, transit or market-integrating country. The 
immediate prospects within ECO are for the strengthening of intra-regional trade 
within the CAR and of increased seasonal and base exports from both the west and 
east cluster exporters to Iran and Turkey.  Kazakhstan will be well placed to export 
to Russia and China once the North-South interconnector has been completed.  
Large-scale export projects from the west cluster countries to Iran and Turkey and 
from the east cluster to Pakistan will require the construction of new 500 kV 
transmission lines through Afghanistan. Such projects are longer term both because 
of the long lead times involved and the current security situation in Afghanistan. 
The evolution of electricity trade will be facilitated by the ECO countries, with the 
support of the IFIs and bilateral donors, working on strengthening the enabling 
environment for trade. The main areas on which the ECO countries can start work 
now are: 
R improving the investment climate - macro-economic conditions, legal 
framework, property rights etc 
R reinforcing the commercial basis of the electricity sector in each country, 
so that local utilities are creditworthy partners for trade projects 
R strengthening regional institutions, including creating new entities in 
the electricity sector to foster technical, environmental and regulation 
cooperation in the electricity sector 
R implementing joint projects ranging from studies to major infrastructure 
investments. It is in response to the requirements of working on joint 
projects that the regional institutions will develop.   
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A necessary first step that is required is for ECO countries to agree on a pipeline of 
regional projects which can be progressively implemented. In this regard, we 
recommend that a prioritisation study be commissioned to accompany the existing 
study on interconnections.  The two studies are: 
R Technical Study Electricity Interconnections among ECO Countries (on-going 
study) 
R Technical study to identify priority opportunities (recommended study) 
The essence of our conclusions is that the way forward for ECO is to start with 
extensions to existing arrangements, building confidence and perceptions of shared 
gains by undertaking progressively more complex and ambitious projects.  The 
regional institutions will develop in tandem – a ‘bottom up’ rather than ‘top-down’ 
approach.  Based on this approach,  Table 18 presents a roadmap of actions for ECO 
countries to work towards realising the potential of electricity trade.  The table seeks 
both to summarise in convenient form previous recommendations and to make 
these more concrete. 
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Table 18  Roadmap for the Development of Electricity Trade in ECO 
Task Objective/Country Means/Project Period
1 Attractive investment environment Comprehensive legal framework for commercial investments on-going
Enhance legal guarantees on private property
Independent central bank and sound fiscal policies
Full currency convertibility or stable, predictable forex mechanisms
Independent, well respected judiciary
Rapid processing of legal disputes & enforcement of judgments
Framework for private arbitration
Adoption and use of international dispute settlement procedures
Police and the military operate in an efficient, apolitical manner
Streamlined procedures for domestic and foreign investors
Fast track planning & approval process for PPPs
2 Well-functioning electricity sectors Cost reflective tariffs on-going
Reduced losses (technical and non-technical)
Reduction or elimination of generalised supply-side subsidies
Non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid
3 Skills available to negotiate complex projects International and commercial law on-going
Financing and financial risk management
Public-private partnership arrangements
Regulation of delivery of infrastructural services
Grid expansion and inter-connection/synchronisation of existing grids
Conjunctive operation of generation facilities with mix of hydro and thermal 
1 Studies to prepare for enhanced trade Electricity interconnections among ECO countries on-going
Technical study to identify priority opportunities short-term
2 Strong regional institutions ECO Electricity Form short-term
Coordination  Centre - start rebuilding role of UDC in Tashkent short-term
Strengthen ECO agreements to facilitate electricity trade short-term
Expand membership of Energy Charter Treaty short-term
Technical Cooperation Advisory Body medium-term
Energy-environment Cooperation Advisory Body medium-term
IWRM Advisory Body medium-term
Energy Regulation Cooperation Advisory Body medium-term
1 Kazakhstan Ekibastuz 2 x 500 MW (AES of USA) short-term
Increased exports to neighbours
Exports to Russia and China
2 Uzbekistan Talimardjan 800 MW short-term
subsequent phases: 3 x 800 MW
Exports to neighbours as pre-cursor to large-scale exports to Pakistan 
3 Kyrgyz Republic Bishkek II 400 MW medium-term
Primarily to meet domestic peak, but potential for seasonal exports
4 Tajikistan Sanguta I & II (RAO of Russia & Iran) and Rogan I and II (3,070 MW) short-term
Seasonal and base load exports to neighbours
Massive capacity for export to Pakistan and elsewhere
5 Azerbaijan Energy corridor between Russia and Iran via Azerbaijan medium-term
Electricity sector trade opportunities
6 Turkmenistan-Iran Third 400 kV line being planned short-term
Swap arrangements to transit through Iran to Turkey & other markets
7 Tajikistan-Afghanistan Transmission line from Sangtuda (Tajikistan) to Afghanistan (220 kV, ADB) short-term
Small exports to Afghanistan, but pre-cursor to major exports to other markets
Opportunity to build-up weak but crucial electricity sector in Afghanistan.
8 TAP project Cooperation via working groups formed under 2006 inter-govt Agreement short-term
Detailed technical & economic appraisal of alternative transmission routes medium-term
Design, legal agreements, construction etc long-term
Creating national environments encouraging trade in electricity
Building on specific projects to maintain the momentum of regional cooperation in electricity
Regional initiatives to encourage growth in electricity trade
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A1 Further details of international case studies 
A1.1 SIEPAC 
A1.1.1 Market backgrounds 
Market reform in the region has progressed at varying speeds among the six 
countries. In 1990, Costa Rica was the first to move away from the state-owned 
vertically integrated utility model to a single buyer model, followed by Guatemala 
in 1991. By 1996 all six countries had moved to the single buyer model and in that 
year Guatemala implemented regulated wholesale competition (a cost-based pool). 
Nicaragua and Panama introduced reform toward wholesale competition in the 
second half of the 1990s and in 1996 El Salvador passed a law to begin the 
implementation of retail competition.  
Costa Rica and Honduras are at less advanced stages of market development. These 
countries to operate centrally planned systems with the private sector involved 
through PPAs.  
A1.1.2 Transmission pricing  
Prior to 2002, wheeling charges were agreed among the country level transmission 
operators in the southern group (Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama) for 
transmission across the transit countries (Nicaragua, Costa Rica). A working group 
was established at the regional level to set the wheeling charges for different market 
conditions. Charges were determined as the difference between the short-run costs 
of energy in the supplying and receiving systems. This system evolved into the 
variable transmission charge (CVT) used in the transitional market. 
The transitional market developed a day-ahead dispatch with hourly nodal prices. 
Transmission costs were based on the principles used in the southern group 
wheeling charges. Nodal prices were based on energy only bids and offers and bids 
for transmission services. Charges for transmission continued to be calculated on 
the basis of CVTs with an additional toll for using the tie-lines. A regional 
optimisation was performed to determine the nodal prices for each half hour.  
Generators supplying firm contracts must have sufficient capacity available to meet 
the contract and corresponding firm transmission rights. If these conditions are not 
met CRIE has the authority to impose penalties on the generator (this will be in 
addition to reputational damage in the market).  
A1.1.3 Institutional structure 
The temporary institutions created to oversee the design and implementation of the 
MER include: 
R Group Director, consisting of a representative of each government, 
oversees implementation of the project (issuing directives, and holding 
meetings on a quarterly basis  
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R Committee on Programming and Evaluation (CPE), consisting of two 
representatives of the electricity sector from each country. The 
Committee advises on the institutional and technical aspects of the 
design of the MER. It is also a supervisory body and provides 
independent evaluation of the project  
R Execution unit, consisting of a full-time manager and two experts. This 
is financed from technical assistance 
R Advisory Group, made up of individual consultants with experience in 
international market design. The Advisory Group provides assistance to 
the Group Director, CPE and Execution Unit on market design issues 
including regulation, administration, structure, operation and 
development. 
A1.1.4 Institutions and agreements supporting trade in the region 
The countries of Central America have a long history of cooperation and projects 
aimed at increasing coordination.  
The Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) is a regional initiative to promote economic 
integration and cooperation among the seven Central American countries 
(including Belize) and Mexico. It brings together a number of initiatives that had 
been developed independently under a single organised programme. The SIEPAC 
project is included as one of 17 specific projects in eight areas being pursued under 
the Plan.  
The PPP was initiated by the government of Mexico, the largest country and 
politically and economically in the group, and by the Secretariat for Central 
American Integration (“SICA”). It is supported by the IADB and other IFIs 
including the World Bank.  
Regional trade is also likely to be enhanced by the Free Trade Agreement between 
the U.S. and Central America (CAFTA), discussions began in 2002 and the signed 
into US law in 2005. CAFTA includes a common legal framework for dispute 
resolution and for the management of direct foreign investment.  
A1.2 Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP)  
The history of the development of power trade within Southern Africa stretches 
back as far as 1906 when the Victoria Falls Power Company was registered in 
Southern Rhodesia “to harness the Victoria Falls and supply electricity to the 
mining industry on the Witwatersrand" in South Africa. At that time, the technology 
to transmit power over long distances did not exist, and the transmission of power 
from the Zambezi to the Witwatersrand had to wait until the 1970s, when Cahora 
Bassa was built. 
Coal-fired power stations make up most of South Africa’s installed capacity of 
42,000 MW. Despite sophisticated abatement efforts, the region where most of these 
plants are located is severely polluted. The country has very limited hydropower 
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resources. There is one nuclear plant which caused considerable consternation when 
it was constructed during the apartheid era.  
The prime target for hydro development in SAPP is a unique site on the Congo 
River, called Inga. This has 40,000 MW of hydro potential in a setting where 
virtually no civil engineering works would be required and where the 
environmental impact would be minimal. At present, only 2,468 MW have been 
installed. 
A1.2.1 History of grid interconnection in the region 
The first significant grid interconnection was a joint project between what are now 
Zambia and Zimbabwe on the Zambezi River, involving the construction of the 
Kariba Dam and 1,320 MW power station complex (1955-59) and the installation of 
330 kV power lines providing a high voltage backbone to the electricity systems of 
the two countries. The power system of the DRC was later interlinked via a 220 kV 
220 MW line from Lubumbashi to the Zambian copperbelt. Further south, the grids 
of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia were developed as off-shoots of the 
South African grid. 
In the late 1960s, the Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique began 
investigations into the development of a major power complex downstream of 
Kariba, at Cahora Bassa on the Zambezi. The only market large enough for the 
proposed 2,075 MW station was South Africa. Eskom and other South African 
companies were heavily involved in the planning and execution of the project, 
which was completed over the period 1974-79. By that time, Mozambique was 
embroiled in a civil war and the 1,360 km direct current (DC) power line was put 
out of operation by sabotage attacks. The line was eventually only restored to full 
operation in 1998. 
Another significant transmission investment was the building of 400 kV 1,000 MW 
transmission lines from South Africa through Swaziland to Mozambique in order to 
supply the alumina smelting project MOZAL. To plan, execute and operate this 
project a joint venture transmission company MOTRACO, was formed in 1998. With 
all of the raw material being imported, the MOZAL project involves toll refining. 
What is being exported is the cheap electricity which South Africa and Mozambique 
are able to supply. At the time the MOZAL project was commissioned, the SAPP 
region had excess electricity generation capacity. That slack has since been taken up 
by growth in demand, and the region now faces shortages.  
A1.2.2 Trade in Electricity 
Over the period 1997-2001, a research project carried out by SAPP with assistance 
from Purdue University developed models to demonstrate the potential for trade in 
electricity in southern Africa. Short-term and long-term models of the 
interconnected system were developed and scenarios developed of different ways of 
meeting projected energy demand. These ranged from non-cooperative solutions, to 
full regional integration with a single market and a single system operator. 
Intermediate solutions were obtained by introducing “autonomy factor” constraints 
(either on the extent to which energy needs had to be met domestically – a more 
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demanding requirement – or on the proportion of peak demand which had to be 
backed by domestic capacity)89. 
As power pool theory predicts, the results showed that there were gains from trade 
in the short run, but much larger gains to be obtained in the long run from co-
ordinating electricity investments.   
A1.2.3 STEM 
The Short Term Energy Market (STEM) arranges trade of firm energy demands and 
offers on an hourly basis for next day trade, or for the establishment of weekly or 
monthly contracts. Bids and offers are made via an internet platform. The 
Coordination Centre checks capacity on the interconnect transmission lines, 
matches demands and offers, and confirms the successful contracts. It also publishes 
(within 4 hours of the initial 10:30 am cut-off) a ‘bulletin board’ giving details of all 
the demands and offers made. This results in trade being expanded on a bilateral 
basis in a ‘post-STEM’ market which typically accounts for 30% of the short-term 
energy traded. 
When considering bids, precedence is given to established bi-lateral contracts. 
Irrespective of actual power flows in the system, wheeling charges in STEM 
contracts are set on the basis of assumed nominal wheeling routes, with the 
wheeling charges being shared equally amongst the countries lying on the assumed 
wheeling path.  
Demand in the STEM market rose from 766 GWh in 2001 to 4,222 GWh in 2004, 
while supply was around 2,550 GWh and lower than this in 2005 when some 
utilities withdrew from STEM in order to rehabilitate equipment. Energy traded 
was far lower, however, with a peak of 842 GWh in 2002 which dropped to 
178 GWh in 2005. The fact that demand and offered supply in the STEM market is 
always multiples of the level of trade that is reached indicates that the market is by 
no means efficient. Some of the reasons for this are that the main bilateral 
agreements, which take precedence, reduce flexibility and that the trades are struck 
on the basis of nominal conditions on the system.   
A1.2.4 Risks 
The inoperability of the line for 17 years is somewhat ironic because when it was 
built a longer route through Mozambique territory was chosen over a more direct 
route through Rhodesia, which at that time was considered insecure due to the 
liberation war which was intensifying during the 1970s. Had the line gone through 
what is now Zimbabwe, it would have had a much better chance of providing 
supply during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Since the self-inflicted economic crisis which began around the year 2000, 
Zimbabwe has had increasing difficulty in making payments to Eskom and HCB for 
electricity imports. However, despite periods of non-payment, the external 
suppliers have continued to provide electricity, this being remarkable testimony to 
                                                     
89 See F T Sparrow and B Bowen (2001) Modelling Electricity Trade in Southern Africa  Year 3 Final 
Report, Purdue. 
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the security of regional arrangements. Due to political reasons, the blackouts and 
load shedding experienced by Zimbabwean consumers since 2000 have been largely 
due to failures to operate internal generating capacity efficiently. Problems at the 
power stations are related to foreign currency shortages, lack of diesel and coal, and 
postponed maintenance. By mid 2006, the largest power station at Hwange, with a 
nameplate capacity of 960 MW, was operating at only 480 MW90. 
Exchange rate risk 
The example of exchange rate risk mentioned in section [ ] relates to the Cahora 
Bassa project. The original Eskom-HCB contract was specified in the South African 
currency (Rand) while much of the debt that was incurred was in hard currencies. 
At the end of the long period when there were zero revenues because of the 
sabotage of the DC transmission line, the agreed price in USc/kWh terms was 
derisory. A protracted negotiation was required before a tariff which HCB could 
live with was agreed and power flows to South Africa could resume. 
Simplistic wheeling charging formulae 
The project which has been particularly prejudiced by the approach taken to 
wheeling charging is the Kudu gas project, off the coast of Namibia. If electricity 
were to be exported from Kudu to say Zimbabwe, the nominal route would be via 
the Cape and right up through the whole extent of South Africa and the Mathimba 
link across Botswana (see map, Figure 21). The simple formulae would thus result in 
a prohibitive wheeling charge. In practice, the export of power from Kudu to 
Zimbabwe would be done via offsets, and total wheeling costs incurred might 
actually be less than they were before the project comes of stream. The savings in 
this case would be through the Cape Peninsula being supplied from Kudu, rather 
than having power being expensively wheeled from Eskom plants in northern 
South Africa. The offset amount would be sent to Zimbabwe over a relatively short 
wheeling distance.  
 
                                                     
90 S Mangwengwende (2006) Ensuring Long Term Energy Security – A Zimbabwean Perspective 
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A2 The Energy Charter Treaty 
A2.1 Main provisions of the Treaty 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) of (date) was the first binding multilateral investor 
protection treaty, to cover  investment and trade and the first to apply transit rules 
to energy networks. It was also one of the first investor protection treaties to 
provide binding  international dispute settlement, between State parties and 
between States and non-States. The Contracting Parties (the 'CPs') to the ECT 
include some of the ECO countries91. 
A2.1.1 Investment 
The ECT contains provisions for the protection, promotion and treatment of foreign 
direct investments in the energy sector, including protections against 
discrimination, expropriation, losses resulting from strife, transfer, restrictions and 
breach of individual investment contracts. 
The key provisions concerning investment require Contracting Parties: 
R encourage and create 'equitable, favourable and transparent conditions 
for Investors to make investments'... 
R to accord 'fair and equitable treatment' and no discriminatory measures. 
R To afford treatment regarding existing Investments which is no less 
favourable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors 
of another Contracting Party. 
R To observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or in 
relation to an Investment of an Investor who is a national of or of any 
other Contracting Party.   
                                                     
91 The full list of current parties is - Albania, Armenia, Austria, Australia*, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus*, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, European Communities, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland*, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway*, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation*, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, United Kingdom.  * - denotes state in which ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty 
is still pending 
Observer States: Afghanistan**, Algeria, Bahrain, People’s Republic of China, Canada**, 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan**, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro**, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United States 
of America**, Venezuela. ** - denotes observer state which has signed the 1991 Energy Charter 
Declaration  
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In relation to New Investments (Pre-investment) (ie the phase of making 
investments and the issue of access conditions), the ECT only provides a soft 
regime. Each party must endeavour to accord to Investors of each Contracting Party's 
the protections set out above. 
A2.1.2 Trade 
The ECT contains provisions relating to trade in energy, which generally reflect the 
rules of GATT -  (that is, the principle of non-discriminatory trade rules to energy & 
materials (but the ECT does not include a tariff standstill) and freedom of transit.) 
To be protected under the treaty, the product needs to originate or terminate in a 
signatory country.  
A2.1.3 Transit  
The ECT obliges CPs to facilitate energy transit on a non-discriminatory basis. The 
treaty  explicitly covers grid-bound energy transport. All government approvals in 
relation to transit are required to be on commercial terms. 
In addition, the ECT provides (Article 7 (4)) that if energy cannot otherwise be 
transported, a CP cannot stop new transit facilities being built on its territory and is 
bound to not place obstacles in the way of new establishments, except as provided 
in applicable, consistent legislation. The only exception is where the State can 
demonstrate that to do so would endanger the security or efficiency of its energy 
systems. 
However, the ECT does not oblige CPs to grant third party access. The ECT's 
existing provisions are intended to be supplemented, extended and modified by a 
legally binding Transit Protocol that is currently being negotiated. A transit protocol 
is currently being developed which is intended to address the following issues: 
R Binding obligations for CPs to prevent unlawful taking of energy in 
transit 
R ensuring that access to available transit capacity is allocated on a non-
discriminatory basis 
R transparent criteria for setting transit tariffs 
The ECT has developed non-legally binding model agreements (both inter-
government agreements and agreements between host governments and private 
companies) as guidelines for individual energy transit projects which is to be 
amended. 
A2.2 Dispute Resolution 
The ECT includes several international dispute resolution mechanisms. The two 
basic forms of binding dispute settlement are: 
R State -state arbitration for basically all disputes arising under the ECT 
(Article 27); 
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R Investor-state arbitration for investment disputes only (Article 26).  
R Special provisions have been developed for the resolution of inter-state 
disputes in the area of trade (Article 29, Annex D) and transit (Article 7). 
These derogate from the otherwise applicable provisions on state-to-
state dispute settlement.   
A2.2.1 Investment Disputes 
Investor-to-State disputes 
The ECT grants foreign investors the right to sue the host country in the case of "an 
alleged breach of an obligation of the host State under Part III of the Treaty", ie the 
provisions relating to investment promotion and protection. This Article does not 
apply to other disputes in which a foreign investor might be involved. 
Key features of the investor-state dispute resolution procedures include: 
R Requirement for a period of three months for consultations . 
R If consultations/negotiations fail, the foreign investor has three options 
as to where to submit the dispute for resolution (Article 26(2)): 
R To domestic courts or administrative tribunals of the host state to 
the dispute; 
R To any applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement 
procedure, eg an arrangement under bilateral investment treaties; 
R To international arbitration. 
R International arbitration - If foreign investors choose to submit a dispute 
to international arbitration, they have the choice between the following 
arbitration procedures: 
R The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, Washington, D.C., established by the ICSID Convention 
of 1965. This option is available if both them home state of the 
investor and the host state are parties to the ICSID Convention. 
Alternatively, the foreign investor may invoke the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules for the Administration of Proceedings by 
the Centre.  
R A sole arbitrator or an ad hoc arbitration tribunal established 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules: or 
R The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. 
R State consent to international arbitration - Under the ECT (Article 26(3)(a), 
each CP gives its unconditional consent to the submission of a dispute to 
international arbitration.   
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States may make two types of limited reservation - (i) to exclude 
disputes already submitted by the investor to a competent forum, (ii) to 
exclude claims under specific contracts made between the defendant 
State and the investor (this reservation had to be made at time of 
entering the Treaty, and therefore only applies to those countries listed 
in the relevant Annex). 
The ECT includes an express requirement that sub-national authorities 
adhere to the provisions of the ECT.  
R Applicable law and finality of awards  - The dispute shall be decided in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the rules and 
principles of international law (Article 26(6)). The award is binding and 
final. 
It is important to note that – these provisions only apply to disputes relating to the 
specific investment obligations of a State under the ECT. The ECT does not create a 
framework for resolving disputes between a private party and a State concerning 
trade or transit issues. These provisions also do not concern disputes arising under 
contracts, even with a State, that concern matters other than those specifically set 
out in the investment protection provisions of the ECT.  
State-to-State disputes 
Article 27 of the ECT provides for inter-state arbitration. The scope of inter-state 
disputes is not limited to investment disputes but applied to the application and 
interpretation of the Treaty as a whole - with very limited exceptions. After 
exhausting attempts to settle them amicably, disputes have to be submitted to an ad 
hoc arbitration tribunal, under the rules of UNCITRAL, unless there is an agreement 
to the contrary between the CPs party to the dispute. 
International arbitration is not available in the following cases: 
R Application or interpretation of competition and environmental issues 
(Articles 6 and 19); 
R Observance of obligations under an individual investment contract 
against states listed in Annex IA; 
R Application or interpretation of trade related matters (Articles 29) or 
trade-related investment matters (Article 5) unless both parties to the 
dispute agree otherwise. 
The tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the Treaty and applicable 
rules and principles of international law. The arbitral award shall be final and 
binding. Unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise, the tribunal shall sit in 
the Hague, and use the premises and facilities of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration. 
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A2.2.2 Trade Disputes  
In the case of disputes concerning the trade provisions The Treaty provides for a 
dispute resolution mechanism that is based on the GATT/WTO panel model, with 
disputes submitted to the appropriate WTO forum. It applies only in cases where at 
least one of the disputing parties is not a member of the WTO. The ECT therefore 
makes a GATT/WTO-like dispute settlement system available although not all 
parties to the dispute are GATT/WTO members. 
However, a Contracting Party or an investor do also have the right to submit a 
trade-related dispute (including a dispute on trade-related investment matters 
(TRIMs)) to arbitration under Article 27, provided that they both agree.  
The ECT provisions do not apply to any dispute that under an agreement among 
States that were constituent parts of the former Soviet Union. 
A2.2.3 Transit Disputes  
The ECT gives CPs the possibility to invoke a conciliation mechanism concerning 
transit disputes, through the Secretary-General of the ECT Secretariat who shall 
consult with the interested parties and appoint a conciliator within 30 days. If the 
conciliator fails to secure an agreement within ninety days, he/she shall recommend 
a resolution or a procedure to achieve such resolution, and shall decide the interim 
tariffs and other terms and conditions to be observed until the dispute is resolved. 
The conciliation procedures may only be invoked after exhaustion of all other 
dispute resolution remedies previously agreed between the CPs or entities 
concerned. 
The ECT ensures continuity of supply during a transit dispute by providing that a 
State may not interrupt (or permit any entity to interrupt) the flow of energy prior 
to the conclusion of the conciliation mechanism. There are only two exceptions to 
this prohibition: where this is specially permitted in the original contract or 
agreement or allowed by the conciliator appointed to seek to resolve the dispute. 
A2.3 Application to ECO electricity trading arrangements 
and risk management 
The ECT provides a framework to address overriding issues of state responsibility 
concerning investment and transit matters. It is not, of itself, a mechanism for 
addressing the operation of a market, whether based on a standardized system of 
bilateral contracts, or a tight or loose trading pool. 
Similarly, its dispute resolution procedures are specifically limited to disputes 
between States and disputes between a State and an investor who is a national of 
another contracting State. 
The dispute mechanics between investor and State are limited to disputes 
concerning specific treaty obligations.  
The provisions do not set out a mechanic for binding arbitration between two 
entities trading or operating in the market, and in such dispute, where neither party 
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can be considered to be a State actor, or their actions attributable to a State actor, the 
ICSID procedure will not be available. However, the provisions for arbitration 
under either UNCITRAL or the Stockholm arbitration tribunal could be adopted in 
a regional agreement for the ECO regions. 
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A3 UCTE reserves definition and use 
This annex discusses the UCTE definitions of operating reserves and their use 
within a synchronised area, including the relationship between reserves and energy 
used for balancing (in a balancing market or pool). The key reference is the UCTE 
Operation Handbook: www.ucte.org/ohb. 
Reserve and balancing energy are used in different ways in different balancing 
markets, but a typical system control / dispatch hierarchy is:  
primary reserves 
secondary reserves 
balancing energy tertiary reserves 
 
The annex also briefly discusses how reserves are procured by system operators and 
the payment methods. 
Dispatch and system operation  
Fast response is provided within seconds of a system frequency deviation by 
primary reserve. Secondary reserve capacity is dispatched to release primary 
reserve capacity. Tertiary reserve capacity is dispatched to release secondary reserve 
capacity. Balancing energy is dispatched in parallel with tertiary reserves on an 
economic basis. This means that the tertiary reserves need to be included along with 
balancing energy in one single bid stack92.  
The table below shows the UCTE definitions of reserves, how they are controlled 
and used.  
Table 19  Reserves – UCTE definitions 
Control  Purpose  Type  Using  Applied by/ to  Over 
periods of 
Primary maintain balance between 
generation and demand in 
the network  
decentralised, 
automatic  
turbine 
speed 
governors  
adjusting the 
generator output of a 
unit as a consequence 
of a frequency 
deviation/offset in the 
synchronous area  
seconds  
                                                     
92 Markets co-optimising all energy and reserves would place all categories of reserve in a single price 
stack 
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Control  Purpose  Type  Using  Applied by/ to  Over 
periods of 
Second-
ary  
regulate the generation in a 
control area based on 
secondary control reserves 
to:  
• maintain interchange 
power flow at the control 
program with all other 
control areas  
• to restore frequency in 
case of a frequency 
deviation originated in the 
control area to its set value 
in order to free the capacity 
engaged by the primary 
control  
centralised, 
automatic  
network 
characteristic 
method  
selected generator sets 
in the power plants 
comprising this 
control loop  
minutes  
Tertiary  restore an adequate 
secondary control reserve at 
the right time  
manual (or 
automatic)  
generators  changing the working 
points  
15 minute 
Source: UCTE Operation Handbook 
In the discussion of reserves, the procurement and provision of the reserve capacity 
and energy is distinguished from the payment for primary and secondary reserve 
services.  
Provision and procurement of primary and secondary reserves  
Primary reserves are procured either under regulated arrangements or 
competitively via tenders or auctions. The price structure may include a capacity 
payment only, or capacity and energy. Primary reserve energy is expected to be net 
zero in each settlement period, so does not need to be netted out from balancing 
energy.  
Secondary reserves are procured either under regulated arrangements or 
competitively via tenders or auctions. The price structure should include a capacity 
(availability) payment and an energy payment. The response of a generator to a 
secondary reserve control signal from the centralised, automatic control system in 
the dispatch centre will not cause the generator to have a financial imbalance in the 
balancing market because the energy in question (whether positive or negative) was 
generated under a secondary reserve contract.  
Payment for primary and secondary reserves  
Payment for reserve in an integrated or single buyer market is generally included in 
other Use of System charges proportionately to all system users, not apportioned to 
individual users (who may have caused part of the need for use of reserve). 
However, pools or balancing markets within synchronised areas aim to apportion 
the cost of reserve to the ‘causer’. This leads to the need for rules on how to detect 
cause and allocate costs. 
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Primary reserve ancillary services have the following characteristics:  
R all parties benefit proportionately from them  
R primary reserve energy is net zero over the course of a market 
settlement period (hour)  
R no parties can be considered to have ‘caused’ the need for primary 
reserve energy  
R no party would be in a position to respond (in real time) to any price 
signals relating to primary reserve  
Therefore, the cost of providing primary reserve services should be added to the 
other costs allocated to the Use of System charge and allocated proportionately to all 
network users.  
Secondary reserve ancillary services have the following characteristics:  
R all parties benefit proportionately from them  
R secondary reserve energy may not necessarily be net zero over the 
course of a market settlement period (hour), but should be net zero over 
the course of an invoice period (month)  
R if a party has ‘caused’ the need for secondary energy, that party will 
experience a financial imbalance in the market 
R the need for secondary energy tends to be random, rather than 
predictable and hence it is not appropriate to send price signals to all 
balancing market participants, which would increase the volatility of 
balancing market prices without any benefit to the system or the 
participants.  
Therefore, the cost of providing secondary reserve services could be added to the 
other costs allocated to the Use of System charge and allocated proportionately to all 
users. 
Tertiary reserve 
According to the dispatch hierarchy above, tertiary reserves are dispatched in 
parallel with balancing energy and on a least cost (lowest bid price) basis. The cost 
of providing tertiary reserve may therefore be recovered from payments for 
imbalances by parties who have an imbalance in each settlement period. 
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A4 Terms of Reference 
Terms of Reference 
for 
Trading Arrangement and Risk Management in International Electricity Trade  
(a policy paper for Regional Electricity Trade) 
 
B.  Objectives 
1. The objectives of this study are to:  
 describe good practices in international electricity trading arrangements -- with 
particular attention to risk management and involvement of private sector – as a 
function of the level of integration of the electricity markets involved in the 
trading; the potential for electricity (and energy trade); and the prevailing 
institutional, legal, policy, and commercial environment; 
 advise the ECO region and its member countries on the optimal approach to 
increased cooperation and trading in the electricity sectors in terms of the form 
of the trading arrangements; institutional organization; policy and regulatory 
environment; risk management; investment strategies; etc., and how these 
arrangements could evolve over time.  
2. The information and recommendations of the study should be useful to the policy 
makers at the regional level as well as at the level of member states, both in pursuing region-
wide initiatives and in negotiating specific trading and investment deals, such as, eg, export 
of electricity from Central Asia to South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), as well as others.  
C.  The Scope of Work 
3. The work would address the following issues: 
4. International electricity trading arrangements. International electricity trade 
takes place in a number of ways, some of which are (the list is illustrative rather than 
complete):  
 opportunistic, ad-hoc short term bilateral exchanges of surpluses between 
national utilities across national borders, on pre-determined or ad-hoc agreed 
terms; 
  long-term contracts for bulk supply, often from dedicated power plant(s), from 
one country to another country (or countries), frequently conducted in island 
mode93;  
 integrated multi-country markets (such as NordPool, or South Africa Power 
Pool).  
                                                     
93  One power system is said to be connected to another in an “island mode” if a part of that power 
system is disconnected from its native system and connected to the other one with which it then 
operates synchronously (ie, with the same system frequency).  
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5. Such trading arrangements differ in their institutional, regulatory, organizational, 
technical and commercial dimensions, as well as in the constraints and potential benefits 
which they offer to the participants. Generally, the complexity of the arrangements increases 
as the level of integration increases, but so do the benefits.  
6. The consultant will review and describe the alternative international electricity 
trading arrangements and their attendant features (technical, commercial, organizational, 
institutional, regulatory, etc.). The review should include description of the possible 
evolution of the international electricity trading arrangements from the simpler ones (eg, 
bilateral cross border trade) toward the more integrated ones.  
7. Risks and risk mitigation in international electricity trade and investments. 
International electricity trading projects94 include a number of stakeholders such as: sellers 
and buyers, project sponsors/investors (which could be private and public, domestic and 
foreign); project companies; host governments; national utilities and regulators; off-takers; 
affectees; lenders and insurers (commercial and International Financing Institutions); 
construction contractors; non-governmental organizations; general public, etc. The project 
risks include (the list is illustrative rather than complete): availability of electricity (supply 
risk); availability of demand (demand/market risks); price and payments; exchange rate; 
profit repatriation; construction risks (costs overruns, completion schedule, technology risks, 
….); uncertainties in environmental and social impact; financing; fuel supply risks (or 
hydrology risk for hydropower plants); access to the facilities (production, transmission, 
consumer,…); political or natural events (political disturbance, sabotage, terrorism, flood, 
earthquakes, other natural events, etc.); developments which may affect the project (eg, 
construction of an upstream hydropower plant in case of hydropower); other legal, 
regulatory, and policy risks (eg labor laws, electricity market structure and regulation, 
natural resource laws, commercial laws, …); etc. Some of the risks are of the same or similar 
nature as for the projects limited to a single country; however, international projects may 
introduce new risks or give a different dimension to the shared ones. 
8. The study will take into account the fact that risk mitigation arrangements depend on 
the legal, policy, regulatory, institutional, and commercial environment, and vice versa – the 
latter could be designed so as to facilitate risk mitigation.  
9. The study will describe how risks are managed -- identified, assessed, allocated, and 
mitigated -- in international electricity trade projects; how the associated contractual and 
institutional framework documents are designed as a function of the trading arrangements 
between and within the relevant markets involved in the trade; and how the projects are 
structured to mitigate the risks. The study will describe the main elements of project 
arrangements and associated contractual and framework documents. The study will address 
all important risks, with a particular focus on those specific to international electricity 
investment and trade projects, bilateral and multilateral. The study will recommend options 
for structuring international electricity projects in the ECO region, including – as a special 
case study – electricity exports from Central Asia (Tajikistan, in the first place) to South 
Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan). The issues pertinent to this case are described in 
Attachment 1 to the ToR. 
                                                     
94  The "projects" discussed here include both  physical investment projects with accompanying 
trading arrangements and "pure" trading deals of buying and selling electricity without physical 
investments involved. Clearly, not all the aspects mentioned throughout the text apply equally to the 
both types of the "projects". 
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10. The study will describe a typical set of legal documents for an international 
investment project in the electricity sector and what they cover (such as, eg, concession 
agreements between the government(s) and developer(s); transit agreement (if electricity is 
to transit a third country); shareholder agreements between the shareholders; power purchase 
agreements; operating agreements; guarantee agreements; construction contracts; etc. – this 
list is not exhaustive and depends on the overall framework for trade – bilateral or 
multilateral, or in a more integrated regional market, with or without an inter-governmental 
framework agreement, etc.). 
11. Role of the public and private sectors and options for financing. The study will 
examine the role of the public and private sectors and options for public-private partnerships 
promoting regional electricity trade and investment, from creating appropriate enabling 
environment to undertaking specific projects, and how such partnership could accelerate 
advance the trade through appropriate incentives and sharing of benefits and risks.  Elements 
of such partnership could include inter-governmental framework agreements with 
appropriate institutional arrangements which would enable private sectors to finance 
investment projects and enter into commercial contracts. The governments could also play a 
significant role at the project level, especially in such aspects as mitigating environmental 
and social impact, guaranteeing performance of national utilities or national regulation, 
providing concession for development of a resource, etc. 
12. Options for financing international electricity projects. The study will describe 
options for financing international electricity trade and investment projects, in the context of 
risks mitigation strategies (this, including financial risk mitigation instruments), and the role 
which private sector can play. The study will focus on the options which could be of 
particular interest in the ECO region context.   
13. International experience. The study will present best practice in international 
experience for the issues examined, illustrated with specific cases of particular relevance to 
the ECO region. Presentation of the cases should include an overview of the physical trade 
and a description of policy, institutional, regulatory and technical arrangements and their 
evolution over time. 
14. Opportunities and constraints. The study will describe the main opportunities for 
increased electricity trade in the ECO region, including the existing generation surpluses, as 
well as the potential for new investments. The study will then describe the main constraints 
to realizing those opportunities, and propose a set of policy, institutional, and regulatory 
measures for overcoming the constraints. 
15. Recommendation. Based on the review, the consultant will: 
• Describe a possible evolution of increased electricity trade in the ECO region, 
on the basis of international experience and the specifics of the region; 
• Propose measure which needs to be taken in the policy, institutional, and 
regulatory areas to enable and promote increased regional electricity trade and 
investment on the basis of economic criteria and associated risks; 
• Propose a roadmap for the region, including organizational forums to discuss 
and promote regional electricity trade at the policy  and technical levels; 
• Examine the initiative for electricity exports from Central Asia to South Asia, 
and describe options for its financing, institutional arrangements, and risk 
mitigation. Describe the role which this initiative could have on encouraging 
wider electricity   in the region. 
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D.  Qualifications and Required Skills 
16. The assignment should be carried out by a consulting firm with an appropriate 
experience in international electricity trading arrangements, including in the policy, 
institutional, and regulatory areas, as well as in the areas of project structuring and finance.   
E.  Working arrangements 
17. This is expected to be largely a desk study. The consultant should coordinate closely 
with the World Bank team in charge of the study. The consultant may also need to work with 
ECO Secretariat and member countries, at their discretion, to the extent needed to ensure the 
study’s relevance to the region. The consultants should get familiarized with other recent 
relevant work (such as under the USAID-financed South Asia Regional Initiative -- SARI), 
World Bank program for energy in South and Central Asia (in progress), , a World Bank 
study on electricity exports potential in central Asia, etc.  
F.  Deliverables and Schedule 
18. Deliverables include an inception report and the final report, with interim draft 
reports as outlined below.  The assignment is expected to last about 18 weeks, assuming no 
more than two weeks for each review and comment period between deliverables.  The main 
deliverables and the timeline are summarized below:  
Main Deliverable Description Due Date 
(after start of 
assignment) 
Inception Report: 
Work Plan 
Submission of detailed work plan, including 
approach and methodology; outline of the 
report; and a list of the main international 
cases to be included in the study. 
2 weeks 
Draft Final  Report Draft Final Report, covering all the issues as 
per the Terms of Reference. 
14 weeks 
Final Report Amended version of Final Draft Report 
addressing review comments. 
A Power Point presentation summarizing the 
main findings and recommendations. 
18 weeks 
19. The reports should be submitted in English language, as MS World files in format 
suitable for electronic transmission. In addition, two hard copies should also be submitted of 
all the reports. 
The consultant may be required to make a presentation of the findings to ECO member state 
officials. This decision would be made at a later stage. In case the presentation is required, an 
additional amount covering consultant’s travel expenses will be added to the contract. 
